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Abstracts 
 
This thesis, by evaluating the EU Anti-Corruption Report 2014 and its impact, analyses 
the development of EU anti-corruption as a policy field. In order to identify key factors 
that shape anti-corruption policy in Europe, it applies the theory of reflexive governance 
to anti-corruption policymaking in the EU. The approach of reflexive governance 
focuses on the new form of interaction between the EU, Member States and Candidate 
States, in particular the dialogical nature of their relationships and how they influence 
each other in building ground and incentives for the sustainable development of anti-
corruption as a policy field. The dissertation begins with an examination of the four 
stages of the development of anti-corruption as a policy field in the EU so far. 
Questions are asked about the involvement of non-state actors in anti-corruption policy 
making and to what extent Member States and Candidate States have involved non-state 
actors in shaping anti-corruption policy in the national context. The main part of the 
thesis is devoted to presenting and applying the theory of reflexive governance in 
analysing the EU Anti-Corruption Report and its impact and achievement in the UK, 
Romania and Albania. In its last part, the thesis discusses insufficiencies of the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report 2014 and offers recommendations for future EU Anti-
Corruption Reports, in particular by making proposals how the legal framework can be 
improved in relation to the protection of whistleblowers. The thesis also makes 
suggestions how the EU, Member States and Candidate States can make further use of 
reflexive governance in order to enhance their anti-corruption policies. 
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Introduction  
 
Since the fall of the iron curtain and the subsequent attempts to enlarge the 
EU towards Central and Eastern Europe, corruption has emerged as a major 
policy issue.  The EU has engaged with Member States and Candidate 
States in improving their social and economic developments that are 
affected by corruption. In its Communications on corruption in 1997 and in 
particular in 2003 the EU Commission has encouraged Member States and 
Candidate States to implement international anti-corruption measures 
promulgated by the UN, the OECD, and the Council of Europe. 
Furthermore, as part of the pre-accession process for Central and Eastern 
European states, the EU, through conditionality, supported post-communist 
countries to develop anti-corruption policy fields. This EU influenced 
development of anti-corruption policies can be characterised as a success 
because most of the Member States and Candidate States nowadays have in 
place adequate anti-corruption plans, laws and policies. However, there is 
still a lack of implementation and involvement of non-state actors in anti-
corruption policy-making.  
 
This thesis does not offer a systemic treatment of the causes of the issue of 
corruption in Europe. I has a more modest aim and focuses on the latest 
development in attempts to establish a separate policy field of anti-
corruption policy in the EU. This attempt is the EU Anti-Corruption Report. 
In my analysis, I evaluate how the EU Anti-Corruption Report supports 
Member States in supporting their own efforts to establish a comprehensive 
anti-corruption policy field and how the involvement of non-state actors in 
anti-corruption policy-making is strengthened. The theory used in this 
analysis is the reflexive governance approach and it will show how the EU, 
Member States and Candidate States can make better use of the reflexive 
governance to develop comprehensive anti-corruption policy. The argument 
of the thesis is developed in five steps and set out in five chapters. 
 
Chapter 1 presents an analysis of the evolution of EU anti-corruption law 
and policy since 1997 leading to the EU Anti-Corruption Report in 2014. It 
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divides the development into four stages. It investigates motives behind the 
first communication on the issue of corruption by the EU Commission in 
1997, in particular in relation to enlargement of the EU in order to integrate 
former socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. In the second 
stage, EU policy focuses on measures addressing corruption within EU 
institutions. The third stage is characterised by redefining the relationship 
of EU and international anti-corruption policies and I interpret the latest 
efforts as attempts in developing anti-corruption as a separate policy field in 
the EU. The last part of the chapter will pay particular attention to assessing 
the processes that surrounded the introduction of the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report.  
 
Chapter 2 introduces the EU Anti-Corruption Report and its content. It 
looks at the rationale behind the establishment of the Report as an anti-
corruption reporting mechanism. The chapter is divided into four main 
parts. The first part investigates the motives of the EU Commission to 
introduce the Report, as well as its objectives and targets. The second part 
of the chapter presents the perceptions of corruption and experience of 
corruption in the EU as portrayed in the Report. The third part of chapter 
discusses the thematic chapter in the EU Anti-Corruption Report, which the 
Report has dedicated to public procurement. The last part of the chapter 
analyses the recommendations that the EU Anti-Corruption Report has 
issued for all of the 28th Member States in 2014.  
 
Chapter 3 examines the regulatory approach of the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report and argues that it is best explained as a form of reflexive 
governance. The chapter is divided into four different parts. The first part 
explains the context of the regulatory approach of the Report, which relates 
to the emergence of new modes of governance in the EU. It involves a 
discussion of the key method of the new governance approach in the EU, 
the open method of coordination, which has considerably changed the 
regulation and methods of governance at the supranational level. The 
second part introduces the concept of reflexive governance and explains the 
transformation of new governance into reflexive governance in EU policy-
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making. The second part also explains the growing use of reflexive forms 
of governance within the EU and shows paradigms how reflexive 
governance occurs. The third part introduces the theory of reflexive law that 
provides key insights into the regulatory nature of reflexive governance. 
The fourth part applies the theory of reflexive governance to the EU Anti-
Corruption Report and proposes that the concept of regulation of self-
regulation provides the crucial insight into the governance approach of the 
EU Anti-Corruption Report. 
 
Chapter 4 presents the first findings on the achievements and impact of the 
EU Anti-Corruption Report in its first two years of operation. The insights 
are derived from three case studies on the United Kingdom, Romania and 
Albania and the chapter is accordingly divided into three main parts. The 
first part on the UK explains the recommendations that the EU Anti-
Corruption Report issued for the UK and how the UK has applied the 
recommendations into concrete policy actions. It also evaluates to what 
extent the UK is characterised by reflexive governance in developing its 
own anti-corruption policy field and the interplay with the EU in improving 
its anti-corruption policy. The second part on Romania explains the 
recommendations of the EU Anti-Corruption Report issued for Romania 
and observes how the EU approach to Romania and the anti-corruption 
policy reforms that Romania has implemented prior and after accession, 
with a particular focus on the post-accession instrument known as the 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanisms. Furthermore, the chapter 
analyses the efforts Romania has made in applying the recommendations of 
the EU Anti-Corruption Report and to what extent Romania engages in 
reflexive governance in establishing its own anti-corruption policy field. 
The third part on Albania analyses the steps Albania has taken in 
developing an anti-corruption policy field since 1990. It distinguishes three 
different phases in the establishing of anti-corruption policy after the 
downfall of the communist regime. It evaluates the support of the EU to 
encourage Albania in its efforts in establishing an anti-corruption policy 
field. Last it asks whether the interaction between the EU and Albania 
reveals forms of reflexive governance.  
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Chapter 5 summarises the results of the foregoing analysis of the EU Anti-
Corruption Report and it addresses key areas of relevance for future EU 
Anti-Corruption polices. It is divided into two main parts. The first part 
assesses achievements of the EU Anti-Corruption Report in its efforts to 
establish a comprehensive anti-corruption policy field. The second part 
offers key recommendations for the second EU Anti-Corruption Report and 
suggests areas that the EU Commission could pay closer attention in future 
Reports. Both sections offer an evaluation from the perspective of the 
theory of reflexive governance. My analysis in this chapter provides 
examples where reflexive governance occurred as a result of the 
achievements and impact that the EU Anti-Corruption Report. Furthermore, 
my analysis offers recommendations how future EU Anti-Corruption 
Reports could be strengthened by making further use of reflexive 
governance mechanisms and how reflexive governance can be helpful to 
Member States and Candidate States in developing their own anti-
corruption policies.  
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Chapter 1  
1 History of the EU Anti-Corruption Policy  
Corruption is not a new phenomenon and it is considered as one of the 
biggest challenges for all societies in the world, including European 
societies. However, it was only in the 1990s, in particular after all the fall of 
the Iron Curtain, that it first emerged as a policy problem that could no 
longer be addressed by Member States and the EU only through domestic 
means. Since the early 1990s, corruption scandals have made the headlines 
all around the world, in institutions, organisations and largely in politics. 
These chains of events have exploded the myth that corruption is a systemic 
issue and it affects all societies, especially those with a relatively new 
democracy like the Central and Eastern European states.  
The growing complication of corrupt practices presents a significant 
challenge for anti-corruption policy success and those anti-corruption 
institutions that operate in fighting corruption. In a globalised world which 
is characterised by rising flows of capital, goods, people, information and 
knowledge, corrupt practices do not only take place within national 
contexts but also across borders. 1  The EU enlargement has increased 
political and economic integration, and thus corruption can be seen as a 
cross-border problem that concerns all of the Member States, even when 
corruption occurs at local or national level. As a result, the globalisation of 
corruption can have great implications for anti-corruption policy efforts, 
which have traditionally been within the responsibility of national policy 
and law-making. Over the last two decades, efforts were attempted for 
collectively addressing the issue of corruption at international level by 
introducing international conventions against corruption, as well as at EU 
level, by developing anti-corruption as a policy field. Although the fight 
against corruption has not always been high on the EU agenda, in recent 
years the EU has taken more rigorous steps in addressing the issue of 
corruption. In accordance with Ralf Rogowski, one can distinguish four 																																																								
1 Teixeira, A., Pimenta, C., Maia, A. and J. A. Moreira (2015), Corruption, Economic 
Growth and Globalization. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 41-51.  
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phases in the development of EU anti-corruption policy as a policy field.2 
1.1 The first phase 
The EU and others in the international organisations started to address the 
issue of corruption as a policy concern during the mid-1990s in the process 
of preparation for the European Union enlargement expansion that took 
place in 2004 and 2007. 3  According to Patrycja Szarek-Mason, 
Transparency International in 1995, in its memorandum to the EU 
institutions, was the first to identify that, ‘the EU was not aware fully of its 
role in fighting corruption; rather, it leaves the issue of corruption to the EU 
Member States or to other international organisations working on 
corruption.’4  
 
The first phase can be characterised as starting in 1997 when the EU 
Commission revealed its objectives to develop a far-reaching anti-
corruption policy at EU level. The EU Commission issued its first 
Communication on the EU policy against corruption later in 1997, which is 
the first EU policy document to focus primarily on the issue of corruption.5 
The EU Commission highlighted that corruption was affecting fair 
competition in the EU and corruption challenged the principles of open and 
free markets in the EU. In particular, corruption affected the proper 
functioning of the internal market, the financial interests of the European 
Communities and international trade. Furthermore, the EU Commission, in 
its Communication on the EU policy against corruption, stated that 
corruption affected also the functioning of good governance and the rule of 
Law. 6   The EU Commission declared in 1997 that it had three main 
objectives in developing an anti-corruption policy to protect: the 																																																								
2 Rogowski, R. (2010), ALACs and the Concept of Citizen Participation in the Light of 
European Law (October 25, 2010 Warwick School of Law Research Paper No. 2010/25. 
3 Schmidt-Pfister, D and H. Moroff (2013), Fighting Corruption in Eastern Europe: A 
Multilevel Perspective, New York: Routledge, pp. 104-105.  
4 Mason-Szarek, P (2010), The European Union's Fight Against Corruption: The Evolving 
Policy Towards Member States and Candidate Countries. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 78. 
5 European Commission (1997), Communication on a comprehensive EU policy against 
corruption, COM/1997/0317 final. 
6 Csonka, P., (1997) ‘Corruption: The Europe Commission’s Approach’ in B. A. K. Rider 
(ed.), Corruption: The Enemy Within (Kluwer Law International, 1997), 343–353. 
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Community’s financial interests, officials of the Community or of the 
Member States, and the private sector. In all three areas there were legal 
instruments in place. However, as history will show, the implementation in 
the EU member states remained inadequate. 
 
The EU Commission, in its first Communication on EU policy on fighting 
corruption in 1997, also specified its first definition of corruption as ‘any 
abuse of power or impropriety in the decision making process brought 
about by some undue inducement or benefit’.7 In 1998 the European Court 
of Auditors accepted this definition. 8  However, the EU’s definition of 
corruption as the ‘abuse of power for private gain’ is very broad to include 
most forms of corruption that they are and thus it makes it hard to work 
with this definition. There were questions over how to define concepts such 
as ‘abuse of power’ or ‘private gain’. This is because it is rather difficult to 
define clearly how big the private gain should be in order to fall under the 
EU definition. In accordance with Patrycja Szarek-Mason, this ‘definition 
starts from the assumption that a concrete, formal and informal system of 
laws and norms exists which is accepted by all sides’ which is not the case.9 
The EU Commission’s definition of corruption is broad, going beyond 
current EU legislation and focusing on active or passive bribery; besides the 
narrow criminal law definition, it also embraces a socio-economic element 
aiming at corruption prevention in the context of good governance.10  
To this day, defining corruption still remains a challenging issue that 
stimulates debate on accepting a common definition. The EU, when it 
comes to refining and developing an acceptable detention by all of the 
Member States, must take into account as many voices and perspectives as 
possible. Definitions and perceptions of corruption vary across many 																																																								
7 European Commission (1997), Communication On a comprehensive EU policy against 
corruption, COM/1997/0317 final. 
8 Court of Auditors, ‘Special Report No. 8/98’, OJ C 230, 22 July 1998. 
9 Mason-Szarek, P (2010), The European Union's Fight Against Corruption: The Evolving 
Policy Towards Member States and Candidate Countries. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. p. 10. 
10 Mason-Szarek, P (2010), The European Union's Fight Against Corruption: The Evolving 
Policy Towards Member States and Candidate Countries. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. p. 11. 
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Member States, depending on their political, cultural and social traditions. 
Thus, coming to a collective definition of corruption is far from easy. Some 
would argue that it is almost impossible to measure the level of corruption 
across all of the Member States because the legal definitions, as well as the 
cultural understandings of a corrupt act, do vary significantly from one 
country to another. Therefore, the EU Commission should aim at adopting a 
concept that can embrace various definitions of corruption across societies 
in the European Union.  
After the first Communication against corruption, the EU Commission at 
the same time also recommended a range of measurements, such as the 
introduction of accounting and auditing standards, blacklisting of corrupt 
companies and banning of tax deductibility to the EU Member States.11 The 
objective of the EU Commission was at the time to formulate an EU 
strategy on corruption within its borders,12 because corruption just started to 
be viewed as a serious crime with a cross-border dimension and thus it was 
linked with other forms of serious crime, such as trafficking of human 
beings, money-laundering and the narcotic trade. 13  Furthermore, anti-
corruption policy became an issue for the EU at the time due to the 
accession process for the Central and Eastern European states that acceded 
to the EU later.  
In 1998, the European Commission’s overall report on progress towards 
accession by candidate countries states that: The fight against corruption 
needs to be strengthened further. The efforts undertaken by the candidate 
countries are not always commensurate with the gravity of the problem. 
Although a number of countries are putting in place new programs on 
control and prevention, it is too early to assess the effectiveness of such 
measures. There is a certain lack of determination to confront the issue and 
																																																								
11 Action plan to combat organized crime (Adopted by the Council on 28 April 1997 (OJ C 
131 of 15.8. 1997  
12 European Commission (1997), Communication On a comprehensive EU policy against 
corruption, COM/1997/0317 final. 
13 The Council [1] adopted the Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 
2003 on combating corruption in the private sector [2] pursuant to Title VI of the Treaty on 
European Union. 
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to root out corruption in most of the candidate countries.14 
This statement reflects the EU Commission’s own Regular Reports on each 
of the candidate country’s progress towards accession. Later, the EU 
Commission, in its conclusions of the individual country evaluations, 
considered that corruption was a serious source of concern in Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, an ongoing problem in 
Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania and an issue of concern in Estonia and 
Slovenia. These and other later assessments in 2001 concluded that, in the 
view of the EU Commission, corruption remained as a serious issue of 
concern, if not a potential barrier for EU accession.15 The EU Commission 
often did express its concern for the high levels of corruption in the EU 
Candidate States and stressed out on many occasions that making progress 
in the fight against corruption is a precondition for all Candidate States in 
order to fulfil the conditions for EU membership.  
According to Stephan Leibfried, post-communist countries in the EU are 
viewed as more vulnerable to corruption due to their inadequate 
institutional structures and their nature of transition to a functioning 
democratic state.16 Evaluating the levels of corruption in Candidate States 
has proven to be a very challenging case for the EU Commission. Not 
because corruption in Central and East European States is different to the 
corruption issues faced by Member States, but because the European Union 
lacked at the time a coherent anti-corruption policy and framework.17 Since 
the EU lacked a clear anti-corruption framework, the EU Commission did 
not establish any clear benchmarks for Candidate States in the area of 
corruption and anti-corruption policy. The absence of a clear anti-
corruption framework brought many issues to the EU.  																																																								
14  European Commission (1998), Composite Paper: Reports on Progress towards 
Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries. 4 November 1998, p. 6. 
15  Miller, W.L., Grodeland, A. B. and Y. T. Koshechkina (2001), A Culture of 
Corruption?: Coping with Government in Post-communist Europe. Budapest Central 
European University Press, p. 279. 
16 Leibfried, S. (2015),The Oxford Handbook of Transformations of the State. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, p. 607.  
17 Mason-Szarek, P (2010), The European Union's Fight Against Corruption: The Evolving 
Policy Towards Member States and Candidate Countries. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. p. 10 
	 10	
Firstly, in the absence of a clear framework for assessing the extent, causes 
and nature of corruption in CEE countries, the EU Commission had to 
evaluate corruption on a basis that tends towards criminal law. Such an 
approach neglected some key aspects of corruption-related issues in the 
CEE countries, varying from societal tolerance of corruption to more or less 
deep-rooted traditions of allocating resources on the basis of close 
networks, as was the common practice in the communist era.  
Secondly, the Copenhagen mandate allowed the EU Commission to push 
for anti-corruption policies from Candidate States, which the EU was 
unable to enforce on the old Member States. The EU Commission regularly 
pushed Candidate States to sign and ratify the Council of Europe Criminal 
Law Convention on Corruption, and by 2002 eight of the ten Candidate 
States implemented the Convention, compared to only three out of fifteen 
old Member States having adopted it. This gave rise to a perception that 
Candidate Countries were being held to different criteria from those within 
the EU.  
These factors illustrated above have made the integration of any anti-
corruption policy goal into the accession process very challenging. 
Furthermore, the main focus of accession negotiations on harmonisation 
and implementation of the acquis communautaire limited the scope for 
inclusion of anti-corruption policy. Thus, the anti-corruption acquis was 
limited and effectiveness of anti-corruption policy was beyond the scope of 
EU policy field.  
Therefore, the situation appeared that a number of Candidate States, in 
which corruption had been persistent as a serious problem, were admitted to 
the European Union. This situation was later a cause of concern for two key 
reasons. Firstly, the EU paid less attention to the issue of corruption, 
because it undermined the proper implementation of the acquis, even 
though there are cumulative signs that corruption in some Member States 
was a major threat to the functioning of democracy and the market. 
Secondly, the high level of corruption and inadequate anti-corruption 
policies in a number of Candidate States undermined the implementation of 
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the acquis and the quality of institutions. Corruption did undermine some 
fundamental values to which the European Union subscribes and presented 
the EU Commission with additional challenges to establishing effective 
instruments and mechanisms that would promote more effective anti-
corruption policy in all the Member States.  
1.2 The second phase 
 
The second phase can be characterised with internal problems that the EU 
institutions faced in 1999 when the Santer Commission had to resign over 
serious allegations of corruption. The collapse of the Santer Commission 
exposed the necessity to implement effective measurements for the 
protection of the European Public Administration’s integrity.18 In response 
to the collapse of the Santer Commission, the UCLAF at the time (Unité de 
Coordination de La Lutte Anti-Fraude) an anti-fraud unit, whose 
responsibility was to investigate corruption in the EU institutions was then 
replaced by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF19  
 
OLAF is an independent administrative body entrusted with powers to 
investigate cases related to fraud and corruption, as well as other illegal 
activity affecting the Community budget. The mission of OLAF was set up 
to protect the financial interests of the EU in fighting corruption and any 
other illegal activities, as well as to protect the reputation of the European 
Institutions. Furthermore, OLAF was entrusted with power to investigate 
any misconduct of the EU institutions personnel that might result in 
disciplinary or criminal proceedings. OLAF also supported the EU 
Commission in developing and implementing anti-corruption policy. The 
objective for establishing OLAF was to create an institution that is more 
effective and has more independence than its predecessor UCLAF.  
 
As a result the EU Commission, during the second phase, started a process 
of developing a broad good governance framework, in particular with the 																																																								
18 Council of Europe (2001), Anti-Corruption Measures. pp. 17 
19 European Commission (1999), Decision of 28 April 1999 Establishing the European 
Anti-Fraud Office. (OLAF), OJ L 13620, 31.5.1999. 
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publication of the White Paper on European Governance in 2001.20 The 
White Paper set out a strategy for the reform of the EU Commission, based 
on principles of accountability, independence and transparency. 21  The 
reforms included the establishment of a new internal audit service, 
improving public access to documents of the European Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission, as well as revising the EU career system, 
enhancing and fraud prevention legislations.22  
 
The White Paper also supported the development of a Code of Conduct for 
Members of the European Parliament and laid the basis for a code for the 
EU Commission officials. In light of the collapse of the Santer 
Commission, stories circulating in early 2002 of another report by the same 
whistleblower for ongoing misconducts at the level of the Commission.23 
The Santer Commission resignation in late 2002 and the suspension of the 
Commission’s former chief accountant, marked the start of good 
governance regime and the start of where the EU Commission had the 
capacity to translate concerns about corruption into concrete anti-corruption 
action.24 
 
Furthermore, the EU Commission at this time undertook numerous 
important initiatives to promote accountability and transparency within the 
EU institutions more seriously. It implemented a series of measurements 
that were aimed at improving integrity among its staff, which included the 
adoption of codes of conduct for EU Commissioners and the commission 
staff,25 and a decision setting rules for the Commission staff on how to 
																																																								
20 European Commission (2001), White Paper on European Governance, COM (2001) 428 
final. pp. 7-11.  
21 European Commission (2001), White Paper on European Governance, COM (2001) 428 
final. pp. 7-11. 
22 Wakefield, J. (2007), The Right to Good Governance. Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International, pp. 31-33.  
23 Vandekerckhove, W. (2006), Whistleblowing and Organizational Social Responsibility: 
A Global Assessment. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 273 – 274.  
24  Thüsing, G. and G. Forst (2016), Whistleblowing - A Comparative Study. London: 
Springer, p. 341. 
25  Mason-Szarek, P. (2010), The European Union's Fight Against Corruption: The 
Evolving Policy Towards Member States and Candidate Countries. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. p. 72. 
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report serious wrongdoings also related to corruption. 26  The EU 
Commission also acknowledged at this time that transparency is a 
significant element to prevent corruption and fraud, and as a result27 the 
European Transparency Initiative was then launched, aiming at inspiring a 
dialogue on areas where transparency at the EU level appeared to be 
necessary for further improvement.28 Examples include the publication of 
data about beneficiaries of EU funds, regulation of lobbying, strengthening 
the ethics in the EU institutions, and adjusting the regulation of access to 
documents at the EU level.29  
 
Further efforts were also taken by the Council of Europe in developing 
twenty Guiding Principles30  to fight corruption at European level more 
successfully. The twenty Guiding Principles supported the national anti-
corruption policy, as they regulate nearly all areas of public administration 
that relate to preventing and fighting corruption within a public 
administration. The twenty Guiding Principles not only supported countries 
to prevent corruption, but also to develop a wide range of precautionary 
measurements. For example, this included raising public awareness, ethical 
behaviour, independence of the judiciary and prosecution, restrictions of 
immunity for public officials, specialisation of individuals and institutions 
in fighting corruption, as well as supporting more codes of conduct for 
public officials and adequate auditing procedures for public administration, 
supervision of financing of political parties and freedom of media.31 
These twenty Guiding Principles are a form of soft law measurements. 
They are not legally binding and national governments are only encouraged 																																																								
26 European Commission (2003), Communication on Comprehensive EU Policy Against 
Corruption’, COM(2003) 317 final. 
27  Mason-Szarek, P. (2010), The European Union's Fight Against Corruption: The 
Evolving Policy Towards Member States and Candidate Countries. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. p. 84. 
28 European Commission (2006), Green Paper on European Transparency Initiative, COM 
(2006) 194 final.  
29 European Commission (2006), Protection of the Communities’ financial interests – Fight 
against fraud – Annual report 2005, COM(2006) 378 final.  
30 Council of Europe (1997), ‘Resolution (97) 24 on the twenty Guiding Principles for the 
Fight Against corruption’ (1997 
31 Eckes, C. and T. Konstadinides (2011), Crime within the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice: A European Public Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 48. 
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to implement these Principles when drafting their national anti-corruption 
policy. However, the non-binding nature has not diminished their 
achievement to encourage adequate anti-corruption policies. In order to 
monitor the performance of the twenty Guiding Principles, the Council of 
Europe developed an evaluation process at EU level in the form of the 
Group of States Against corruption (GRECO).  
GRECO monitors states' compliance with the organisation's anti-corruption 
standards and it is an important institution in the fight against corruption 
within and outside the EU. GRECO’s main objective is to improve its 
members' capacity to fight corruption more successfully by using the 
Council of Europe anti-corruption compliance-monitoring instruments 
through a process of mutual evaluation and peer pressure. 32 According to 
the Open Society Institute, GRECO reports are the closest instrument to 
analyse corruption, based on reliable standards, producing evaluations that 
can be used on a proportional basis in the area of anti-corruption policy.33  
 
GRECO also evaluates compliance with the Council of Europe anti-
corruption conventions, the Criminal Law convention on corruption 
(Criminal Law convention)34 and the Civil Law convention on corruption 
(Civil Law convention 35  The Criminal Law convention focuses on the 
criminalisation of active and passive bribery of public officials, thus also 
involving national and foreign officials, officials of international 
organisations and members of national and foreign public legislatures.36It 
not only included corruption and bribery, but also undue influence, which is 
another form of corruption, whereby benefit is given to anyone who asserts 
																																																								
32  Mason-Szarek, P. (2010), The European Union's Fight Against Corruption: The 
Evolving Policy Towards Member States and Candidate Countries. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. p. 37. 
33 Schmidt-Pfister, D and H. Moroff (2013), Fighting Corruption in Eastern Europe: A 
Multilevel Perspective, New York: Routledge, pp. 104-105. 
34 Boister, N. and J.C. Robert (2015), Routledge Handbook of Transnational Criminal 
Law. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 79-80.  
35  Mason-Szarek, P. (2010), The European Union's Fight Against Corruption: The 
Evolving Policy Towards Member States and Candidate Countries. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. p. 254. 
36 Bantekas, I. and S. Nash (2007), International Criminal Law. London and New York: 
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influence over a public official or entity.37 Furthermore, the Criminal Law 
convention guaranteed protection for informants cooperating with 
investigating and prosecuting authorities, 38  and ensured that the 
administrative parties assured the independence of anti-corruption 
institutions. Similar to the OECD convention, these convention goals are to 
support international cooperation in extradition cases of corruption.  
In addition to the above measurements, the EU also implemented a number 
of anti-corruption instruments, in particular conventions on protection of 
the Community financial interests. However, as of mid-2002, none of these 
conventions were ratified by the Member States. Thus, the EU anti-
corruption framework remained mainly non-binding and inadequate. There 
are two possible reasons for this.  
Firstly, the level and nature of corruption appeared to differ widely across 
the Member States, reflecting different national traditions and historical 
backgrounds. An example is that there is a clear difference between the 
bureaucratic traditions of integrity and probity characteristic of the 
Northern EU Member States on the one hand, and the more informal style 
of public service characteristics of South and Eastern European Member 
States. These differences can be observed in numerous examples. The most 
prominent example is the departure of Eva Joly, the judge in charge of the 
investigation into the Elf Aquitaine affair in France.39 The scandals that 
surrounded the former French President Jacques Chirac40 or the former 
Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, 41  highlighted the fact that 
corruption was not only a problem for Candidate States. Secondly, the EU 
Commission during the second phase did see corruption as a concern to 
implement EU policy, but it was rather left for the competence of Member 																																																								
37 Bantekas, I. and S. Nash (2007), International Criminal Law. London and New York: 
Routledge, pp. 282. 
38 Boister, N. and J.C. Robert (2015), Routledge Handbook of Transnational Criminal 
Law. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 79-80. 
39  Transparency International (2007), Global Corruption Report 2007: Corruption in 
Judicial Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 84 – 88.  
40 Henley, J. (2013), Gigantic sleaze scandal winds up as former Elf oil chiefs are jailed. 
The Guardian, 13th November 2013 [Online], Retrieved from; 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2003/nov/13/france.oilandpetrol   
41 Tänzle, D., Giannakopoulos, A., and K. Maras (2012), The Social Construction of 
Corruption in Europe. Surrey: Ashgate, p. 134.  
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States. Also, the Commission’s inner problems with the collapse of the 
Santer Commission made it hard at the time to push Member States for 
reforms in addressing the issue of corruption in terms of policy.  
For these reasons as shown above, there was a contradictory situation in the 
EU. On the one hand, the EU started to embark on a number of important 
steps to implement good governance practices at the EU administration 
level; on the other hand, efforts to support common anti-corruption 
standards and policies across existing Member States were challenging for 
the EU because of its own internal issues concerning corruption. This was 
despite the fact the EU, through the Copenhagen mandate, had sufficient 
power and credibility to exercise leverage over the Candidate States to 
implement a number of anti-corruption measurements.  
The Copenhagen Council did per se clearly mention corruption as an 
accession criterion in the Candidate States, but the concern was included in 
the Regular Reports with an individual chapter in the section on political 
standards (democracy and rule of law), which highlights it as institutional 
issues (the executive, judiciary, and parliament Corruption was generally 
understood as a significant issue for the public administrations in the 
Central and Eastern European states because of their socialist legacy.42 
Thus, the monitoring of corruption cut across different chapters for some 
Candidate States such as Customs Union, External Policies, Industrial 
Policy and foremost for every states the negotiation chapter 24: 
Cooperation in the Field of Justice and Home Affairs.43 
Furthermore, the EU Commission went further in interpreting these 
arrangements into more tangible benchmarks and standards. The most 
concrete effort was the Annex to the Commission’s 2003 Communication 
on a Comprehensive Policy on Corruption. In contrast to the reluctant tone 
that the text takes on the necessity for key measurements concerning 																																																								
42 Kajsiu, B (2015), A Discourse Analysis of Corruption. Instituting Neoliberalism Against 
Corruption in Albania, 1998-2005, London and New York: Routledge, p. 83. 
43  Vermeulen, G. and W.D. Bondt (2014), EU Justice and Home Affairs: 
Institutional and policy development. Antwerpen and Apeldoom; Marklu Publishers, pp. 
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corruption in the EU member states, it also brings a concise checklist on the 
desired policies to be implemented in the EU candidate states. The 
recommended measurements went beyond criminal offences by 
encouraging more a change of culture in understanding corruption. 44 Some 
of the ‘Ten Principles for Improving the fight against Corruption in 
acceding, candidate and other third Countries’ 45 went so far as its actual 
competences. For example, the call for clear rules on whistleblowing, the 
promotion of public intolerance of corruption by awareness-raising 
campaigns in the media and the need to developing transparent rules on 
party financing, and external financial control of political parties are 
examples that it went beyond its actual competences.  46 At this point, it was 
clear that the EU was moving towards another phase of its development of 
anti-corruption as a policy field and these developments marked the start of 
the third phase in the EU.  
1.3 The third phase 
The third phase can be characterised as having started in the beginning of 
the new millennium, as the fight against corruption gained further 
momentum at international level and the EU adopted important 
international instruments. 47  These include the adoption of OECD 
Convention on combating bribery of foreign public officials in international 
business transactions48 and the UN Convention against corruption.49 The 
shift of attitudes in the EU to support international initiatives such as the 
United Nations and the OECD, and suggesting its Member States to ratify 
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them,50 according to Ralf Rogowski indicated that the EU at this point gave 
up in perusing their own policy in addressing corruption, but rather adopted 
international measurements.51 The EU saw its role during the third phase to 
support international efforts against corruption and become a global player 
in policymaking.   
 
The EU’s objective to fight corruption was further confirmed in 2003 in the 
Second EU Commission Communication on a Comprehensive EU Policy 
against Corruption. 52  The EU Commission’s understanding of 
‘comprehensive’ policy meant reducing corruption at all levels in a 
coherent way within the EU institutions and in the EU Member States.53 In 
the evaluation of Transparency International, the Second Communication 
was seen as a real game changer. 54  The context of the Second 
Communication included a number of more explicit policy 
recommendations for the EU Member States to undertake in comparison to 
the first Communication in 1997. 55  For example, establishing specialised 
anti-corruption agencies to fight corruption and guarantee the independence 
of specialised anti-corruption authorities. Also, the introduction of rules and 
codes of conduct that were aimed at preventing conflicts of interest for 
public authorities whose activities are subject to private-sector interests, 
ensuring freedom of the media, and freedom of information. 56 
Furthermore, the EU Commission developed the concept of corruption at 
EU level in 2003 and defined it as an abuse of power for private gain.57 																																																								
50Schmidt-Pfister, D and H. Moroff (2013), Fighting Corruption in Eastern Europe: A 
Multilevel Perspective, New York: Routledge, pp. 104-105. 
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Thus, the EU in 2003 also embraced both the public and private sectors 
with this definition.  
 
In defining corruption for the purposes of EU policy, the EU Commission 
defined a distinction between a narrow criminal law definition and a 
broader notion of corruption used for purposes of preventive policy.58 The 
distinction between the criminal law definition and the broader concept of 
corruption adopted for the purposes of preventing it is important. This is 
because criminal law definitions constitute a basis for prosecuting offenders 
and thus must be unambiguous and specific. The clarity of definition is 
preserved against the discretionary power of public authorities. As a result, 
EU criminal law recognises only discrete corrupt practices, such as taking 
or offering bribes, and fails to cover the full range of corrupt activities.59 
Bribery is simply one type of corruption, there are many others, such as 
buying votes, favouritism, nepotism, trading in influence and illegal 
political party financing.60 
 
As highlighted above, the EU Commission’s anti-corruption policy changed 
during the pre-accession stage because of different events in the EU; in 
particular, the high level of corruption in the Central and Eastern European 
states. The policy first changed because new legal instruments were 
adopted at international level. Secondly, in parallel to the incremental 
changes of the Copenhagen criteria in which the EU Commission 
established specific criteria for the Candidate States, the EU Commission 
learnt to also address similar issues towards the Member States. From 2003, 
the EU Commission started to encourage Member States to join GRECO 
and other international agreements. 
This shift of attitudes by the EU Commission showed that the EU policy 
against corruption developed further in preparation for the 2004 																																																								
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enlargement. The Candidate States were under strong political pressure to 
comply with the EU Commission’s recommendations set out in the Regular 
Reports and the EU had legal leverage to push for anti-corruption reforms 
in the countries that acceded to the European Union in 2004.  
The instruments established in the enlargement policy did not have a more 
decisive impact in this context, but rather proposed a platform for 
improvement in policy against corruption. Furthermore, to the inclusion of 
corruption as a serious crime into a number of instruments of criminal law, 
such as the European Arrest Warrant and money laundering, the most 
related development was the increased cooperation between different 
Directorate Generals inner the Commission.  
The Communication also highlighted the exceptional role of GRECO, as in 
a new section it went further than the narrow focus on criminal law, or in 
the words of a Commission official ‘we will be looking at - I guess the 
jargon is ‘mainstreaming’—and mainstreaming, thinking about corruption 
in a whole lot of other areas’.61 An example of this is the checklist annexed 
to the 2003 Communication that highlighted the specific standards of 
evaluating a state’s legal and implantation apparatus. According to official 
form Commission; “It is a handy checklist for our colleagues, particularly 
in the external relations area, in the area of development aid . . . these are 
the areas, they will never be specialist on corruption, but if they have a 
quick checklist of what are the things that are signals that things are going 
well, or that things are potentially going to go badly” 62.  
Following along such lines, the connections between different services in 
the EU Commission were reinforced and strengthened over the last few 
years for the purpose of improving the consistency in consensual 
agreements between the EU, Candidate, and Potential Candidate states. 
Furthermore, the Council raised awareness of anti-corruption regulations in 																																																								
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the EU’s external relations and supported the EU Commission’s external 
competences by making the fight against corruption one of the key 
objectives of the European Neighbourhood Policy.63 
In the same approach for future enlargements, certain changes were 
introduced and thus opened up a new set of conditionality, such was the 
case for Bulgaria and Romania. On the one hand, the ratification of the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
(UNTOC) and United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) by 
most EU Member States meant that these conventions were also considered 
in the monitoring process of Candidate States. On the other hand, anti-
corruption moved from chapter 24 to the new chapter 23 of the European 
Neighbourhood acquise, which placed the judiciary, and fighting against 
corruption and organized crime higher on the agenda. This shift of priorities 
significantly reinforced the leverage on anti-corruption policy also in the 
current structure for EU policy in Candidate and Potential Candidate 
states.64 
Although the Commission in its enlargement policy strengthened anti-
corruption policy, competences in addressing anti-corruption policy in the 
Member States were still limited. The only significant transformation at this 
time was that the Commission started to make improvements in 
approaching crime throughout the development of comparable statistics. 
Not least it started to collect a comparable and inclusive summary on all EU 
Member States within the boundaries of its competences at the time. Also, 
the EU Commission went beyond its statistics on corruption, by also using 
the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, thus engaging 
with civil society in identifying corruption in the EU member states. This 
progress of the EU Commission to use these comparable statistical data was 
an effort to regulate the EU’s low awareness about corruption in the 
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Member States.65  
According to an EU official, data statistics were used to reduce the gap of 
‘how much we watch and know in the member states as opposed to the 
countries that are acceding. This will help ourselves and the member states 
to be actually a bit clearer on what is going on across a whole range of 
crime areas, not just corruption’.66 As highlighted in the Council’s draft 
document European Policy Needs for Data on Crime and Criminal Justice; 
State of Play, the Commission’s initiatives on producing comparative 
statistics were met by constant disagreement between Member States. The 
limited support for relying on soft law underlined the argument that, in 
contrast to other policy areas such as administrative cooperation and 
collaboration, the EU Member States were clearly reluctant to build up a 
unified framework in the area of anti-corruption policy. These challenges 
undermined also the influence of Commission initiatives in areas such as 
comparative statistics, which also as a result lacked the efficiency for as 
long as the Member States do not comply with it.67 
EU anti-corruption as a policy field up to this point was characterised 
largely by fragmentation and the lack of a strategic vision on how to fight 
corruption collectively. Though the Regular Reports on the Central and 
Eastern Europe States did offer an adequate set of anti-corruption standards, 
these countries failed to apply them consistently. The biggest weakness of 
EU policy was the fact that it ended on the day of accession of the CEE 
countries to the EU, which was in May 2004.68 Although the problems with 
corruption remained serious in these countries, the EU lost its influence to 
drive reforms in the CEE countries at that point. Even so, the EU accession 
process had a significant impact on the legal and institutional framework 																																																								
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that was heavily involved in addressing corruption. The pressure by the EU 
Commission led to major legislative changes, in particular in the areas of 
public procurement legislation, criminal and civil procedure, anti-
corruption legislation, and civil service legal frameworks. The EU approach 
in the area of application of criminal law led also to major changes in 
Candidate States. For example, it improved the coordination between law 
enforcement agencies, education of law enforcement officials and EU-
assisted reform of the judiciary. The progress accomplished in the Czech 
Republic in improving the effectiveness of enforcement agencies and the 
courts in fighting corruption was possible due to EU assistance.69  
However, EU assistance was not as successful as in the case of the Czech 
Republic in the cases of Poland and Romania in particular. 70 The influence 
of the EU Commission in developing anti-corruption policy in the 
Candidate States was rather limited and fairly inadequate for a number of 
reasons at the time. Firstly, as shown above, the EU itself lacked a generally 
based anti-corruption framework. Secondly, the successes of EU 
Commission in encouraging on a regular basis Candidate States and 
Member States was limited because Governments had not always shown 
the will to implement the anti-corruption initiatives that the EU was 
pushing. Nevertheless, this might be possibly inevitable in the area of anti-
corruption policy, because the EU Commission clearly did not to want to 
risk facing an open battle with corrupt Governments in some cases. 71 
Thirdly, in a number of policy areas, the EU standards that existed at the 
time were mainly focused on preventing corruption. An example was the 
objective of the EU Commission directives on public procurement to 
support a single market in procurement, and the anti-corruption effects of 
procurement legislation are secondary.72 On a similar note, the pressure 																																																								
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applied by the EU Commission on Candidate States to carry out civil 
service reforms is not inspired mainly by a will to fight corruption, but by 
the need to enhance a specialised public administration that is capable of 
implementing the full Copenhagen acquis.  
In itself, the EU Commission directives border context is a good objective, 
because corruption is not the most important problem facing public 
administrations in the EU and this fact was taken seriously when designing 
reforms. However, this highlighted the importance of understanding the 
positive aspects of these reforms for Candidate States, rather than looking at 
it as a demand by the EU. As a result, the EU came to the conclusion that 
the best way to fight corruption was not always to address corruption 
specifically in a policy context, but to pursue other primary policy objects 
whose fulfilments prevent corruption as a side effect.73 
However, the EU Commission methods in practice, when supporting 
Candidate States for developing their own anti-corruption policy, have not 
always been as organised in PHARE projects related to anti-corruption 
policy that are established on an ad hoc basis, frequently relying on 
consultancy contracts with private firms.  There is no centralised pool of 
resources and official EU expertise, nor any system of twinning or 
secondment organised on a regular and strategic basis at this time for the 
Candidate States.74 
In summary, the approach of the EU Commission to address corruption in 
the CEE States was not always effective in supporting them to develop a 
successful anti-corruption policy that addressed the actual problems that 
exist with corruption. Also, it was not made sufficiently clear to the CEE 
States what key benchmarks they must meet or were supposed to achieve in 
terms of anti-corruption policy in order to directly satisfy the accession 
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criteria set in the Copenhagen acquis.75 
The CEE states accession wave heightened concerns that the EU itself 
lacked a coherent anti-corruption policy. The policy at the time was limited 
to conventions that were general and were not ratified by a number of 
Member States.76 The mandate of the EU Commission to address the issues 
of corruption in the CEE States was rather weak and the EU Commission 
did not have a mandate to impose anti-corruption reforms on existing 
Member States. Although the Copenhagen acquis expired once Candidates 
joined the European Union, the fact is that the issue of corruption remained 
a serious issue for concern in most of the CEE States that joined the EU in 
2004. Such a position left the EU to assess its own efforts and to focus 
attention on tackling corruption through clarified benchmarks and 
strengthening its monitoring mechanisms for the future Candidate 
countries. The acknowledgment of such shortcomings to address corruption 
by the EU made the Commission change strategy during the accession of 
Bulgaria and Romania. 77 The anti-corruption strategy used for the CEE 
countries that acceded the EU in 2004 was no longer deemed to be adequate 
and clearly lacked sufficient anti-corruption standards in addressing the 
high levels of corruption in Bulgaria and Romania.78 As a result of this 
reflection and understanding, on 13th December 2006 the Commission 
adopted a decision on the basis of Articles 37 and 38 of the Treaty of 
Accession, in which it established the Co-operation and Verification 
Mechanism for Bulgaria79 and Romania.80 This was the first time that such 
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a monitoring mechanism was used in post-accession in the history of EU 
policies. The establishment of the CVM opened up a second generation of 
conditionality and it marked the beginning of the fourth phase of the EU 
anti-corruption policy as a policy field.81  
1.4 Fourth phase 
 
The EU enlargement in 2004 made the EU Commission go beyond its 
single market objectives and focus also on promoting the proper 
functioning of democracy and the rule of law. The fight against corruption 
was understood at this time as a key objective to enhance the rule of law 
and democracy, but less significant than the economic and administrative 
adjustments that guaranteed the proper functioning of the single market 
after the accession of the CEE states to the European Union. After the 
accession of the CEE states in 2004, corruption was acknowledged by the 
EU Commission as a serious problem and the EU wanted to avoid a similar 
mistake made with the CEE states in the case of Bulgaria and Romania. As 
a result, the EU decided to reinforce its EU enlargement policy towards 
Bulgaria and Romania. 82 
 
The Treaty of Accession with CEE states implemented three specific 
safeguard clauses in relation to the economy, the internal market and the 
area of JHA, which can be enforced for three years after accession and thus 
it ended in 2007. Thus, any new or old EU Member State had leverage to 
invoke an economic clause in case of any serious economic crises as a 
result from accession.83 The internal market clause could be invoked when 
a new Member State created or risked causing a serious violation of the 
functioning of the internal market. The EU Commission can then take some 																																																																																																																																																																												
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measurements, for example excluding States from benefiting from specific 
internal market legislation. Also, the JHA safeguarding measurements 
allowed the old Member States to have power to reject any application of 
judgments and arrest warrants from the CEE states in case of forthcoming 
risks in the implementation and application of the acquis that concerned the 
mutual recognition in civil and criminal cases.84 
 
The widespread corruption was seen as potentially damaging the 
appropriate implementation of the acquis in the CEE states and thus could 
also have a damaging effect in the independence and impartiality of the 
justice system, which is a key prerequisite for the implementation of the 
principle of mutual recognition. One could argue that it would appear that 
the high levels of corruption in the CEE states would potentially activate 
the application of the JHA clause. All the same, this was not the case in the 
end and the JHA clause was unlikely to be used to punish the CEE states 
concerning their anti-corruption strategies and policies also in the case of 
Bulgaria and Romania. As highlighted above, the safeguard clauses were an 
emergency break instrument for possibly invoking them, but in the end it 
was never used. 
Thus, the EU saw an alternative in the case of accession of Bulgaria and 
Romania in January 2007. Both states applied for EU membership in 1995 
and until 2005 were subject to the same EU accession policy as the CEE 
states that joined the EU in 2004. However, in 2005, when the Treaty of 
Accession with Bulgaria and Romania was signed, one could observe a 
shift in the EU Commission’s strategy and corruption as a central theme 
and issue for both states. The EU Commission started to monitor Bulgaria 
and Romania more strongly than the 2004 entrants. This is because it also 
involved some more practical reasons for this change of policy. Firstly, it 
was easier to monitor only two countries and the issue of corruption was 
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more widespread in the public administration in Bulgaria and Romania.85 
There were also other reasons that led to a more different approach by the 
EU Commission in Bulgaria and Romania, mainly because of the political 
climate within the EU. The refusal of the Constitutional Treaty in the Dutch 
and French referendums showed a public disapproval of various aspects of 
EU policy, including that of EU enlargement policy. In a more difficult 
political climate, the EU Commission was under pressure to show a 
stronger approach that there was a tougher commitment to address 
corruption in Bulgaria and Romania more thoroughly in comparison to the 
CEE states in 2004. Furthermore, the EU also learned from the previous EU 
enlargement and acknowledged that it is essential to implement effective 
monitoring instruments to ensure that the implementation of anti-corruption 
policy is effective and can have an impact.86 As a consequence, the EU 
policy towards Bulgaria and Romania was reinforced in two ways. Firstly, 
by introducing a sanction option of postponing accession; secondly, by 
introducing the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism to monitor 
progress in the area of anti-corruption after the accession process was 
finished in Bulgaria and Romania.87 
 
The different policy approach of the EU towards Bulgaria and Romania 
was not the result of different governance standards, but was more a matter 
of political will of their governments to tackle the issues concerning 
corruption more effectively. In Adam Łazowski’s account, the 
postponement clause was a ‘stick to discipline the forthcoming Member 
States in their last minute pre-accession efforts’.88 
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In addition to the postponement clause, Bulgaria and Romania were also 
presented with a list of specific anti-corruption commitments to be followed 
after the accession negotiations were concluded. In the 2004 enlargement, 
only Poland was presented with one special recommendation to introduce 
the liability of legal persons for corruption. By contrast, the list issued 
towards Bulgaria and Romania showed that the EU Commission took a 
tougher policy stance towards addressing corruption in the 2007 
enlargement. The EU acknowledged the risks involving corruption, but still 
on political grounds decided not to postpone the accession of Bulgaria and 
Romania. This was even though the two countries did not complete the EU 
membership criteria. According to Noutcheva, the EU fell into ‘its own trap 
and there was no easy way out’.89 The EU could not postpone the accession 
of Bulgaria and Romania on the one hand without losing its integrity and 
credibility; on the other hand, the accession of Bulgaria and Romania with 
high levels of corruption and inadequate frameworks to fight organised 
crime was going to have a severe effect in the functioning of the EU.90 
 
Thus, the EU opted for a solution to establish a post-accession monitoring 
system, which no previous EU Member State had ever faced before. As a 
result, Bulgaria and Romania were allowed to join the EU under the 
condition that they had to meet certain anti-corruption benchmarks after 
their accession into the European Union. Benchmarking is definite as a 
system that targets at comparing in a structured approach organisational 
procedures and performances with the aim of improving these procedures, 
and subsequently forming new and higher standards.91 It was used in the 
pre-accession process mainly. Nevertheless, the anti-corruption benchmarks 
were ambiguous and not systematically implemented throughout the EU 
candidate states. The new monitoring mechanism gave the EU Commission 																																																								
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some leverage to maintain pressure on Bulgaria and Romania in 
establishing effective anti-corruption reforms. It was observed that the EU 
acted on the notion that it might be better to work with Bulgaria and 
Romania once they are inside the EU, rather than to try to push for reforms 
from outside of the EU and lose the EU enlargement momentum.92  
 
This new approach by the EU did not only extend the application of pre-
accession monitoring instruments, but also improved the EU enlargement 
policy. As shown above, the greatest shortcomings of the EU policy 
towards the CEE states was that it lacked coherent and clear anti-corruption 
benchmarks. In December 2006, the EU Commission implemented a 
decision on the basis of Articles 37 and 38 of the Treaty of Accession to 
establish the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism to evaluate and 
monitor the progress in implementing benchmarks in the area of judicial 
reform and the fight against corruption in Bulgaria and Romania. Articles 
37 and 38 of the Treaty of Accession included similar internal markets and 
JHA safeguarding measurements as the ones used for the 2004 
enlargement. If Bulgaria and Romania failed to implement these 
benchmarks, the EU Commission had the power to apply these 
safeguarding measurements. The main difference with the previous round 
of enlargement was that the insufficient efforts to fight corruption could 
lead to the postponement of other EU Member States’ duty to recognise 
rulings and execute warrants issued by Bulgaria and Romania's courts, and 
prosecutors could fail under the principle of mutual recognition. The 
safeguarding measurements gave the EU Commission the power to invoke 
up to three years after their accession.93 
 
The benchmarks designed for Bulgaria and Romania form the EU 
Commission in context supported for fundamental reforms. These 
benchmarks suggest that both Bulgaria and Romania fulfilled the principal 
membership condition of having an independent and effective judicial 																																																								
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system, which is central for implementation of the acquis. Bulgaria and 
Romania were required to submit reports on their progress in meeting these 
benchmarks by the end of March of each year. The EU Commission, also 
on the basis of the national reports and its own findings, issued its own 
report every six months, which was also communicated to the European 
Parliament and the Council. 
 
The monitoring instrument under the Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism, as a post-accession monitoring system, is very different from 
the pre-accession strategy. It contains meeting specific policy goals for 
Bulgaria and Romania on the basis of setting up specific anti-corruption 
benchmarks, periodical monitoring of compliance with the benchmarks 
using independent sources of information and providing the financial and 
technical assistance to support anti-corruption reforms. This procedure of 
benchmarking is similar to the Council of Europe’s GRECO evaluations of 
the Twenty Guiding Principles against Corruption. However, the CVM 
reports cover more detailed evaluations than any other pre-accession 
instruments. It shows that the EU understood that the anti-corruption policy 
established for the purpose of the 2004 enlargement policy was inadequate 
and insufficient.94 
 
The EU, by establishing the CVM, clearly responded to the problematic 
issue of corruption in Bulgaria and Romania and took it more seriously than 
in the previous round of enlargement. The EU policy against corruption 
also became more systematic, not only because new Member States were 
asked to achieve better anti-corruption policy actions, but also the EU 
developed clearer and more coherent anti-corruption guidelines. It is 
observed that the imposition of this monitoring system can be interpreted as 
an admission that the accession process has failed to ensure they meet EU 
standards. 95  The former Romanian justice minister, Monica Macovei, 
endorsed the CVM as a post-accession monitoring instrument, because she 																																																								
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believed that the reforms of the judiciary and the fight against corruption 
must continue even after Romania joined the EU.96 
 
However, some argue that the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism has 
not always been as effective. The monitoring procedures were criticised by 
France, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, which all stated 
that the EU Commission was not taking the work seriously enough. The 
former EU Commissioner Frattini, who was in charge of assessing the 
progress of Bulgaria and Romania, was accused of getting too close to the 
governments he was supposed to be inspecting, which included going on a 
skiing trip with the Bulgarian interior minister. In the Economist’s 
observation, there was a shared view that Bulgaria and Romania joined the 
EU too soon and, since they joined the EU, they have sided away from 
implementing crucial reforms since accession.97 
 
The post-accession monitoring instrument is more comprehensive, given 
that the effectiveness of the CVM depended largely on the application of 
sanctions, which was limited for political motives. Most of the efforts 
undertaken by Bulgaria and Romania since the accession were superficial, 
and the EU Commission did not propose to invoke the safeguarding clauses 
given by the Treaty of Accession. The EU Commission believed that 
sanctions were not deemed necessary and appropriate at that point; it stated 
that safeguards are not punitive measurements to take in case of non-
delivery – but are measurements of last resort in order to safeguard the 
welfare and interests of the European Union.98 
 
The context of the CVM reports was subject to political pressure from the 
EU Commission. The Commissioner responsible for JHA at the time, Mr 
Frattini, recommended introducing modifications to the context of the CVM 																																																								
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reports, stating that ‘critical remarks are too strong and should be toned 
down. Under pressure from Bulgaria and Romania Commissioners, the 
words ‘no room for complacency’ in pursuing reforms and fighting 
corruption were changed into a more diplomatic format that ‘there is need 
to step up efforts’. Franco Frattini defended this amendment by saying that 
it was important to choose ‘appropriate language’.99 
 
It appears that the CVM as a mechanism relied more on peer pressure rather 
than the threat of using the safeguarding clauses. One can argue that any 
forms of pressure for reform might have been more effective if used before 
accession, when the EU influence over the national policies of Bulgaria and 
Romania was much stronger. However, the monitoring instrument was 
designed to keep the political pressure up. The EU Commission came under 
some pressure from Member States, which insisted on taking more serious 
steps towards Bulgaria and Romania. A Dutch EU affairs minister at the 
time asked the EU Commission in June 2009 to activate the clauses if the 
progress in judicial reform turned out to be inadequate again. Furthermore, 
a group of Member States, including the United Kingdom, France and the 
Netherlands in 2008, asked for the postponement of Bulgaria’s and 
Romania’s participation in Schengen due to their insufficient anti-
corruption reforms.100 
 
In summary, the CVM offers only a provisional ground to push Bulgaria 
and Romania for anti-corruption Reform, but it did not solve the problem in 
the long term. The EU decided to establish the CVM in acknowledgment 
that its structure was not able to offer a sufficient solution in the long term 
and a better solution would be to establish an anti-corruption instrument 
that evaluated all Member States on an equal basis, which would remove 
the disagreement of applying double criteria within Member States. The 
2004 and 2007 enlargements presented a number of lessons, which are now 																																																								
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being integrated into the pre-accession strategy towards the current 
Candidate States. In any future enlargement, the timescale for accession is 
likely to be longer and more rigorous in addressing anti-corruption 
shortcomings, as the case study for Albania will show in Chapter 4.  
 
The EU anti-corruption policy, as a policy field, developed further in 2010 
with the establishment of the Stockholm Programme, which sets out key 
priorities for the EU in the areas of justice, freedom and security for the 
period 2010-14. It aimed at addressing key challenges in the areas of 
justice, freedom and security and it also included addressing corruption.101 
With the adoption of the Stockholm Programme, the EU Commission had a 
political mandate to evaluate efforts in the fight against corruption and 
developed further its anti-corruption policy, in close co-operation with the 
Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption. 102 
 
Subsequently after the Lisbon Treaty, the legal grounds for more efficient 
instruments to fight corruption were consolidated and efforts to support 
better anti-corruption policy were taken. By abolishing the pillar structure, 
the Treaty permitted for an effective decision-making procedure and better 
implementation by the Member States of the actions in areas of Freedom, 
Security and Justice, while making them subject to better parliamentary and 
judicial control, in order to enhance more the balance between judicial and 
security safeguarding of citizens.103 Article 83 TFEU classified corruption 
among the serious crimes with a cross-border dimension for which 
minimum rules on the definition of criminal offences and sanctions might 
be established. Furthermore, with the ‘Stockholm Program: An open and 
secure Europe serving and protecting the citizen’104 the European Council 																																																								
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encouraged the European Commission to develop further effective 
indicators for assessing efforts in the fight against corruption, specifically in 
the areas of the acquis. For example, public procurement, financial control 
and the establishment of a coherent anti-corruption policy. Afterwards, the 
European Parliament on numerous occasions requested for a comprehensive 
anti-corruption policy and the establishment of clear mechanisms 
monitoring the situation in the EU Member States on a more regular basis. 
  
It is within this context that the EU Commission decided to set up an EU 
Anti-Corruption Report. Thus, in June 2011, the EU Commission 
implemented the EU Anti-Corruption Report in order ‘to address more 
robustly the serious damage that corruption causes to EU – economically, 
socially and politically’. 105  The new EU Anti-Corruption Report was 
communicated to be a set of measurements for addressing corruption also 
within the EU institutions. It consists of a Communication on the fight 
against corruption in the EU that is known as106 a Commission Decision 
establishing an EU Anti-Corruption Report for building and implementing 
more effective policies against corruption at the EU and national levels.107 
The publication of objective fact-based reports that the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report would present would be applicable to all of the EU Member States. 
Thus, they would offer a more inclusive overview of the existence and 
efficiency of the anti-corruption efforts in the EU. A group of experts108 and 
a network of researchers was set up to assist the Commission in its 
preparation.109 
 
Furthermore, the new EU Anti-Corruption Report was building on existing 
tools in terms of evaluating anti-corruption policies and aimed at adding 																																																								
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innovative measurements in addressing anti-corruption policy 
shortcomings. The evaluation and recommendations that the new EU Anti-
Corruption Report was added to serve to everyone including politicians, the 
public, the media, and practitioners as a useful tool to see the level of 
corruption and policy shortcomings throughout the EU. The EU Anti-
Corruption Report was also designed to monitor and evaluate the Member 
States in addressing corruption and to stimulate political commitment in 
pushing for anti-corruption reform. Supported by a specialist group and a 
network of research correspondents, the Report will be managed by the EU 
Commission Home Affairs and be published every two years. The Report 
was designed to present a rational reflection of the achievements, 
commitments and vulnerabilities of all the Member States efforts in 
addressing corruption. The EU Anti-Corruption Report’s main objective 
was to identify trends and weaknesses that were necessary to be addressed, 
as well as to encourage more peer learning and exchange of best practices 
in areas of anti-corruption policy.110  
 
The new EU Commission, in its communication in 2011, stated that the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report would try to avoid any duplication with the existing 
mechanisms and instruments, and to fill their gaps with other available 
means. As a result, the EU Commission decided to collaborate with the 
existing monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, while involving other 
participants such as independent experts, researchers, Commission services 
and the European Anti-Fraud Office, Europol and Eurojust, the European 
Anti-Corruption Network, surveys and civil society. The Report was 
established on the basis of existing international instruments from the 
Council of Europe, UN, and OECD, while concentrating on the cross-
cutting problems of particular concern at EU level, as well as certain issues 
specific to each of the Member States.  
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report embodies a reiterated effort by the EU to 
achieve a more clear anti-corruption policy in the EU external and internal 																																																								
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policies in the area of addressing corruption, which was the initial objective 
of the EU Commission in the late 1990s. However, it still remains to be 
seen whether the EU Anti-Corruption Report would effectively contribute 
to achieving the goals set out by the EU. What is clear is that the EU has 
developed further its anti-corruption policy field and the EU Anti-
Corruption Report marks the pivotal fourth phase of the EU anti-corruption 
policy as a separate anti-corruption policy field in the EU.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 38	
Chapter 2 
 
2 The EU Anti-Corruption Report 
 
The EU Commission revealed its intention for the first time on 6 of June 
2011 to set up a new mechanism, the EU Anti-Corruption Report that 
would monitor and evaluate Member States' efforts against corruption.111 
The Report broadly aimed at address corruption in areas related to 
economy, politics and social relate issues affected by corruption practices. 
The EU Commission also inspired through the Report to encourage more 
political engagement to enhance more comprehensive anti-corruption 
policy. Furthermore, the EU Commission designed the Report to support 
Member States in enforcing legislation and to implement fully their 
international commitments, as well as to improve the coherence of their 
anti-corruption policies and actions at lower level. 
 
Carlos Closa and Dimitry Kochenov, explain the development of the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report was the EU Commission’s direct response to the 
appeal by the Member States in the Stockholm Programme, to develop 
additional indicators on the basis of existing systems and common 
benchmarks that would ensure measuring anti-corruption efforts within the 
European Union on a regular basis.112 
 
The EU Commission published the EU Anti-Corruption Report for the first 
time on the 3rd of February 2014. 113  The EU Anti-Corruption Report 
presented an analysis of corruption within each of the EU's Member States, 
the steps that they can take to prevent and combat corruption more 
effectively, and possible ways to enhance their tools to fight corruption. 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report aimed mainly to support the anti-
corruption work in the EU Member States and improve the political 																																																								
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commitment in address the issue of corruption, and to identify how the EU 
dimension can support EU Member States further in fighting corruption. 
 
The establishment of the EU Anti-Corruption Report was based in the 
principle that there is no 'one-size-fits-all' solution to combat corruption in 
one or several of the EU Member States, but corruption is a major concern 
for all the EU Member States. 114  Through periodical evaluation and 
publication of objective fact-based reports, the Report aims at producing 
additional impetus for the Member States to address corruption more 
effectively, especially by implementing internationally recognised anti-
corruption standards. The EU Anti-Corruption Report is applicable equally 
to all Member States that aims at encourage them to develop a framework 
for more effective anti-corruption measurements. Furthermore, the Report 
aimed at supporting Member States to identify causes of corruption and 
aimed at laying grounds for future EU policy actions against corruption. 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report also aimed to be as a crisis alert instrument 
in order to identify potential risks deriving from corruption that could 
develop into a more serious economical and political crisis.115 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report116 covers all of EU Member States and it 
has the following structure. 
 
a) The introduction of the EU Anti-Corruption Report, which presents the 
policy background and key objectives. 
b) Results of Eurobarometer surveys of 2013 on perceptions of corruption and 
experience of corruption in the EU Member States. 
c) Thematic chapter is focused in assessing public procurement. The EU 
views public procurement crucial part for the internal market and public 
procurement can be a source for corruption. The chapter covers corruption 
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and anti-corruption measurements within national systems of public 
procurement. 
d) Annex on methodology, describing how the report was prepared as well as 
methodological choices and limitations that were encounter. 
e) The country chapters cover all of the Member States policy shortcomings. 
These chapters do not provide a comprehensive description of corruption-
related concerns and anti-corruption legislations. The country chapters 
mainly highlight selected key shortcomings identified through the 
individual assessment of each country and offer general recommendations 
for each of the countries. 
 
2.1 The objectives of the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
 
According to Jeremy Horder and Peter Alldridge the aim of the EU Anti-
Corruption Report is to provide an analysis of corruption within the 
Member States and the steps that they can take to prevent, and fight 
corruption more effectively. 117  Furthermore, in Horder and Alldridge 
account the main objective of the Report is to launch a border debate 
involving the EU Commission, Member States, the European Parliament 
and other stakeholders to assist the anti-corruption work and to identify new 
methods in which the European dimension can support Member States to 
address corruption more successfully.118 
 
The Member States have in place most of the necessary legal instruments 
and institutions to prevent and fight corruption. However, the results they 
deliver are not satisfactory across the EU according to the findings of the 
EU Anti-Corruption Report. 119  Anti-corruption laws are not always 
properly enforced, systemic problems of corruption are not addressed 
effectively, and the relevant anti-corruption institutions do not always have 
adequate capacity to enforce anti-corruption rules according to the EU Anti-																																																								
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Corruption Report. Promising intentions from Member States governments 
are still too distant from concrete action, and genuine political will to 
address corruption appears to be largely missing in many of Member States. 
 
In line with international legal instruments, the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
defines corruption in a broad sense as any ‘abuse of power for private 
gain’.120 It therefore covers specific acts of corruption and those measures 
that Member States take step to prevent or punish corrupt acts as defined by 
the law. It also mentions a range of areas and measurements in which 
impact on the risk of corruption occurring and on the capacity to control it. 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report focuses on selected key issues of particular 
relevance to each Member State, as it will be described in the following 
section. It describes good practices as well as weaknesses and identifies 
steps in which will allow Member States to address corruption more 
effectively. The EU Commission recognises that some of these issues are 
exclusively to national competence. However, it is in the common interest 
of EU to ensure that all Member States have sufficient anti-corruption 
policies in place and that the EU supports Member States in pursuing 
developing sufficient anti-corruption policy. Thus, the main aim of the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report is to promote high anti-corruption standards across 
the Member States by highlighting shortcomings as well as good practices 
in the Member States.   
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report views corruption as a complex 
phenomenon that is entrenched in the economic, social, political and 
cultural dimensions, which cannot be easily eliminated only with the work 
of the Report.121 Therefore, an effective policy response to the Report by 
Member States cannot be sufficient enough, as there is no ‘one size fits all’ 
solution for all the Member States. That is way the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report examines corruption within the national context of each Member 
State, and suggests recommendations that are more pressing for Member 																																																								
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State need. Although, there is a wider policy objective why the EU Anti-
Corruption Report was established.  
 
According to Kemal Dervis and Jacques Mistral the global financial crisis 
in 2007 – 2008 put additional pressure on Europeans governments and the 
EU economic challenges required that European Union respond to promote 
higher integrity and transparency of public expenditure. 122  The 
Eurobarometer for the Report found that citizens expect the EU to play an 
important role in supporting Member States to protect their economy 
against organised crime, financial and tax fraud, money laundering and 
corruption, not least in times of budgetary austerity and economic crises.123  
 
The Europe 2020, which is the EU’s growth strategy over the present 
decade to foster a smart, sustainable and inclusive economy, therefore 
supporting the EU and its Member States to deliver high levels of 
employment, productivity and social cohesion.124 The EU Anti-Corruption 
Report suggests that the success of the Europe 2020 strategy will also 
depend on institutional factors, such as the proper application of good 
governance, rule of law, and in particular the control of corruption. 125 
Therefore, fighting corruption is viewed by the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
to contribute also to the EU’s competitiveness in the global economy. 
Therefore, anti-corruption measurements have been highlighted in respect 
to a growing number of Member States as part of the European Semester, 
which is a yearly cycle of economic policy coordination involving a 
detailed analysis of Member States’ programmes for economic and 
structural reform as well as country-specific recommendations. Broadly 
speaking, the EU Anti-Corruption understands that improving the 
efficiency of public administration, especially if combined with greater 
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transparency, would help in mitigating corruption-related risks. 126  The 
Commission Communication for a European Industrial Renaissance in 
January 2014 as a result pays particular attention to quality of public 
administration as a driving aspect of the EU’s growth strategy.127  As a 
result the Report also sees itself as an instrument for promoting higher 
standards of integrity in the Member States. 
  
2.2 Perceptions of corruption and experience of corruption in the EU 
 
In preparing the background of the EU Anti-Corruption Report, the EU 
Commission conducted two Eurobarometer surveys in early 2013. The first 
survey was the Special Eurobarometer128 and the second was a business-
focused ‘Flash survey’.129 The EU Commission also used the ranking of the 
CPI index used by Transparency International to evaluate the answers given 
by the Eurobarometer respondents for balancing the EU Anti-corruption 
Report.130  
 
General responses to the Eurobarometer found that there was a positive 
perception and low experience of paying bribery in the Member States like 
Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden.131 Respondents in the surveys 
in these Member States hardly suggested that they had been asked to pay a 
bribe or engaged in a corruption act (less than 1 %) and the number of 
citizens who thought that corruption is widespread is 20 % in Denmark, 29 
% in Finland, 42 % in Luxembourg, and 44 % in Sweden.132 These numbers 
are considerably below the EU average. In the case of the UK, only 5 
citizens out of 1115 were found to pay a bribe or engaged in corruption act 																																																								
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(less than 1 %), thus showing the best result in all of the EU. Nevertheless, 
the public perception data show that around 64 % of UK respondents that 
took part in the surveys think that corruption is widespread in the country. 
133 
 
In Member States like Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Estonia and 
France, while more than half of the respondents that took part in the surveys 
consider corruption is a widespread phenomenon. Even though the actual 
number of citizens had to pay a bribe is lower than 2 % according to the 
citizens that took part in the surveys.134  These Member States are also 
among the best performers in the Transparency International Index. Austria 
also shares similar characteristics with these Member States with the 
exception of a somewhat high number of respondents around 5 % who 
according to the citizens that took part in the surveys reported to have been 
expected to pay a bribe or engaged in a corruption act.135 
 
In other Member States, Hungary (13 %), Slovakia (14 %) and Poland (15 
%) there is relatively a higher number of citizens according to those that 
took part in the surveys that suggested that they had personal experience 
with bribery or engaged in corruption act in some number of sectors.136 In 
these Member States, one sector, in particular the public healthcare system 
provided the bulk of instances of bribery. In these Member States there are 
evidences that the structural problems in the public healthcare system 
provide incentives to engage in bribery or corruption with medical staff for 
having access to better healthcare.137  In Hungary, Slovakia and Poland, 
according the surveys showed that the public healthcare is the sector were 
citizens were frequently asked to pay a bribe.138 While in other sectors such 
as police, customs, politicians, public prosecutors’ services, were 																																																								
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considered less than 1 % of respondents to engage in some form of 
corruption. Although, corruption in a broader sense is perceived as 
widespread in these Member States and the citizens respond was that they 
though corruption occurs broadly around 82 % in Poland, 89 % in Hungary 
and 90 % in Slovakia.139 
 
In Member States like Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and Italy, bribery was 
perceived as rare but corruption in a broader sense is considered as a 
serious concern. In the surveys a relatively low number of respondents 
claimed that they were asked or expected to engage a corruption act in the 
last 12 months.140 Whereas personal experience of bribery is was witness as 
rare with around 1-3 %.  According to Alina Mungiu-Pippidi the perception 
is mainly influenced by recent political scandals and the economic crisis in 
these Member States in which reflects in the respondents’ negative 
impression about corruption as an issue overall.141 The surveys found that 
the general perception was that in corruption is widespread with 90% in 
Portugal, 91% in Slovenia, 95% in Spain and 97 % in Italy.142 
 
Member States including Croatia, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Bulgaria, 
Romania and Greece according to the surveys lagged more behind in the 
scores concerning both perceptions and actual experience of citizens 
engaged with corruption.143 In these Member States between 6 % and 29 % 
of respondents that took part in the surveys indicated that they were asked 
or expected to engage in some form of corruption in the past 12 months.144 
Whereas, 84 % up to 99 % of citizens thought that corruption is widespread 
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in their country.145 In Member States like Croatia and the Czech Republic it 
appear that there is somewhat a more positive impression with slightly 
better scores than the rest of the countries from the same group.146 Member 
States like Latvia, Malta, Ireland, and Cyprus do not show results that 
diverge as much from the EU average on any of these aspects shown above. 
 
At European level, three quarters of respondents (76 %) think that 
corruption is widespread in their own country.147 The Member States where 
respondents are most likely to think that corruption is extensively 
widespread are Greece with 99 %, Italy 97 %, Lithuania, Spain and the 
Czech Republic with 95 %. A quarter of Europeans (26 %), compared with 
29 % showed by the 2011 Eurobarometer, considered that they are directly 
affected by corruption in their daily lives.148 Citizens are most likely to say 
that they are directly affected by corruption in Spain and Greece (63 %), 
Cyprus and Romania (57 %) and Croatia (55 %149 The least likely citizens 
to think that they are directly affected by corruption are in Denmark (3 %), 
France and Germany (6 % Around one in twelve Europeans or 8 % of EU 
citizens say according the surveys that they have experienced or witnessed 
a case of corruption in the past 12 months.150 Respondents that took part in 
the surveys were most likely to say they have experienced or witnessed 
corruption personally in Lithuania with 25 %, Slovakia (21 %) and Poland 
(16 % 151 The very least likely according to the respondents that took part in 
the surveys those were most likely to say they have experienced or 
witnessed corruption personally in Finland and Denmark with 3 % in each, 
Malta and the UK with 4 % in each.152 
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Around three quarters of Europeans or around 73 % considered that 
corruption and the use of personal connections is often the easiest path to 
get access to certain public services in their country.153 In Member States 
like Slovakia and Croatia 89 % in each Cyprus with 92 %, and Greece with 
93 % share this belief that corruption and personal connections is the 
quickest way to get access to public services.154  
 
Similarly to 2011, around two in three Europeans or 67 % think the 
financing of political parties is not sufficiently transparent and properly 
supervised.155 In Member States such as Spain with 87 %, Greece 86 %, 
and the Czech Republic 81 %, citizens have the view that that the financing 
of political parties are not adequately transparent and highly supervised.156 
Where as in Member Stets like Denmark 47 %, the UK 54 %, Sweden 55 % 
and Finland 56 %, citizens share similar views in respect o supervising and 
transparency of financing of political parties. 157  Around a quarter of 
Europeans or 23 % of EU citizens agree that their Government’s efforts are 
sufficient in tackling and addressing the issue of corruption. Whereas 
around a quarter or 26 % of EU citizens think that there are adequate 
successful prosecutions in their country to deter people from bribery and 
corrupt practices.158 
 
For the business-focused Flash survey the Member States results show a 
striking variations amongst them in the levels of perceived corruption. The 
highest Member States in the level of perceived corruption in business is 
Greece with 99 % and the lowest Denmark with 10 %. A similar result is 
also reflected in the ‘Special Eurobarometer’ presented above, between 20 
% to 99 %.159 																																																								
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At European level, more than 4 out of 10 companies consider corruption as 
an obstacle for doing business, and this is also the case for patronage and 
nepotism as well.160 When asked directly whether corruption is a concern 
for doing business, 50 % of the construction sector and 33 % of the 
telecoms and IT companies thought that it was a problem to a serious 
degree.161 The business-focused Flash survey found that the smaller the 
company was, the more often corruption and nepotism were as a problem 
for doing business. According to the business-focused Flash survey 
corruption in Member States such as Greece and Slovakia both 66 %, 
Portugal 68 %, Czech Republic 71 %, were most likely to considered 
corruption as a major problem when doing business by companies.162  
 
2.3 Public Procurement 
 
According to the EU Anti-Corruption Report public procurement is an 
important element of the national economies in the EU and nearly one fifth 
of the EU’s GDP is spent every year by public authorities in procuring 
works, goods and services. 163  An estimation by the EU Commission 
suggested that the total value of calls for tenders above those EU thresholds 
is as nearly as EUR 425 billion in 2011.164 Thus, the EU Commission chose 
public procurement a thematic chapter for the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
to make Member States aware of the threat that corruption poses to public 
procurement.  
 
A study in the EU Anti-Corruption Report based on identifying and 
reducing corruption in public procurement in the EU suggested that the 																																																								
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overall direct costs of corruption in public procurement for key sectors 
including rail, road, water, waste, urban, utility construction, training, 
research and development in eight Member States, France, Italy, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Romania and Spain was between EUR 1.4 
billion to EUR 2.2 billion.165 
 
The flash Eurobarometer 2013 survey, used by the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report,  found  more than three out of ten, or around 32 % of companies in 
the Member States, participating in public procurement tenders, had 
reported that corruption had prevented them from winning a public 
contract. 166  This respond was widely shared amongst companies in the 
sectors such as construction with around 35 % and engineering with around 
33 % overall in all of the Member States.167 In Member States like Czech 
Republic with 51 %, Cyprus (55 %), Slovakia (57 %) and Bulgaria with 58 
% company representatives suggested in the flash Eurobarometer 2013 
survey that has been the case in these sectors.168 
 
The flash Eurobarometer 2013 survey also found that the main reasons why 
companies have not taken part in a public procurement tendering process in 
the last three years is because of red tape with – around 21 % and criteria 
that appeared to be aimed for certain participants – around 16 %. 169 
Furthermore, approximately four out of ten companies say that a variety of 
illegal practices in public procurement procedures are common, particularly 
specifications tailor-made for certain corporations – around 57 %, conflict 
of interest in bid assessment – around 54 %, collusive bidding around 52 %, 
unclear selection – around 51 %, involvement of bidders in setting up the 
specifications for tendering – around 48 %, violation of negotiated 
procedures – around 47 %, modifications to the procurement terms after 																																																								
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conclusion of the public contract – around 44 %. 170  The flash 
Eurobarometer 2013 survey used by the EU Anti-Corruption Report found 
that engineering and construction companies are the most likely to claim 
that all of these practices above are widespread in doing business.171 
 
Furthermore, the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggested that more than half 
of all companies say that corruption in public procurement managed by 
national governments amount up to 56 %. Whereas corruption in public 
procurement managed by regional and local governments amount up to 
60%.172  
 
The Special Eurobarometer 2013 survey on corruption used by the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report found that nearly 45 % of the Europeans 
interviewed in survey believe that bribery and the abuse of positions of 
power for personal gain are prevalent amongst officials that award public 
contracts.173 The Member States where respondents are likely to believe 
that there is widespread of corruption practices by officials awarding public 
contracts in Italy around – 55 %, Croatia 58 %, Slovenia 60 %, Greece 55 
%, the Netherlands 64 % and the Czech Republic 69 %. Member States 
with the most positive perceptions of officials that award public contracts 
were in the UK – 33 %, Luxembourg 32 %, Ireland 32 %, Finland 31 % and 
Denmark 22 %.174  
 
According to Gustavo Piga and Tunde Tatrai the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report in the country chapter evaluations finds that public procurement is 
one of the areas that is the most vulnerable sector to corruption practices 
and the above prospection confirm this notion.175 The Report suggested a 																																																								
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number of possible actions that Member States can take in addressing the 
policy shortcomings concerning public procurement and the EU Anti-
Corruption Report suggested these general recommendations to the 
Member States:176 
 
First the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggested that Member States should 
consider adjusting their risk assessment in order to detect the systematic use 
of corruption within public procurement. 177  The Report suggested the 
following general recommendations; 
 
a) Member States should consider developing risk assessments at the level of 
public procurement oversight, irrespective of their institutional setting, with 
the support of law enforcement or anticorruption and integrity agencies. 
b) Member States should consider ensuring a centralisation of data on detected 
corrupt practices and patterns, including those of conflicts of interests and 
revolving door practices.  
c) Member States should consider developing a based on risk assessments, 
tailor-made measurements for vulnerable sectors. 
d) Member States should consider implementing targeted anti-corruption 
policies for regional and local administrations in detecting corruption 
practices. 
e) Member States should consider developing common guidelines for use of 
red-flagging indicator systems and supporting contracting authorities to 
detect corruption, favoritism and conflicts of interest. 
 
Second the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggested that Member States 
should consider implementing higher standards for transparency in respect 
to awarding procurement contracts.178 The Report suggested the following 
general recommendations; 
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a) Member States should consider ensuring common minimum standards for 
transparency at local and regional level in relation to public procurement 
procedures. 
b) Member States should consider ensuring free access to public contracts, 
those including the provisions on rights, obligations and penalty clauses. 
c) Member States should consider improving further their transparency in 
public procurement procedures, pre and post-award through online 
publication in all of the administrative structures – those including central, 
regional and local level. Furthermore, Member States should consider 
ensuring more transparency of procurement in particular to state owned 
companies. 
 
Third the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggested that Member States should 
consider strengthening of internal and external control mechanisms for the 
entire procurement cycle, and also during contract implementation.179 The 
Report suggested the following general recommendations; 
 
a) Member States should consider that there is sufficient capacity of public 
procurement review bodies in place, consultative and oversight bodies, as 
well as courts of audit to carry out their verification in case of violation. 
b) Member States should consider strengthening the internal control 
mechanisms for purposes of prevention and detection of corrupt practices 
and conflicts of interests. Furthermore, Member States should consider 
developing common methodologies for anti-corruption and conflict of 
interest detection tools during the public procurement cycle. 
c) Member States should consider ensuring the recommendations of the courts 
of audit identifying irregularities in public procurement tendering. 
d) Member States should consider carrying out more effective checks on 
ownership of bidders and subcontractors. 
e) Member States should consider ensuring that there are adequate control 
mechanisms for procurement in place for state-owned companies. 
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Forth the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggested that Member States should 
raise more awareness about the need for preventing and detecting of corrupt 
practices at all levels of public procurement.180 The Report suggested the 
following general recommendations; 
 
a) Member States should consider improving the coordination between 
different public authorities that oversight with public procurement. 
b) Member States should consider raising more awareness and develop 
coherent guidelines on prevention of corrupt practices and conflict of 
interests in public procurement, especially aimed at regional and local 
governments. 
c) Member States should consider providing adequate training on technical 
and legal aspects of the public procurement process to prosecutors and the 
judiciary staff that investigate public procurement violation. 
 
Fifth the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggested that Member States should 
strengthen the sanctioning regimes for those that breach public procurement 
contracts.181 The Report suggested the following general recommendations; 
 
a) Member States should ensure proper application of dissuasive sanctions in 
relation to corrupt practices, favoritism or conflicts of interests in public 
procurement contracts.  
b) Member States should develop effective mechanisms for repealing 
decisions or annulling public procurement contracts.  
 
The above-mentioned recommendations are general recommendations for 
all of the Member States in which the EU Anti-Corruption Report aims at 
raising the profile of addressing corruption in public procurement and 
making Member States aware of the key elements that they must have in 
place to prevent corruption in public procurement. Furthermore these 
recommendations were preparing the ground in 2014 for the 
implementation of EU directives on public procurement, which by April 																																																								
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2016, Member States had to transpose; Directive 2014/24/EU on public 
procurement,182 Directive 2014/25/EU on procurement by entities operating 
in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors,183 and Directive 
2014/23/EU on the award of concession contracts into national law.184 The 
following section describes the country chapter recommendations for all of 
the Member States.     
 
2.4 Country chapter recommendations by the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report 
 
2.4.1 Austria 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report found that in Austria there are some 
obstacles to investigators in having access to banking information and thus, 
having a faster access to banking information where necessary would make 
the prosecution of domestic and international bribery more effective for 
investigation purposes. 185 The Report suggest to Austria to pay prioritising 
the investigation and prosecution of foreign bribery and have in place the 
essential capacity of the specialised prosecutors to deal corruption cases at 
domestic and foreign. Furthermore, the Report suggests an introduction of a 
monitoring mechanism for checking the declarations of assets and interest 
for elected and appointed senior officials and putting in place a sanctions 
for non-compliance with rules on declaring interests, incomes and assets. 
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2.4.2 Belgium 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report found that Belgium has not addressed 
corruption consistently and concrete efforts could be made in prioritises 
corruption related policy at regional and federal level. 186  In particular 
introducing an integrity policy in the administrations and supporting 
integrity schemes at regional and federal level in order to prevent conflict of 
interest for all appointed and elected officials, at federal, regional and local 
levels. The Report also suggest that Belgium should increase the capacity of 
the justice system in order to avoid lengthy criminal proceedings in 
particular to corruption cases that in the past have not been prosecuted in 
time due to expiry of the statute of limitations. Providing sufficient capacity 
for the police to detect and investigate corruption-related offences. Lastly, 
Belgium should ensure that there is a proper legislation in place on political 
parties funding and that there is an effective supervisory mechanisms in 
place to audited political parties at federal and local under a unified 
supervision and audit structure. 
 
2.4.3 Bulgaria 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report found that for Bulgaria fighting the issue 
of corruption should still be priority because corruption still remains a 
serious challenge at different levels, and petty corruption continues to be 
reported in healthcare, police, customs, local authorities and beyond in 
Bulgaria.187 The Report suggests that Bulgaria should improve further the 
independence and effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions and in 
particular the judiciary. Thus, Bulgaria is suggested to shield anti-
corruption institutions and the judiciary from any political influence and 																																																								
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appointing their management in a transparent, merit-based procedure. 
Furthermore, the Report finds that Bulgaria should increase the integrity 
and accountability of elected officials, and to put safeguard measurements 
in preventing electoral irregularities. Lastly, the Report suggests that 
Bulgaria should adopting a code of ethics for Members of the National 
Assembly and establish an effective supervisor mechanism in order to 
ensure dissuasive sanctions for electoral fraud.  
 
2.4.4 Croatia  
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report found that in Croatia the politicisation and 
favouritism of the public administration and the integrity standards in the 
political system is a cause for concern.188  The Report suggests that Croatia 
should establish an effective mechanism to prevent corruption in state-
owned companies and should implement an effective anti-corruption action 
plan within state-owned companies to promote high accountability 
standards. Furthermore, the Report finds Croatia should implement 
effective protection mechanisms in both the public and private sectors for 
whistleblowers that report corruption and mismanagement. The EU Anti-
Corruption Report also finds inadequacies of the rules of the conflict of 
interests of public officials at central and local levels and suggests that 
Croatia complies with the Constitutional Court decision of 2012 in ensuring 
there is a full complies with the conflict of interests of public officials rules. 
 
The Report, also suggests that Croatia supports the Conflict of Interest 
Commission to improve their techniques of verification, including use of 
electronic tools, swiftly access to relevant information, cooperation with 
other authorities and has sufficient powers to impose deterrent sanctions in 
case of conflict of interests of public officials. Lastly, the Report suggests 
that Croatia implements a merit-based recruitment and promotion for public 
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officials at mid-management and lower levels, and develops an adequate 
code of conduct for elected officials at central and local level. 
 
2.4.5 Cyprus 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report found that in Cyprus there should be 
greater focus on the financing of political parties. 189 The Report suggests 
that Cyprus should introduce a code of conduct for elected and appointed 
officials for them to declare any assets periodically, and to disclose any 
potential conflicts of interests. Furthermore, the Report suggests that 
Cyprus should lower the thresholds for donations to political parties, limit 
the possibilities of state-owned companies to sponsor political events, 
adequately regulate the donations for election candidates and campaigns. 
The Report also suggest that Cyprus should regulate that parties publish 
their financial statements and accounts online, in particular including the 
identity of donors, and to establish an external supervision of election 
candidates’ income and expenditure. Lastly, the Report suggests that 
Cyprus reinforces the disciplinary body for public servants and endowing 
the necessary powers to anti-corruption institutions for a more effective 
implementation of anti-corruption policies. 
 
2.4.5 Czech Republic 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report found that in Czech Republic corruption is 
widely believed to represent a major obstacle in doing business and there 
are problems related to the misuse of public funds. 190 The Report suggests 
that Czech Republic should introduce legislation on the civil service that 
addresses well the conflicts of interest of public official and the legislation 																																																								
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should also enhance the stability of the civil service by safeguarding it 
against political interference. The Report also suggests that Czech Republic 
should introduce an ex-ante verification mechanism to prevent the conflicts 
of interest, and corrupt practices in relation to the European Structural and 
Investment Funds programmes. Czech Republic is also suggest in the 
Report to make further efforts to strength the independence of all bodies 
responsible for the implementation of EU funds.  The EU Anti-Corruption 
Report also found that Czech Republic should regulate the properly 
electoral campaign expenditure and establish an impartial supervision of 
financing of political parties. Thus, Czech Republic should ensure that the 
financial reports of political parties are easily accessible to the public and 
they should disclose in detail party and electoral campaign expenditure in 
annual financial reports. Lastly, the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggests 
that Czech Republic should strengthen the capacities of prosecutors to 
handle corruption related cases in an independent way by re-examining the 
criteria for nomination of prosecutors, and Czech Republic should pursue 
reforms to strengthen the independent of anti-corruption bodies.   
 
2.4.7 Denmark 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report highlights that Denmark is amongst the 
EU’s leading country in terms of transparency, integrity and has very low 
corruption practice. 191 Thus, the Report does not considered corruption to 
be a problem in Denmark. However, the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
suggests that there are still some room for improvement in Denmark and it 
suggests that there should be some further attention in addressing the 
financing of political parties. The Report suggests that Denmark should 
consider the GRECO recommendations to improve the transparency and 
supervisory instruments for the financing of political parties and individual 
candidates. The EU Anti-Corruption Report also observed that Denmark 
should improve the framework for prosecuting and sentencing Danish 																																																								
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corporations on grounds of foreign bribery. Thus, the Report suggests that 
Denmark should consider to reviews the provision of dual criminality in 
respect of foreign bribery offences and ensuring that the small facilitation 
payment defence is clearly defined, and foreign bribery legal framework is 
in line with OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. 
 
2.4.8 Estonia 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report finds that the corruption in Estonia is 
considered low in comparison to other post-communist states, and petty 
corruption hardly affects citizens’ everyday lives. 192 However, the Report 
finds that Estonia should pay additional efforts to further improve 
transparency in the financing of political parties and suggests that Estonia 
develops an effective monitoring instrument for political parties, and 
applies dissuasive sanctions in case of any violation. Furthermore, the 
Report suggests that Estonia develops guidelines on monitoring compliance 
with anti-corruption requirements at local government level and provides 
sufficient training to local governments. The EU Anti-Corruption Report 
also suggests that Estonia implements a parliamentary code of conduct 
together with supervision body to ensure scrutiny of economic interest 
declarations of public officials. Lastly, the Report suggests that Estonia 
conducts an independent and in-depth analysis into the risk of politicisation 
of appointments in public administration, state-owned companies, at local 
officials. 
 
2.4.9 Finland  
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report finds that Finland is a leading country in 
the EU as a champion of anti-corruption and petty corruption is not an issue 
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in Finland. 193 However, the Report finds that corruption cases in Finland 
appears in term of favouritism were exchanges on the basis of informal 
relationships, and lobbying by business people providing campaign 
financing to politicians have occurred. Thus, the Report suggests that 
Finland requests the municipalities and local authorities to ensure an 
adequate level of transparency in public contracts with private 
entrepreneurs. Furthermore, the Report suggest that Finland supports 
further the anti-corruption unit of the National Bureau of Investigations to 
effectively investigate corruption-related cases, and to coordinate anti-
corruption procedures between government agencies more effectively. 
 
2.4.10 France 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report finds corruption in France is mainly related 
to cases in politics. 194 The report finds that the French politics has been 
subject to allegations of corruption and nepotism, spreading to high-ranking 
politicians and public officials. Thus, the Report suggests that France takes 
into account the GRECO recommendations on party findings, increases the 
transparency of financial information in election campaigns, and 
strengthens the supervisory capacity of the National Commission for 
Campaign Accounts and Political Funding. Furthermore, the Report 
suggests that France pursues its on-going reforms on the asset disclosure 
and conflicts of interest concerning appointed and elected public officials. 
The Report, also suggest that France improves the legislation on foreign 
bribery, and to include rules on dual criminality and jurisdiction in line with 
the recommendations by the OECD, GRECO and the UNCAC review 
mechanism. Lastly, the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggests that France 
provides additional resources to investigators and prosecutors dealing with 																																																								
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corruption cases, and protect the operational independence of prosecutors of 
related corruption cases.  
 
2.4.11 Germany 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report finds that Germany is amongst the top 
ranking EU member state and is perceived to be among the consistently 
best performers of transparency and integrity. 195  However, the Report 
suggests that there are still some issues that have not been dealt in 
Germany, such as the lack of sanctions for corruption of elected officials 
and the absence of a revolving door policy, particularly in the public sector. 
The Report suggests that Germany should strengthen further their 
preventive measurements regarding the funding of political parties and 
those preventive measurements should be in line with the GRECO 
recommendations on electoral campaign accounts and donations. The 
Report also suggests that Germany should expand the legislation 
transposing the Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA on fighting corruption 
in the private sector with respect to some elements of the bribery offence. 
Lastly, the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggests that Germany should raise 
more awareness in small and medium-sized enterprises with regard to the 
foreign bribery offence. 
 
2.4.12 Greece 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report finds institutions that fight and combat 
corruption are facing the same resource pressure in Greece as felt by the 
whole of the public administration. 196 The Report first suggests that Greece 
should ensure that there are sufficient efforts to enable the national anti-																																																								
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corruption coordinator to implement accordingly the anti-corruption 
policies that Greece is perusing. Furthermore, the Report suggests that 
Greece should consider to strengthen an independent functional review of 
the anti-corruption framework in lines of the national anti-corruption action 
plan and ensuring that the national anti-corruption action plan is effective 
implemented also across sector that are vulnerable to corruption such as 
healthcare and tax administration. Second, the Report suggests that Greece 
addresses the issues of political parties finances and strengthens the 
supervision body of party funding, and ensures the independence, 
efficiency and transparency of the Control Committee. Furthermore, the 
Report suggests that Greece reinforces the mechanisms for tracing 
donations and loans to political parties, and ensure sufficient resources for 
the Supreme Court of Audit to carry out effective verification of party 
funding. Thirdly, the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggests that Greece 
institutions establishes an in depth ethical code of conduct for elected 
officials at national and local levels, and establishes effective accountability 
tools for potential violations of these codes, thus including in case of 
corrupt practices or conflict of interests in particular. Furthermore, the 
Report suggest that Greece should seek to reduce any potential barrier to 
the investigation of corruption offences by releasing any immunity 
protection of high-ranking officials from investigations and thus in 
particular simplifying the procedure for lifting immunities, and ultimately 
reforming the statute of limitations rules concerning current and former 
members of the Government. 
 
2.4.13 Hungary 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report finds that in Hungary clientelism, 
favouritism and nepotism in public administration remain matters of 
concern, and thus there is a strong informal relation between businesses and 
political actors at local level, making local governments more vulnerable to 
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corrupt practices. 197  First the Report suggest that Hungary ensures that 
there is an independent verification mechanisms for asset declarations and 
conflicts of interest of elected and appointed officials, both at national and 
local levels. Furthermore, Hungary develops codes of conduct for elected 
officials at central, regional and local levels, which also covers conflict of 
interest and ensures sufficient accountability instruments for detecting any 
potential violations of such codes. The Report also suggests, that Hungary 
should take harder steps to address the corruption risks connected with 
clientelism and favouritism within public administration. Second, the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report suggests that Hungary should clarify the rules on 
accounting of political parties. Furthermore, the Report suggests that 
Hungary should strengthen the transparency and the independence of 
auditing of political parties checking party finance. Third, the Report 
suggests that Hungary should fight corruption in the healthcare system by 
eliminating the practice of gratitude payments, rewards or other forms of 
informal payments to public employees in the healthcare sector. 
 
2.4.14 Ireland 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report finds that even though the Irish 
Government in recent years has undertaken reforms at legislative and policy 
levels to address many of the issues concerning corruption and related 
issues of transparency, accountability and integrity, still more consideration 
could be given to ensure that corrupt behaviour are properly sanctioned.198 
First, the Report suggests that Ireland improves record of successful 
prosecutions of in corruption cases handled by the Standards in Public 
Office Commission, the Director of Corporate Enforcement and the police. 
Furthermore, the Report suggests that Ireland should enhances more power 																																																								
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to all the relevant investigator authorities and extend their responsibilities in 
a provision to prosecute conflict of interest also to the regional and local 
levels. Second, the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggests that Ireland should 
place a threshold on the overall limit on the amount an individual may give 
to a political party and electoral candidates or elected representatives who 
are members of that party in line with the recommendations made by the 
Mahon Tribunal. Furthermore, the Report suggests that Ireland should 
regulate financing of referendum campaigns and impose a sensibly time-
limit for political parties to release their financial disclosure obligations. 
Third, the Anti-Corruption Report suggests that Ireland should enhance 
further power and capacity to the independent urban planning regulator to 
investigate problems that local authorities have with fraud and corruption. 
Last, the Report suggests that Ireland implements a plan for the prevention 
of corruption at local authorities and ensures that there is an effective 
detection mechanism for conflicts of interest at local level. 
 
2.4.15 Italy 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report finds that despite considerable efforts 
corruption remains a serious challenge in Italy. 199 First the Report suggests 
that Italy should seek to strengthen the integrity regime for elected and 
appointed officials, at national, regional and local levels. Furthermore, the 
Report suggests Italy should revise and implement thorough ethical codes 
of conduct together with adequate accountability instruments, and tough 
sanctions for potential violations of such codes of conduct. The Report also 
suggests that Italy should consider promoting codes of ethics within 
political parties, and strengthen the legal framework on party funding. 
Second, the Report suggests that Italy should address the deficiencies of the 
statute of limitation as recommended in July 2013 in the context of the 
European Semester, and introduces more flexible rules on suspension and 
interruption. Furthermore, the Report suggests that Italy evaluates 																																																								
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accurately the risks of pending corruption cases becoming time-barred and 
ensures that prioritisation of cases that are running such risks. Third, the 
Report suggests that Italy strengthens the capacities of the national anti-
corruption agency for it to perform an effective inspection and supervisory 
functions, also at regional and local levels. The Report also suggests, that 
Italy implements a uniform framework for internal controls and use of 
external independent audits at regional and local levels with regard to 
public spending, in particular to public contracts. Last, the EU Anti-
Corruption Report suggests that Italy enhances an independent body for the 
verification of conflicts of interest and asset declarations of elected and 
appointed public officials. 
 
2.4.16 Latvia 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report found that in Latvia even though anti-
corruption laws are gradually being developed and refined, the 
implementation in practice remains unsatisfactory. 200  First the Report 
suggests that Latvia continues to strengthen capacities and independence of 
the Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau (KNAB) from potential 
political interference, particularly in supervisory and budgetary procedures. 
Furthermore, the Report suggests that Latvia promotes better use of 
centralised e-procurement for public contracts and enhances further the 
KNAB’s efforts to detect corruption in public contracts. Second, the Report 
suggests that Latvia should pay more attention in improving the 
transparency of state-owned companies and redefines the professional 
selection criteria for supervisory and management posts. Third, the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report suggests that Latvia strengthens the capabilities and 
resources of the judiciary to handle corruption related cases in an 
independent way by reinforcing the role of self-governing judicial bodies in 
relation to appointments and career progression, by taking further 
measurements to uphold due process in disciplinary proceedings, and more 																																																								
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importantly Latvia should restrict Parliament’s powers to the confirmation 
of judicial appointments. Forth, the Report suggests that Latvia modifies 
and applies more strictly Parliament’s Code of Ethics. Lastly, the Report 
suggests that Latvia issues guidelines on conflicts of interest of public 
officials and lifts administrative immunities for MPs. 
 
2.4.17 Lithuania 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report found that in Lithuania reinforcing the 
independence and effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions would help 
address challenges in public contracts, the financing of political parties, and 
healthcare. 201  First, the Report suggest that Lithuania should prioritises 
public contracts corruption related cases and develop additional preventive 
instruments within contracting authorities to assist detecting corruption at 
various stages of tendering, with a particular focus on the local level and the 
healthcare sector. Second, the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggests that 
Lithuania should enhance the resources of the Special Investigation Service 
(STT), by focusing more attention on the number of indictments and 
seriousness of cases. Furthermore, the Report suggests that Lithuania makes 
improvements in better coordinating institutions to proactivity investigate 
high-level corruption more efficiently. Third, the Report suggests that 
Lithuania reinforce the capacities and power of the Chief Official Ethics 
Commission in order to improve the procedures for checking the 
declarations of conflict of interest by elected and appointed officials, and 
monitoring violations more effectively. Forth, the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report suggests that political parties provide adequate information on their 
sources of funding and Lithuania enhances the capacities of the Central 
Electoral Commission to monitor more effectively expenditure and income 
of political parties. 
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2.4.18 Luxembourg 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report found that in Luxembourg the absence of 
rules on access to information, lobbying, and the lack of a revolving-doors 
policy raise the risk of conflicts of interest and other undetected instances of 
corruption related acts. 202  First, the Report suggests that Luxembourg 
should increase the resources to fight financial and economic crime, 
including within the judiciary and the police. Second, the Report suggests 
that Luxembourg should introduce a supervisory mechanism applicable to 
the financing of individual candidates and campaign accounts, and making 
ensuring that the rules on donations from legal persons to individual 
candidates are coherent with the rules applicable to parties. Third, the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report suggests that Luxembourg should ensure an 
independent mechanism for properly verifying the conflicts of interest of 
elected officials and civil servants at national and local levels. Last, the 
Report suggests that Luxembourg should implement legislation on access to 
public information that establishes the responsibility of the public 
authorities to provide access to information, documents of public interest, 
and clearly defines the conditions under which requests may be denied. 
 
2.4.19 Malta 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report finds that addressing corruption has been a 
priority in Malta, but the financing of political parties remains largely 
unregulated and is a matter for concern.203 First the Report suggests that 
Malta introduces a disclosure rule and caps on political donations. 
Furthermore, the Report suggests that there should be a ban on anonymous 
donations beyond a reasonable threshold in Malta and there should be 																																																								
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independent audits of political parties’ accounts. Second, the EU Anti-
Corruption Report suggests that Malta should improve the coordination 
among anti-corruption units to optimise the collection of evidence and 
priorities investigation and prosecution of corruption related cases. The 
Report also suggests that Malta should empower further the Permanent 
Commission against Corruption (PCAC) and allocate more resources in 
order to appoint specialists on anti-corruption. Third, the EU Anti-
Corruption Report suggests that Malta should strengthen the capacity of the 
judiciary to deal with corruption related cases. The Report suggests that 
Malta should improve the appointment and dismissal procedures for judges, 
and to enhance more transparent and merit-based selection and removal of 
judges. Furthermore, the Report suggests that Malta accordingly enforces 
the decisions of the Commission for the Administration of Justice that find 
a breach of the Code of Ethics in the Judiciary. Forth, the EU Anti-
Corruption Report suggests that Malta should continue its reforms at the 
Malta Environmental Planning Authority (MEPA) to build further public 
confidence in its integrity and impartiality. 
 
2.4.20 The Netherlands 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report finds that in the Netherlands integrity is 
traditionally highly valued and continuously there has been a strong public 
demand for transparency and accountability, both in the public and the 
private domain. 204 First, the Report suggests that the Netherlands should 
extend the rules on the assets and interests to elected officials and members 
of government. Furthermore, the Report suggests that the Netherlands 
should support a transparent verification system and develops a framework 
for post-employment conflicts of interest of former elected officials. 
Second, the EU Anti-Corruption Report finds that the Netherlands should 
focus more its efforts on the prosecution of both natural and legal persons 
for corruption in international business transactions. Also the Report 																																																								
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suggests that the Netherlands should increase the resources and capabilities 
to investigative office that deals with the prosecution of foreign bribery. 
Last, the Report suggests that the Netherlands should increase the level of 
fines applicable to the legal persons of Dutch firms that engage in foreign 
bribery acts.  
 
2.4.21 Poland 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report finds that addressing corruption has been a 
priority in Poland prior to join the EU and the authorities have implemented 
adequate policies that have contributed to progress in fighting corruption, 
especially against petty corruption.205 However, the Report first finds that 
Poland should take further reforms to safeguard the independence and 
effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions. The EU Anti-Corruption 
Report suggests that Poland establish a long-term strategy against 
corruption with a reasonable timeframe for implementing the strategy 
across different sectors that are vulnerable to corruption. Furthermore, the 
Report suggests that the strategy against corruption should also aim at 
reforming and increasing the capacities of the relevant anti-corruption 
institutions in Poland. Second, the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggests that 
Poland ensures that there are measurements in place to safeguards against 
potential politicisation of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA) by 
introducing an impartial and transparent procedure for the appointment of 
it’s the CBA Director. Also the Report suggests that Poland should 
continue to provide expertise training in order to increase the effectiveness 
of the CBA. The Report found that Poland should also improve the 
cooperation and coordination with police, and other special anti-corruption 
services and prosecution to deal more efficiently with corruption related 
cases. Third, the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggests that Poland should 
implement more effective measures in order to supervise state-owned 
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companies and increase transparency, professionalism and integrity 
standards in the public and the healthcare sectors.  
 
2.4.22 Portugal 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report finds that Portugal over the last decade has 
demonstrated a degree of political commitment to address corruption. 206 
However, key institutions that combat corruption in Portugal are facing the 
same resource of pressure as the whole of public administration. Therefore, 
the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggests that Portugal in the context of the 
State reform that is currently being introduced after the economic crisis 
should pay more attention to anti-corruption initiatives. However, there is 
no national anti-corruption strategy in place in Portugal. Thus, first the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report suggests that Portugal should maintain a track 
record of successful prosecution of corruption cases. The Report also 
suggests Portugal should ensure sufficient resources and financial support 
for assist further the law enforcement agencies, the prosecution service and 
the judiciary. In order to deal more effectively with complex related 
corruption cases. Second, the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggests that 
Portugal should strengthen further the preventive detective tools on party 
funding and take into account GRECO recommendations on political party 
financing. The Report also suggests that Portugal should develop codes of 
conduct for elected officials at central and local levels, accompanied with 
sufficient accountability instruments to address any possible violations of 
these codes. Furthermore, the Report suggests that Portugal should consider 
developing ethical codes of conduct within political parties and should 
implement adequate standards on conflicts of interest.  Third, the EU Anti-
Corruption Report suggests that Portugal should sufficiently evaluate urban 
planning decisions on projects at local level to detect any risk elements of 
corruption practice and improve further the measurements of transparent 
decision-making at local level. Last, the Report suggests that Portugal 																																																								
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should seek to further strengthening control instruments in this sector of 
corruption related cases at local government and urban planning at local 
level.  
 
2.4.23 Romania  
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report finds that both petty and political 
corruption remains a systemic problem in Romania. 207 The Report suggests 
that the political will to address corruption and promote high standards of 
integrity has been inconsistent over time in Romania. The Cooperation and 
Verification Mechanism (CVM) Report of January 2014 highlighted that 
even though progress was made in many areas of judiciary and anti-
corruption policies, the political will is far from a general consensus about 
pursuing the objectives set by the CVM. Thus, first the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report suggests that Romania should ensure the independence of anti-
corruption institutions and the judiciary regarding non-partisan 
investigations. Furthermore, the Report suggests that Romania should 
ensure that court proceedings concerning high-level corruption cases related 
to elected and appointed officials are not politically intervened. The Report 
also suggests that Romania should reinforce the integrity standards in the 
judiciary and to address corruption more efficiently within the judiciary 
system. Second, the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggests that Romania 
should implement codes of conduct for elected and appointed officials, and 
ensures that accountability instruments are in place for detecting more 
efficiently corrupt practices and conflicts of interest. The Report suggests 
that Romania should develop ethical codes for political parties and 
establishes ethics pacts between parties to promote higher integrity 
standards in the political system. Furthermore, the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report suggests that Romania should ensures that there are no obstruction 
of justice is allowed in cases of political cases related to corruption and 
immunities are lifted for elected officials. Third, the EU Anti-Corruption 																																																								
207 European Commission (2014), Annex 23: Romania to the EU Anti-Corruption Report, 
COM (2014) 38 final, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-
report/docs/2014_acr_romania_chapter_en.pdf  
	 72	
Report suggests that Romania should implement an anti-corruption national 
strategy to develop tools that prevent the level of informal payments. The 
Report suggests that Romania anti-corruption national strategy works to 
reduce the level of informal payments in the public contracts at central and 
local government, and in the public healthcare system. The Report 
furthermore suggests that Romania should consider improving the working 
conditions for medical staff and raises the level of professionalism within 
the Ministry of Health. Last, the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggests that 
Romania should effectively implement clear rules on revolving door 
practices in public contracts and raising awareness of the risks such 
practices entail, including EU-funded projects. 
 
2.4.24 Slovakia  
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report finds that Slovakia faces problems with 
independence of the judiciary and finds close ties between the political and 
business elite undermines the functioning of anti-corruption efforts. 208  
Thus, the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggest that structural reforms and 
measurements to address conflicts of interest between the political and 
business elite, and good coordination in investigations should therefore be 
prioritized in Slovakia. Firs, the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggests that 
Slovakia should increase the independence of the judiciary, in particular 
implement rules to clearly define the criteria for the removal from office of 
presidents and vice-presidents of courts. Furthermore, the Report suggests 
that Slovakia should strengthen the procedural guarantees in disciplinary 
proceedings against judges that have misused their position and ensures the 
independence of disciplinary panels. Second, the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report suggests that Slovakia should support a merit-based approach to 
appointments to management positions within the police departments and 
develops a strategy to detect and prosecute more effectively corruption 
related crimes. Third, the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggests that 																																																								
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Slovakia should increase the transparency of finances of political parties at 
local and regional levels. Thus, the Report suggest that Slovakia establishes 
an independent body to investigate and supervise party financing, and 
ensures that the sanctions are applied accordingly in case of any violations 
of political funding rules. Forth, the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggests 
that Slovakia should develop an effective policy to fight corruption cases 
affecting EU funds, public contracts, and corruption in the healthcare 
system. Last, the Report suggests that Slovakia should reinforce its efforts 
of law enforcement, prosecution and judiciary to pursue corruption cases 
affecting EU funds and public tenders more effectively at central and local 
levels.  
 
2.4.25 Slovenia  
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report finds that Slovenia in recent years has seen 
a decline in the political will to fight corruption and there is a decline in the 
level of the integrity of high-level officials, both elected and appointed, and 
other officials within the public administration and state-owned companies. 
209   Thus, first the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggests that Slovenia 
applies tougher penalties to elected and appointed officials at central and 
local levels for conflicts of interest and unjustified wealth. The Report also 
suggests that Slovenia develops codes of conduct and adequate 
accountability and preventive tools for violations of such codes for elected 
officials and appointed officials. Second, the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
suggests that Slovakia should seek to develop ethical codes within political 
parties and establishes a supervision body to check party funding and 
electoral campaigns more effectively. Third, the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report suggests that Slovenia should support and ensure the independence 
of the Commission for Prevention of Corruption is preserved, and its 
powers and capacity are further reinforced. The Report also suggests that 
Slovenia maintenance the operational independence of prosecution services 																																																								
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specialised in fighting financial and economic crime. Last, the EU Anti-
Corruption Report suggests Slovenia should encourage a fair engagement in 
anti-corruption and effective collaboration by all relevant public institutions 
that address corruption in Slovenia.  
 
2.4.26 Spain 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report finds that Spain largely has shown good 
results in investigating corrupt practices at central and local levels. 210 
However, the Report finds that recent large-scale corruption cases have 
revealed a number of alleged corrupt practices affecting public funds and 
financing of political parties. The Report finds that public spending at 
regional and local level has been particularly challenging and public tenders 
and urban development appear to be among the most vulnerable areas in 
Spain. Thus, first the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggests that Spain 
develops a tailor-made strategy for regional and local administrations to 
prevent corruption practices and establishes monitoring mechanisms to 
increase transparency of decision-making at local and regional governance. 
Second, the Report suggests that Spain should develop codes of conduct for 
elected officials at central, regional and local levels. The Report also 
suggests that Spain should develop ethical codes within political parties as 
recommended by the resolution of the Spanish Parliament in February 2013 
and implements clear rules on asset disclosure and conflicts of interests for 
elected and appointed officials at central, regional and local levels. 
Furthermore, the Report suggests that Spain should reinforce the resources 
of the Office of Conflicts of Interests to carry out verifications in an 
independent and effective way. Last, the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
suggests that Spain should implement new law on transparency, access to 
public information and increases good governance, supported by an 
independent supervisory mechanism matched with a strict sanctioning 
system.  																																																								
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2.4.27 Sweden 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report finds that Sweden is among the least 
corrupt countries in the EU and it has taken an ambitious approach to 
fighting corruption, and implemented several effective anti-corruption 
initiatives. 211 However, the Report finds that in Sweden a few areas of 
concern remain such as corruption risks at local levels and loopholes in the 
Swedish legal framework for prosecuting and sentencing Swedish 
corporations on grounds of foreign bribery. Thus, the Report first suggests 
that Sweden should seek to ensure that the liability of legal persons for 
foreign bribery is activated in cases where the offence is committed through 
lower-level employees, intermediaries, subsidiaries, or third-party agents 
including non-Swedish nationals. Furthermore, the Report suggests that 
Sweden should raise the level of penalties for corporations and other legal 
entities. Thus, the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggests that Sweden should 
consider revise the provision of dual criminality. Second, the EU Anti-
Corruption Report suggests that Sweden improves the transparency of the 
funding of political parties and of individual candidates in line with 
recommendations suggested by GRECO. Furthermore, the Report suggest 
that Sweden should consider that the future legislation that are introduces 
have a general ban on donations from donors whose identity is not enclosed 
to the party or candidate, and the legalisation extends the scope to cover 
regional and local levels. 
 
2.4.28 United Kingdom  
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report finds that the United Kingdom. Moreover 
has made progresses in encouraging its companies to engage from bribing 
officials abroad, through severe legislation and detailed guidelines. 212  
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However, the Report first suggests that for the UK to continued success on 
tackling foreign bribery it should take further preventive measures to risks 
of foreign bribery, and provide sector-specific guidelines to companies in 
areas which may be at increased risk, such as the defence industry. Second, 
the Report suggests that the UK should strengthen accountability in the 
governance of banks and thus including stricter law enforcement, and 
ensures that the beneficial owners of UK-registered companies are declared 
fully and in a transparent manner. Third, the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
suggests that the United Kingdom should impose limits on electoral 
campaign spending and capping donations to political parties. Furthermore, 
the Report suggests that the UK should ensure proactive monitoring misuse 
of political parties donations and prosecution of potential violations. The 
Report also suggests that the UK should consider lowering the thresholds 
for the reporting of financial holdings and for the registration of received 
gifts to elected official, and thus providing clear guidance on acceptable 
gifts for Members of Parliament. Forth, the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
suggests that the United Kingdom should address the issues identified by 
the Leveson Inquiry. In particular regarding the legitimate interaction 
between the press and the police, and such time limits on the employment 
of former police officers by the media should be clearly regulated. 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report throughout this chapter generally calls for 
a developing stronger integrity standard in all of the Member States as the 
recommendations suggested above. Furthermore, the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report suggested key improvements in preventing corruption in a number 
of sectors that Member States seem to be vulnerable according to the 
Report. The following chapter analysis the EU Anti-Corruption Report as a 
form of reflexive governance that supports Member States to enhance their 
anti-corruption policy shortcomings as the Report suggested in this chapter.  
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Chapter 3 
 
3 The EU Anti-Corruption Report and Reflexive Governance  
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter argues that the regulatory approach of the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report is best described as reflexive governance. The chapter is divided 
into four parts. The first part explains the context of the regulatory approach 
of the Report which relates to the emergence of new modes of governance 
in the European Union. It includes a discussion of the key method of the 
new governance approach in the EU, the open method of coordination, 
which has significantly changed the regulation and methods of governance 
at the supranational level. The second part introduces the concept of 
reflexive governance and explains the transformation of new governance 
into reflexive governance in EU policy-making. The second part also 
explains the growing use of reflexive forms of governance within the EU 
and shows examples how reflexive governance occurs. The third part 
introduces the theory of reflexive law that provides core insights into the 
regulatory nature of reflexive governance. The fourth part applies the 
theory of reflexive governance to the EU Anti-Corruption Report and 
demonstrates that the concept of regulation of self-regulation provides the 
key insight into the governance approach of the Report. 
 
3.2 New Governance in the European Union 
 
The emergence of new modes of governance in the European Union dates 
back to the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the introduction of the European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU Ten years of successful 
experimentation with economic policy coordination enabled the launch of 
the EMU in 2002 and triggered a reorientation of European policy-making 
and change of methods of governance at the supranational level. The model 
of coordination of economic and fiscal policies was adopted for the 
coordination of employment policies in the form of the European 
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Employment Strategy (EES), as well as other coordination policies in 
several new policy areas. The underlying concept of governance based on 
policy coordination was outlined in the European Commission White Paper 
on European Governance in July 2001.213 
 
The European Commission identified the reform of European governance 
as one of its four strategic objectives alongside democracy, transparency, 
and subsidiarity at the beginning of the new millennium in the White 
Paper.214 It made use of the global debate on good governance to discuss 
opportunities for internal reform that aim at bringing the European Union 
closer to its citizens, rendering it more effective, and consolidating the 
democratic legitimacy of its institutions.215 The Commission’s White Paper 
on governance established five basic principles that could strengthen the 
good governance approach. These are openness, participation, 
accountability, effectiveness, and coherence.216  
 
Openness is largely related to the importance of communication between 
the European institutions and the Member States as far as the decisions that 
the EU makes are concerned. This includes the use of a practical language 
in the public documents. Participation means the broad involvement of 
institutional bodies, agencies, social partners and civil society at all stages; 
from designing a policy concept to implementation of a policy, it 
constitutes a key condition for the quality and the effectiveness of the EU’s 
policies. Accountability relates to the trusting and explicit roles of the 
participants in the process of decision-making. Effectiveness concerns the 
degree of achievement of targets that have been put in place on the basis of 
assessment processes of applied policy areas. Lastly, coherence relates to 
the synchronisation between the policies and the actions, as well as their 																																																								
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easy understanding. The applications of these five principles are intended to 
strengthen the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity according to the 
European Commission.217  
 
Each principle is important by itself. However, they cannot be achieved 
through separate actions. Policies can no longer be effective unless they are 
prepared, implemented and enforced in an inclusive way. The White Paper 
calls for the renewing the Community method by following a less top-down 
approach and enlarging its policy tools through an increased use of non-
legislative instruments.  
 
The White Paper acknowledges the vital role that civil society plays in 
giving ‘voice to the concerns of citizens and offering services to people’s 
needs’ and involving civil society organisations at all levels of the policy 
process. 218 One of the concluding proposals of the White Paper aims at 
institutionalising the EU’s relationship with civil society by introducing a 
code of conduct that identifies responsibilities and improves accountability 
of all partners.219 In involving EU-level civil society, organisations can be 
part of the EU policy-making process through a more structured processes 
of consultation.220 This approach leads to a ‘transnationalization’ of policy 
process, meaning it is reinforced by provisions of the Lisbon Treaty on 
participatory democracy.221  
 
The following section analyses the key guiding instrument for improving 
European governance proposed in the White Paper, which is the open 
method of coordination (OMC OMC was seen as a new form of integrative 
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policy-making that enables it to meet external and internal pressures. 222 
The OMC, as will be shown below, promotes a soft policy approach, which 
is applied to a growing number of policy areas, including social exclusion, 
pensions, education, health care, research and development.223  
 
3.3 The Open Method of Coordination 
 
The introduction of new forms of governance in the EU, and in particular 
the open method of coordination, has significantly changed the regulation 
and methods of governance at supranational level. 224  The OMC was 
presented at the European Council in Lisbon as the central tool for fulfilling 
the Lisbon agenda. However, elements of this method have a longer history 
within international governance. For instance, benchmarking and 
evaluations have been the main tools for the IMF and the OECD for 
decades. 225  In the EU context, the OMC is rooted in Treaty-based EU 
policy coordination processes introduced during the 1990s, such as Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG), and a European Employment 
Strategy (EES) developed in order to coordinate the economic policies of 
the member states after ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.226 The OMC is 
defined as a broadly applicable governance instrument for EU policy-
making at the Lisbon Socio-Economic Summit in 2000. 227  OMC was 
defined at Lisbon as a specific ensemble of procedural elements involving 																																																								
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iterative benchmarking of national progress towards common European 
objectives and organized mutual learning. A four step governance 
architecture, modelled on the EES and the four steps, can be distinguished 
in relation to the OMC that have been summarised by Ralf Rogowski in his 
analysis of the White Paper as follows.228 
 
1) Setting up of guidelines supplemented by timetables for achieving the goals 
in the short, medium and long term (the EU Commission makes proposals 
on the guidelines). 
 
2) Introduction of quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks as a 
means of comparing best practices (the EU Commission organises the 
exchange of best practices and makes proposals on indicators). 
 
3) Translation of the European guidelines into national action plans by setting 
specific targets and adopting measures, thereby taking into account national 
and regional characteristics. 
 4) Follow-up	 system:	 monitoring	 and	 evaluating	 combined	 with	 peer	review	(this	provides	support	to	the	processes	of	implementation	and	peer	 review).	 In	 their	 review	 of	 the	 national	 action	 plans	 the	 EU	Commission	 and	 the	 Council	 regularly	 provide	 comments	 and	recommendations	 that	 are	 often	 based	 on	 comparisons	with	 the	 best	performers	and	create	additional	benchmarks	for	each	member	state.	
 
The non-binding nature of the OMC, in comparison to the traditional hard 
supranational legislation, is designed to facilitate the achievement of the 
EU’s main goals by enhancing transparency, mutual learning and peer 
review, while leaving decision-making to the member states.229  
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The OMC is an iterated method, repeating the policy cycle every one to 
three years, depending on the type of policy area in which they operate. An 
OMC is created by the European Council in areas of problem-
interdependence that require policy coordination, but in which member 
states are not willing to delegate authority to the EU. After discussions with 
relevant committees, public and private stakeholders, and outside experts, 
the European Commission makes a proposal for a common strategy for 
dealing with the problems that have been identified. 230 Examples are the 
areas of employment and pensions where this practice has taken place. The 
Commission then suggests a series of guidelines and objectives to the 
Council of Ministers, who might adjust the guidelines and objectives before 
approving them. Generally, the guidelines are presented under a few 
overarching strategic pillars. For example, the guidelines for the 
employment OMC were initially presented under the four pillars of 
Employability, Entrepreneurship, Adaptability and Equal Opportunities. In 
addition to the policy guidelines, the EU Commission proposes quantifiable 
targets or objectives with timetables, either short or medium.231 
 
In contrast to objectives pursued by using the traditional Community 
Method, objectives in OMC guidelines must be reaffirmed at the beginning 
of each cycle and can be amended or removed in the light of experience. 
Jonathan Zeitlin and his colleagues view this as a strong indication of 
Lisbon’s institutionalisation, particularly if one considers the separate 
benchmarking devices and norms adopted by the European Council.232  
 
Secondly, OMCs facilitate several new mechanisms and instruments 
designed to enhance monitoring of policy and performance, such as 
indicators, benchmarks and quantitative targets. The Member States are 																																																								
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expected to produce National Action Plans or National Reports that outline 
the state of affairs in the related policy domains, and actions taken or 
planned in response to the new Community objectives. Throughout the 
course of the process, the EU Commission and the experts assigned by the 
EU Commission monitor the progress in each of the states and in the 
community as a whole. At the end of the annual, biennial or triennial cycle, 
the EU Commission - after consultations with the relevant experts, social 
partners, Parliament and other EU Community entities - presents a draft 
report of the progress made. For example, the Employment Strategy and the 
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines could make explicit recommendations 
from the EU member states. The designated Council body or joint Council 
must approve the Joint Report and submit it to the European Council.233 
 
Thirdly, institutional devises have been introduced to assist cross-national 
learning. One significant institutional innovation is the creation of hybrid 
experts’ groups that involve supranational and intergovernmental experts in 
a consultative body for the Council and Commission. These so-called 
experts’ groups hold non-public meetings approximately every few months, 
which were invented to facilitate mutual learning processes by 
incorporating expertise into the OMC. 234  Though they have no official 
power, the personalised settings where discussions take place encourage a 
free exchange of ideas, and help to build trust between the Commission and 
Member State experts. In addition to the technical evaluation and 
monitoring, these groups and, in some cases, committees are responsible for 
the establishment of policy and performance indicators, which are critical 
for assisting the monitoring process and exchange of comparable 
information. 235  Also, in some OMCs, the EU Commission arranges 																																																								
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voluntary peer reviews in which Member State, stakeholders, the EU 
Commission, national and independent experts engage in a qualitative 
review of members’ best practice, which may include site visits and the 
exchange of expert reports, and in-depth discussions varying on the policy 
area at stake. 236 
 
The Lisbon European Council described the OMC as a fully decentralised 
approach, incorporating regional and local governments, and the EU 
Commission develops benchmarking exercises for managing change by 
networking with different providers and users, namely the interest groups, 
companies and NGOs. OMC is a particularly flexible EU governance tool, 
which has been designed to fit the policy logic of different domains, such as 
employment, pensions, education, healthcare, the level of problem 
interdependence, and the national sensitivity around the particular 
concerning area. 237  
 
After the re-launch of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005, on the bases of the 
recommendations of the two Kok reports, the OMC for economics and 
employment policies were integrated under the Lisbon agenda. This 
redesign of the OMC did address the problems of effectiveness, legitimacy 
and visibility by calling for a broader set of actors to be involved at member 
state level. 238 However, other issues, like the specificity of policy targets 
and democratic participation, remain problematic. 239  When the Lisbon 
Strategy expired in 2010, it was replaced by the Europe 2020 Strategy, 
which broadened the commitment to EU social cohesion objectives by 																																																																																																																																																																												
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introducing new headline targets and integrated guidelines aimed – inter 
alia – at reducing poverty and social exclusion.240  
 
From a legal perspective, the OMC is non-binding and ultimately voluntary 
in nature. The OMC is designed to be flexible. Its voluntary nature allows 
member states to amend reforms in accordance with the structures of their 
regimes, institutional networks and their specific circumstances.241 It allows 
for a wide-ranging participation of social partners. Nevertheless, if a 
Member State decides not to cooperate or chooses à la carte which policies 
it wishes to follow while resisting others, there are no hard sanctions that 
could be imposed.  
 
Therefore, the effectiveness of the OMC mainly depends on the 
participants’ willingness to cooperate or, to use the language of reflexive 
law, to engage in self-regulation. 242 However, from a policy-oriented view, 
it is a widely-shared belief that in areas such as employment and social 
policy, the OMC is the suitable method because Member States are largely 
unwilling to transfer sovereignty beyond coordination. The soft law 
approach of the OMC appears to have advantages for national governments, 
because they might get impulses to reform their systems without losing 
their sovereignty. 243 
 
In theory, the OMC prompts a learning process, in which member states are 
subjected to benchmarking, peer review and evaluations of their 
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progress.244 The outcomes of the ‘OMC in action’ show few examples of 
successful learning. 245  However, there seems to be some evidence of 
learning from negative experience. The results of evaluations and 
benchmarking can lead to open criticism of Member States governments. 
The so-called soft sanctions of ‘naming and shaming’ can harm the 
reputation of member states that score less favourably and put their 
governments under pressure to conform.246  
 
The OMC has been criticized in a number of ways. Doubts have been 
voiced, for example, about the implementation process, alleging that the 
production of the National Action Plan is often an affair solely involving 
technocrats and government officials.247 Furthermore, sociological accounts 
of the monitoring process see it riddled with cultural misunderstandings and 
linguistic ambiguities. It has also been suggested that a proper theoretical 
account of the use of OMC in economic, employment and social policies is 
lacking.248 
 
3.4 Reflexive governance 
 
It will be argued in the following that we witness a transformation of new 
governance into reflexive governance in EU policy-making. There is a 
growing use of reflexive forms of governance within the EU that transforms 
the technocratic limits of the OMC in order to develop more effective 
policies, regulations and laws. Reflexive approaches view diversity of 
policies, laws and practices across the EU Member States as the basis for 																																																								
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experimentation and mutual learning within the overall process of European 
governance. There are three main aspects that distinguish OMC and new 
governance from reflexive governance.  
 
Firstly, the EU Commission uses new governance and OMC as a top-down 
approach. It operates with a model that ideas developed at the EU level 
gradually influence developments at national or sub-national level. Change 
occurs as a result of shaming by the Commission. Reflexive governance 
suggests instead a holistic approach and argues that policy change may 
result as much from bottom-up as top-down pressures. Key are processes of 
diffusion through mimesis or discourse, deliberation, learning, and 
networks. 
 
Secondly, reflexive governance emphasises the multilevel nature of 
governance. The multilevel approach transcends a new governance 
approach insofar as decision-making authority is distributed across more 
than one level of relatively autonomous public-sector institutions. In that, 
reflexive governance promotes a shift of responsibilities to a lower level of 
governance and views governance as supportive of self-regulation.  
 
Thirdly, reflexive governance argues that this shift of responsibilities has to 
be reflected in the use of new legal instruments. The OMCs resort to moral 
or political pressure in only a second-best solution. Flexibilisation of 
exiting legal instruments constitute a core concern of reflexive governance.   
 
Reflexive governance has been introduced as a new concept that responds 
to a shift in understanding processes of decision-making, policy making and 
policy implementation. This can broadly be described as a shift from a 
primary focus on the top down activities of government, whether operating 
through regulatory, financial or educational instruments, to governance, 
which recognises a much broader mix of participants involved in policy 
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making and implementation processes. 249   These actors are active at 
various governance levels, ranging from global to local, with often 
overlapping and conflicting jurisdictions. It is through networks around 
government ministries on regional, national and local levels responsible for 
a policy sector that policy gets formulated and implemented.  
 
Reflexive forms of governance enable stakeholders to frame and tackle 
problems in collaboration. Key component to the success of reflexive 
governance is to include individuals, organisations and agencies in 
collective learning and collaboration. This means breaking away from 
routines that are no longer appropriate to the problem, and experimenting, 
adapting and reviewing new measures in a search for more flexible 
relations.250 This includes viewing the policy process as shared problem 
construction and searching for collective solutions to a similar problem. 
Since various groups of people conceive of the world in different ways, 
different actors will frame the object of governance and its boundaries 
differently. How these different framings are interactively and mutually 
negotiated has an important bearing in reflexive governance.  According to 
Schutter and Lenoble, there are four key characteristics of reflexive 
governance, which are collective learning, active participation, global 
interaction, and innovative problem-solving.251  
 
a) Collective learning is a key element of reflexive governance approaches. 
The aim is to provide a platform for dialogue and mutual learning between 
different levels of governance and actors engaged in different practices. The 
line of communication here is not vertical and not a feedback mechanism. 
Reflexive governance transcends a top-down approach by shifting decision-
making responsibilities to and into an organised discussion, where there is 
the possibility for a broader spectrum of perspectives that can be heard, in 																																																								
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which compromise must be reached between the participants on the basis of 
rational argument and experiences. However, the reflexive approach to 
governance transient collaborative-deliberative approaches, represented by 
the work of Charles Sabel and his colleagues, 252  which promote local 
experimentalism and use Habermas’ discourse theory of communicative 
action.253 Reflexive governance does not privilege consensus and allows 
room for as much dissensus as necessary. The bases of success for reflexive 
governance depends on the participants to actively engage and participate in 
dialogue and experimentation, and thereby engage in the process of mutual 
learning. Learning is conceived as a continuous process of reflexive 
learning in which knowledge is developed through a feedback circle 
between different actors characterised by double-loop learning 254  that 
focuses on rethinking of existing policies and strategies. This approach 
suggests a new set of dynamics that enables learning between a mixture of 
governmental and non-governmental participants. 255 The work on reflexive 
learning contributes to the previous literature on reflexive approaches to 
governance by integrating theories of collective and mutual learning with 
organisational theory and links the process of collective learning to the 
three other core aspects of reflexive governance such as active 
participation, global interaction and innovative tools that can lead to 
implementation of knowledge.  
 
b) Active participation: Reflexive governance emphasises that active 
participation of a wider set of actors at domestic, regional, and local level is 
key to successful policymaking. It allows for interest groups and expert 
individuals to become active participants and engage in exchange of 																																																								
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knowledge between different levels of actors involved in the process of 
policymaking. This is unlike the ‘new governance’ approach, where the 
Commission and governments of Member States are the main actors that 
participate in the process of policymaking. Reflexive governance means 
inclusion of civil society and citizen groups in consultation processes and 
supporting governance in shaping policy and regulation.256 It also means 
shifting responsibility to lower levels and engaging citizens in 
policymaking. 257  The representation of different interests of stakeholder 
groups is possible, although the representation of larger sections of citizens 
cannot be guaranteed by this procedure and complex collective choice must 
be part of a concept of active participation. 258 . Nevertheless, from a 
reflexive governance perspective, it is important to collaborate and involve 
local movements, NGOs and individual experts at local level in 
policymaking and the process of preparing policies and regulations. 259  
 
c) Global interaction: The theory of reflexive governance emphasises that 
governance at national and local level has to be understood as part of global 
responses to global problems. Thus, it sees globalisation as an opportunity 
for reflexive governance to gain useful knowledge and for benchmarking 
national policy and regulations against international standards. 
Furthermore, reflexive governance is aware that national and local 
initiatives must be evaluated and enriched in the light of fast-changing 
global conditions.260 It recognises the need for global knowledge transfer 
and the willingness and ability to exchange useful knowledge. The global 
knowledge transfer involves a number of steps that include idea creation, 
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sharing, evaluation, dissemination and adoption.261 These five steps are key 
for reflexive governance because decision-making processes in reflexive 
governance usually are not based on a single event, but rather a series of 
interactions and discoveries that make use of knowledge in different local, 
national and global settings.262  
 
d) Innovative problem solving: The theory of reflexive governance pays 
particular attention to process of innovation and experimentation in solving 
policy shortcomings. This includes capacities to create new solutions to 
policy shortcomings, as well as improving regulations, trainings, structures, 
technology and knowledge transfers. However, new instruments and policy 
do not automatically emerge from old instruments and policy. This requires 
innovative experimentalism. For example, exchanges between different 
regions can foster innovation, as each region will have to redefine its 
policies, strategies and improve on them in light of the successes and 
failures of others that have used a particular instrument. 263An important 
condition in order to successfully produce new ideas is innovative training, 
which then can lead to the discovery of new effective instruments. In order 
to learn from experience innovatively it is crucial to design mechanisms 
that can monitor failure and success of past experience. In other words, 
knowledge has to be converted from tacit to explicit knowledge.264 This 
process requires tools such as databases, or apps that can allow access to 
best practice examples. Technology has been fundamental to innovation 
and it has enhanced wider participation throughout the world. 265  For 
instance, nowadays surveys can be carried out through online platforms and 
the use of technology has been useful to evaluate the knowledge through 																																																								
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survey, which then leads to further innovation and experimentation of 
policies.266 Finally, online platforms have been key to lowering the barriers 
for the dissemination of knowledge dramatically and have been a good 
platform to obtain knowledge for innovation. It is easier than ever before to 
target and inform people in both desirable and rather undesirable ways. For 
instance, groups can discuss new ideas though online tools and spread 
valuable information on an independent basis. Such global participants can 
make citizens a valuable source and can help to create acceptance and 
transparency tools, which lead to a potentially innovative and better 
policy.267  
 
The four elements features of reflexive governance above, when applied to 
policies and initiatives of the EU, can explain why new governance is 
gradually transforming into reflexive governance. Furthermore, the theory 
of reflexive governance can be enhanced by using social system theory as 
demonstrated by Ralf Rogowski. In doing so, it quickly becomes clear that 
the notion of reflexive governance is based on the concept of reflexive law. 
Reflexive law is a means to develop and find new ways to support reflexive 
policy-making in the EU. The following section explains the theory of 
reflexive law and its role in reflexive governance.  
 
3.5 Reflexive law  
 
The theory of reflexive law adds important elements to the theory of 
reflexive governance in accordance with social systems theory. Reflexive 
law views and understands the legal system as an autonomous function 
system within society, placed on the same level as the economy and the 
political system. According to Niklas Luhmann, the legal system is guided 
by the necessity to safeguard its self-reference and self-reproduction, in 
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other words its autopoiesis. 268  Reflexive law provides the basis for an 
evaluation of the limits, but also the potentials of law as a mechanism for 
social change.269 
 
According to Luhmann’s theory of society, 270 subsystems such as law and 
politics are operationally closed and cognitively open systems of 
communication. Operational closure means that they can reproduce 
themselves through self-regulations of these communications.271 It leads in 
case of law to a normatively closed system of counterfactually stabilised 
expectations. Only law transmits normative validity to its elements and this 
process allows for legislation and adjudication to take place, which enable 
law to create law.  
 
In Luhmann’s theory of societal development, possibilities for reflexive 
processes increase when society has adopted functional differentiation as its 
mode of integration.272 Luhmann demonstrated this in relation to what he 
calls positivisation of law and the argument goes as follows. Reflexivity 
takes place when the legal system becomes an autonomous function system 
of society. Reflexivity arises as a by-product of norm application in 
decision-making. It defines the process of presenting new types of norms 
for the regulation of norm application. By evolving second-order norms, the 
legal system becomes able to carry out decision-making founded on the 
application of the binary code legal and illegal. Therefore, reflexivity 
contributes to the closure of the system and to its autonomy.273  
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Reflexivity in the sense of ‘norming of norms’ is not unfamiliar to legal 
theory and is discussed in numerous ways. Hans Kelsen’s idea of a pyramid 
of norms as a self-validating mechanism of law in which higher norms 
provide legitimacy to lower-ranking norms is an example. 274  Another 
example is H.L.A. Hart’s concept of secondary legal laws as norms of 
ordering primary legal norms.275 Reflexivity as an instrument of self-control 
of law and stabilizer of positivisation of law can be distinguished from the 
founding reflexivity connected to the stabilization of expectations. 
Fundamental for the development of law as a system according to Luhmann 
is the development of reflexive expectations. The processing of normative 
expectations lies at the heart of the evolution of law as an autonomous legal 
system in society.276   
 
Ralf Rogowski distinguishes between internal and external reflexivity in 
system theoretical accounts of the legal system. 277 The main interest of 
Niklas Luhmann was in reflexive processes inside systems. With the 
concept of reflexive law, Gunther Teubner278 focuses on external reflexivity 
in inter-systemic links. In his new theory of regulations, reflexivity refers to 
the law’s capability to reflect on its regulatory abilities. The theory of 
reflexive law is not merely an abstract interpretation of modern law, but has 
solid implications for regulatory design. It argues that, in seeking to 
influence other autopoietic systems, which are operationally closed to their 
environment, the legal system resorts to indirect means of regulation.  
 
The main reasons are that legal intervention is dependent on self-regulation 
within the systems, which are the target of legal intervention. For regulation 
to be successful, it has to facilitate self-reflection and self-regulation. The 
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forms of law have to shift from substantive to procedural law.279 This Law 
becomes reflexive when it understands that regulation depends on processes 
of self-regulation within other social systems. The regulation of other social 
systems needs a sophisticated reinterpretation of societal prerequisites into 
legal facilitation. Regulation of other social systems differs because there 
are no essential internal guidelines for the legal system to constrain any 
potential destructive use of regulations. Thus, the legal system has to rely 
on external sources to assess its impact.280 
 
Teubner’s well-known regulatory trilemma is a good example of an 
analysis of the limits of regulation. Hugh Collins describes this trilemma as 
‘either the legal rules may fail to have an impact on social practice, or they 
may subvert the desirable social practices by making impractical demands, 
or the law may lose the coherence of its own analytical framework by 
seeking to incorporate sociological and economic perspective in its 
reasoning’.281 Teubner called his account of the trilemma a ‘strategy for 
post-regulatory law’, but it is in fact a complex account of modern limits 
and potentials of legal regulation.  
 
Teubner proposes as solution for the trilemma that regulation has to become 
regulation of self-regulation. Ralf Rogowski, in his account of successful 
legal regulation, adds that self-regulation requires as precondition law’s 
own self-regulation. Reflexive law means that law transforms itself so that 
it becomes capable of facilitating self-regulation in other systems. This 
means, in practical terms, the development of new forms of law, in 
particular soft law, and a shift to procedural tools that allow law to 
influence self-regulation indirectly.282  
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The idea of proceduralism is inspired by a number of debates, amongst 
them the legal philosophy of Jürgen Habermas. In Habermas opus magnum 
on law, Between Facts and Norms, Habermas suggests that proceduralism 
is not just an important form of law in modern societies, but part of a 
paradigm shift towards deliberation as a form of regulation.283 For Jacques 
Lenoble, the paradigm shift to procedure in governance results from the 
failure of the dominant formal and material programmes of modern law.284 
Others argue that proceduralisation is linked to formalisation and according 
to Rudolf Wietholter a particular form of juridification.285   
 
However, the reflexive law transience proceduralism, which is based on 
Habermas theory of modern law as deliberation, is ill-suited to an analysis 
of supranational forms of law- making. OMC leaves the idea of polity 
behind.286 Indeed, the OMC is an example of reflexive governance and 
reflexive new forms of law that facilitate self-regulation in Member 
States.287  
 
The Commission uses methods such as recommendations, monitoring, and 
peer review to create new forms of soft law that facilitate self-regulation. 
These new modes of governance are not legally binding. From the 
beginning, European Community and European Union practice has relied 
on a range of not legally binding instruments and the European institutions 
themselves envisaged soft law and self-regulation as regulatory alternatives.  
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The European instruments and mechanism that are discussed under the 
heading of soft law are numerous. They can be categorised in different 
ways according to Linda Senden. 288  For example, action programmes 
created by the Commission and adopted by the Council are preparatory and 
informative instruments.289 Some researchers also include green and white 
papers issued by the Commission amongst the informative instruments, and 
qualify them as soft law.290 In particular Communications published by the 
Commission are informative instruments that are addressed at wider public 
including other institutions, private stakeholders and civil society. 
 
In addition interpretative and decisional instruments, whose role is to 
interpret primary or secondary EU law, are also called ‘communications’.291 
Generally, interpretative communications are issued by the Commission 
and other EU institutions. 292  Decisional instruments are decisional 
guidelines, codes and frameworks that are also issued by the Commission. 
Their objective is to support rulemaking in areas where the Commission 
assists Member States. 
 
Another form of soft law are steering instruments such as Council 
declarations, joint declarations, inter-institutional agreements and Council 
resolutions,293 as are Council and Commission ethical codes of conduct or 
practice. The Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, which was adopted 
by the Commission on 13th September 2000 and which applies to 
Commission staff in their dealings with the public is an example of 
regulation of self-regulation after the scandals of the Santer Commission in 
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1999.294 In this case, soft-law is used by the Commission to regulate itself 
and constitutes a European form of self-regulation and reflexive governance 
of EU law and policy.  
  
An analysis of EU Anti-Corruption Report as reflexive governance 
 
In the final section of this chapter, seven components of the theories of 
reflexive governance and reflexive law discussed above will be applied in 
analysing the EU Anti-Corruption Report as a form of reflexive 
governance. The seven components are collective learning, active 
participation, global interaction, innovative problem-solving, 
proceduralism, soft law and regulation of self-regulation. 
 
The first component of reflexive governance, ‘collective learning’, is a key 
characteristic of the Report. One of its main aims is to support different 
actors to engage in learning best practice from each other. Curial 
information for collective learning is provided in the section classified as 
‘the main findings of the EU Anti-Corruption Report’. This section of the 
Report analyses the state of corruption in all EU Member States and 
identifies sectors vulnerable to corruption. For example urban development 
and construction are sectors identified in the Report as being vulnerable to 
corruption in some Member States. In response to the risk of corruption in 
these areas, the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggests that Member States 
establish a specialised prosecution service. In addition the Report finds that 
environmental planning is an area vulnerable to corruption in some Member 
States where granting of planning permits, particularly for large-scale 
projects, has been affected by allegations. Another sector is healthcare that 
the EU Anti-Corruption Report finds vulnerable to corruption, especially 
regarding procurement and the pharmaceutical industry. Further sector in 
which the EU Anti-Corruption Report identifies serious problems in some 
Member States is tax administration.  
 																																																								
294 Topan, A. (2002), ‘The Resignation of the Santer-Commission: The Impact of 'Trust' 
and 'Reputation'. European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Vol. 6. pp. 1-14. 
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Finally, the Report highlights in its thematic chapter the risks with 
corruption in public procurement in all of the Member States. It suggests a 
far-reaching anti-corruption agenda to tackle corruption in public 
procurement that covers politics, banking, police, local government and 
other corruption-related sub-sectors.  
 
By identifying areas that are vulnerable, the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
suggests learning from negative experience. Furthermore, collective 
learning is supported by the EU Anti-Corruption Report by offering 
indicators of corruption that poses a direct risk in vulnerable sectors. Good 
practices are presented as sources of inspiration for collective learning. An 
example of best practices in the area of ‘Financing of Political Parties’, that 
is advocated by the EU Commission is Finland which has a ‘well-regulated 
and transparent funding system’. It can serve as a best practice in the EU 
from which other Member States can learn in improving their own 
regulation of political party financing.  
 
An area of successful collective learning from best practice is preventative 
policies according to the Report. The Commission singles out the 
Netherlands and its ‘public sector integrity’ initiative as the best model to 
promote integrity in the public sector with the aim of preventing corruption 
in public administration. The EU Commission suggests that other Member 
States can collectively learn from the Netherlands model to reform their 
own polices and regulations to promote higher integrity in the public sector.   
 
The EU Commission also mentions a number of anti-corruption agencies 
that the EU has assisted in being established. They include ‘The Slovenian 
Commission for Prevention of Corruption’, ‘The Romanian National Anti-
Corruption Directorate’, ‘The Latvian Bureau for Prevention and 
Combating of Corruption’, ‘Spanish specialised anti-corruption prosecution 
office’ and ‘The Croatian Bureau for Combating Corruption and Organized 
Crime’. These agencies are examples of sharing best practice that the EU 
Commission in the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggests for other Member 
States to reflect on when designing their own anti-corruption policy. 
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Member States that were recommended in the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
to establish or enhance their anti-corruption agencies are encouraged to 
asses the experience and models of agencies mentioned above as best 
practice suggested by the EU Commission for establishing an effective anti-
corruption organisation. 
 
The best practices strategy of the Commission can be interpreted has a form 
of reflexive governance by which the Report provides a platform for 
learning between different levels of governance, in which participants are 
able to actively engage and participate in dialogue and experimentation, 
thereby engaging in a process of learning.  
 
The second component of reflexive governance, ‘active participation’ is a 
key element of reflexive governance approach. For collective learning to 
occur, active participation must take place at domestic, regional, and local 
level. This component of reflexive governance focuses in particular on civil 
society to get involved in policymaking, and is viewed as key for active 
participation of a different range of actors. Reflexive governance differs in 
this respect from the New Governance approach where the Commission and 
Member States are the main actors that participate in the process as active 
participants in developing a certain policy. In other words, the active 
participation concept requires that the Commission is shifting 
responsibilities to develop anti-corruption policy and measurements to 
lower levels.  
 
The central concern with ‘active participation’ is widely evident in the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report, as the overall goal of the Report is to involve a 
wide range of participants from the governmental and non-governmental 
sectors in shaping policies, laws and regulations at EU, Member State, 
regional and local level. This feature of the Report is evidence for its 
concern with reflexive governance. It does not impose standards but 
encourages actors to revisit and redefine their interests and actions through 
ongoing deliberative processes.  
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A good example of support of active participation – in particular, shifting 
responsibilities to local level - can be identified in the thematic chapter of 
the EU Anti-Corruption Report. The risk of public procurement at regional 
and local levels is addressed and the EU Anti-Corruption Report finds that 
public procurement at regional and local levels raises particular issues 
where local authorities have wide discretionary powers that are not matched 
with sufficient checks and balances mechanisms. Furthermore, the Report 
finds that, in some regions and municipalities, a strong network of clientele 
around small interest groups were developed. The Report shows that, in 
some Member States, local administrations have developed their own anti-
corruption action plans. The Report also shows that, in a few cases, civil 
society initiatives have had a beneficial effect on the accountability of local 
administrations with regard to transparency of public spending. Thus, from 
a reflexive governance theory perspective, the active participation - in 
particular, shifting responsibilities to local level – occurs, in particular local 
experimentation.  
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report recommends two best practices from 
Member States’ local government own initiatives. The first example is the 
‘Slovakia Open Local Government Initiative’. The Report suggests that the 
Slovakia Open Local Government Initiative is an external monitoring of 
public spending mechanisms in Slovakia, which is run by Transparency 
International that ranks 100 Slovak towns according to a set of criteria 
based on transparency in public procurement, access to information, 
availability of data of public interest, public participation, professional 
ethics and conflicts of interests. The second example is the German model, 
which has developed ‘guidelines for prevention of corruption in public 
procurement at local level’. The EU Anti-Corruption Report singles out the 
‘Brochure on the Prevention of Corruption in Public Tendering’, jointly 
approved by the German Association of Towns and Municipalities and the 
Federal Association of Small and Medium-Sized Building Contractors. The 
Brochure provides an overview of preventive measures against corruption 
in public procurement at the level of towns and municipalities. The 
objectives of this German initiative are to enhance codes of conduct to 
	 102	
regulate sponsorship and acceptance of gifts, establishing centralised 
authorities for public tenders, increasing the use of e-procurement, 
exclusion of enterprises found guilty of corruption offences and 
establishing black lists/corruption registers.  
 
From a reflexive governance perspective, these two examples can be 
understood as attempts of the EU Anti-Corruption Report in supporting 
local experimentation and active participation at local and regional level in 
order to develop instruments that can prevent and fight corruption 
effectively. The Report presents two examples of successful local initiatives 
that other Member States can learn from and adopt to their own local 
initiatives to fight corruption.  
 
Reflexive governance in form of support of active participation also 
characterises the processes that led to the introduction of the EU Anti-
Corruption Report itself. There was a wide range of actors that participated 
in the establishing of the EU Anti-Corruption Report. These included the 
EU Commission, Member States, government officials, non-governmental 
organisations, civil society and academia. The most prominent examples of 
active participation were two occasions in the process of preparing the 
Report in form of two regional workshops. The first regional workshop 
took place in Sofia, Bulgaria on 10-11 December 2012, and the second 
regional workshop took place in Gothenburg, Sweden on the 5th March 
2013. In both workshops there were representatives from the DG Home 
Affairs, representatives from each of the Member States’ national 
authorities, civil society, independent experts and groups of experts selected 
by the EU Commission, academia, NGOs, journalists and business 
representatives. All of the participants came from a wide variety of 
backgrounds and engaged actively in supporting and consulting the 
Commission in preparing the EU Anti-Corruption Report. Thus, the process 
of creating the Report was a result of reflexive governance in the form of 
active participation.  
 
	 103	
The third crucial component, ‘global interaction’, is another key element of 
reflexive governance. It emphasises the importance of global challenges for 
local, national and supranational efforts. Corruption as well as anti-
corruption has to be understood as a result of the increasingly global and 
highly integrated world society and its economy. The global interaction 
component of the theory of reflexive governance is also evident in the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report in viewing its response to fight corruption as part of 
global efforts.   
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report, as illustrated in Chapter 2, is part of a 
global response to improve legal regulation and policies of anticorruption. 
The Report acknowledges the influences of international bodies such as 
GRECO, UN and the OCED on its design and content. The EU Anti-
Corruption Report is itself a response to pressures on the European Union 
and its Member State governments to pay closer attention to informal and 
corrupt practices after the 2008 global financial crisis. For example, the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report is a means to implement the UN convention against 
corruption known as UNCAC. In the light of the economic challenges both 
in Europe and elsewhere, stronger guarantees of integrity and transparency 
of public expenditure were seen as necessary after the global financial crisis 
of 2008. In surveys and opinion polls conducted in research preparing for 
the Report, citizens responded that they expect the EU to play an important 
role in assisting Member States after the global financial crisis and the Euro 
crises to protect their economy against organised crime, financial and tax 
fraud, money laundering and corruption. The EU Anti-Corruption Report 
indicates that the responses	 by	 citizens to implement international anti-
corruption initiatives were positive, especially in times of economic crisis 
and budgetary austerity.  
 
Another example of global interaction in the EU Anti-Corruption Report is 
the use of international indicators, corruption indices and, in particular, the 
Transparency International CPI index. The EU Anti-Corruption Report 
makes use of the CPI index published by Transparency International, firstly 
to understand the ranking of each of the Member States and, secondly, the 
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sectors that are perceived to be mostly affected by corrupt practices. From 
reflexive governance perspectives, the EU Anti-Corruption Report uses 
global instruments such as the Transparency International CPI index to 
prepare some of the policy objectives of the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
and to double check their own research, in particular the Special 
Eurobarometer and the business-focused flash survey. The involvement of 
international indicators such as the CPI index is another example where the 
EU Anti-Corruption Report engages in global interaction, a key component 
of reflexive governance.  
 
The open acknowledgment of the EU Anti-Corruption Report that it is an 
anti-corruption instrument in response to global efforts fighting corruption 
is an indication of reflexive governance. The EU Anti-Corruption Report is 
thereby making a valuable contribution to strengthening global efforts in 
fighting corruption. Furthermore, it engages in reflexive governance insofar 
as it makes Member States aware of opportunities and obligations in the 
global fight against corruption.     
 
The fourth element of the theory of reflexive governance, ‘innovative 
problem-solving’, also characterises the governance approach of the Report. 
This is true in relation to evaluation of existing capacities in order to create 
new solutions to policy shortcomings and enhancing instruments to 
improve regulations, policy, training, technology and knowledge transfer 
between Member States. The EU Anti-Corruption Report suggests that 
Member States find innovative solutions in two additional ways; by 
learning from best practices from other Member States and by creatively 
implementing international standards in fighting corruption. In fact, the 
Report itself can be seen as a mutual experience-sharing programme to 
develop innovative tools to prevent corruption practices.  
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report encourages in particular finding innovative 
solutions in fighting corruption in public procurement, a very important 
area for the EU economy, as approximately one fifth of the EU’s GDP is 
spent every year by public entities. The Report itself calls for stronger 
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integrity standards in the area of public procurement and suggests 
improvements in control mechanisms in a number of Member States. The 
detailed information and specific points suggested for further improvement 
are suggested in each of the country chapters as explained in Chapter 2. The 
main section suggests that the EU Anti-Corruption Report should raise 
awareness of the rules among all public procurement actors and promote a 
culture of integrity in public service. Thus, from a theory of reflexive 
governance point of view, the EU Anti-Corruption Report supports Member 
States to reflect on their shortcomings and introduce innovate new tools and 
instruments to promote integrity in public service. Research shows295 that 
Member States are testing new ways and use technology to better collect 
and analyse data in order to improve public procurement governance, thus 
ensuring a better collection of data on procurement. Member States are 
using technology and innovative tools to establish contract registries for 
public procurement contracts, to establish public procurement irregularities 
databases based on remedies and audits, to develop anomalies detection 
tools, and to ensure interconnectedness between public procurement data 
and public and business registries and EU funds databases. A good example 
of innovative use of technology in the Member States is the introduction of 
an e-procurement system. The EU Commission aims for all the Member 
States to have an e-procurement system in place	 by 2018, which ultimately 
will help to reach the EU Anti-Corruption Report objectives to promote a 
higher culture of integrity in public service, as well as reducing corruption 
in the area related to public procurement. The EU Anti-Corruption Report 
has suggested for the improvement of integrity in public service also at 
local and regional government.  
 
In addition to the four key components of reflexive governance mentioned 
and identified above, the EU Anti-Corruption Report is innovative in terms 
of reflexive law. Its approach is characterised by proceduralism, use of soft 
law and regulation of self-regulation. These features are used in order to 																																																								
295 European Parliament (2015), eGovernment: Using technology to improve public 
services and democratic participation. EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service 
Author — PE 565.890. 
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support Member States to enhance their anti-corruption policies, laws, 
programmes and agendas to fight corruption.  
 
There are signs that	 the Report takes seriously the paradigm shift towards 
deliberation as a form of regulation. It uses insights of the theory of 
reflexive law on ‘proceduralism’ that express a new understanding of law in 
modern society. Proceduralism supports the idea that a broader range of 
actors is involved in the process of policymaking. The main insight of 
proceduralism, offered by the theory of reflexive law, relates to the function 
of procedure and procedural requirements in structuring participation.  
 
The importance of participatory procedure can also be detected in the 
creation of the Report. In its preparation, a procedure was followed that 
involved a group of experts from a wide variety of backgrounds to advise 
the EU Commission. In addition, a network of research correspondents 
collected and processed information from each of the Member States. 
Furthermore, the Commission held expert meetings with the participation of 
national authorities, researchers, NGOs, journalists and business 
representatives. Proceduralism guaranteed the involvement of civil society 
and that civil society actors become part of the process in preparing the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report. Furthermore, proceduralism characterises the 
structure and the process of dialogue between the Commission, Member 
States and civil society, as well as the involvement of different actors that 
go beyond the EU Commission and national authorities, and include the 
findings of civil society in the Report.  
 
Proceduralism also typifies the organisation of the Report itself. Procedural 
devices are the biannual cycle of the EU Anti-Corruption Report and the 
request of the Member States to respond to the recommendations and 
outstanding issues that the EU Anti-Corruption Report mentions. The 
Member State response is expected to take the form of a national action 
plan. A number of Member States, including the UK and Romania, have 
already adopted an anti-corruption national action plan, with a clear 
timetable and procedures as to what each sector should do in enhancing 
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measurements and regulations to address corruption and irregular practices 
more effectively.  
 
Overall, the nature of the EU Anti-Corruption Report is characterised by 
proceduralism. The procedure for regulation by dialogue used in the Report 
is not dissimilar to the procedure and the technique of the OMC and new 
governance in general. The Report is in fact a monitoring instrument that 
observes and reports on the level of corruption and on the measures to fight 
it in each of the Member States. 
 
Another sign of the reflexivity of the governance approach of the EU Anti-
Corruption Report is the choice of ‘soft law’ as its main legal instrument. 
The EU Anti-Corrupting Report does not operate with legally binding ‘hard 
law’. Instead it favours soft law instruments, well known in international 
and European law, such as ‘codes of conduct’, ‘guidelines’, 
communications’ and other non-treaty obligations. Reference to these forms 
of soft law can be found throughout the Report, including the national 
chapters, the thematic chapter on public procurement	 and in particular the 
recommendations issued for each Member State.   
 
The choice of Recommendation as the main legal instrument in conducting 
a dialogue with the Member States is one of the clearest indication of the 
reflexive governance nature of the Report. Recommendations are 
suggestions for the Member States to take action but are not automatically 
binding. However, they are instruments of governance because they aim at 
closer cooperation and coordination among the Member States within the 
EU. In addition to promotion and coordination of national policies, they 
also aim at contributing to the establishment of anti-corruption as a policy 
field at supranational level. The EU Anti-Corruption Report itself is a major 
stepping-stone in the construction of this policy field.  
 
The final component, ‘regulation of self-regulation’, is probably the key 
concept offered by the theories of reflexive governance and reflexive law. It 
captures the overarching approach to governance taken in the Report. Ralf 
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Rogowski, in his account of reflexive law, suggests that reflexive legal 
regulation means that legal regulation has to transform itself so that it 
becomes capable of facilitating self-regulation in other systems. This 
means, in practical terms, the development of new forms of law that allow 
law to assists self-regulation.  
 
The way regulation of self-regulation operates in practice can be 
demonstrated in relation to how the recommendations of the EU Anti-
Corruption Report were generated. In the first instance Member States were 
asked to identify their anti-corruption policy shortcomings and engage with 
the EU Commission in writing up their own recommendations in the 
Report. The recommendations that were finally issued for each of the 
national chapters were officially written by the EU Commission but 
followed closely the reports of each of the Member States. In practice the 
EU Commission was inviting Member States to reflect on their own policy 
shortcomings in addressing the issue of corruption and write their own 
recommendations in the EU Anti-Corruption Report. Thus, the 
recommendations of the Report are truly reflexive as they just mirror self-
identified problems and thereby become part of self-regulations of Member 
States. 
 
In summary, the seven components of the theory of reflexive governance 
can all be found and are characterising the governance approach of the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report. Overall, the main aim of the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report is regulation of self-regulation by actively supporting Member 
States in creating and conducting their own anti-corruption policies. The 
theory of reflexive governance can show that the governance approach of 
the EU Anti-Corruption Report is not just new governance, but reflexive in 
its nature because it consciously aims at creating a European anticorruption 
policy through supporting and strengthening Member State anticorruption 
policies.  
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Chapter 4 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter discusses first findings on the impact and achievements of the 
EU Anti-Corruption Report in its first two years of operation. The insights 
are derived from three case studies on the United Kingdom, Romania and 
Albania and the chapter is accordingly divided into three parts. The first 
part on the UK illustrates the recommendations that the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report made for the UK and how the UK has implemented the 
recommendations into concrete policy actions. It also evaluates to what 
extent the UK engages in reflexive governance in developing its anti-
corruption policy field and the interplay with the EU in enhancing its anti-
corruption policy. The second part on Romania explains the 
recommendations of the EU Anti-Corruption Report for Romania and 
comments on the EU approach towards Romania and the anti-corruption 
policy reforms that Romania has implemented prior and after accession, 
with a particular focus on the post-accession instrument known as the 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanisms. Furthermore it analyses the 
efforts Romania has made in implementing the recommendations of the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report and to what extent Romania makes use of reflexive 
governance in establishing its anti-corruption policy field. The third part on 
Albania analyses the steps this country has taken in developing an anti-
corruption policy field. It distinguishes three phases in the development of 
anti-corruption policy after the downfall of the communist regime. It 
evaluates the assistance of the EU to support Albania in its efforts in 
establishing an anti-corruption policy field and asks whether the interaction 
between the EU and Albania reveals forms of reflexive governance.  
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4.2 The United Kingdom 
 
4.2.1 The EU Anti-Corruption Report for the United Kingdom  
  
The EU Anti-Corruption Report country chapter for the United Kingdom 
suggests several steps for the UK to take into consideration in addressing 
the issue of corruption more effectively. The EU Anti-Corruption Report 
highlights that the UK does not have any issues concerning petty 
corruption. The UK has made positive steps in encouraging companies to 
not get involved in corruption acts and preventing bribing officials overseas 
through good practice guidelines, and rigorous legislation, most nobly 
under the Bribery Act 2010.  
 
Historically, the UK has a long lasting tradition in promoting and 
advocating for high ethical standards in public service and addressing 
corruption. However, the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggested that more 
rigorous efforts are necessary in addressing the risks of corruption in some 
sectors. The EU Anti-Corruption Report recommends that the UK needs to 
establish more effective measurements to prevent and address the potential 
risks of foreign bribery in particular. The Report encourages the UK to 
establish sector-specific guidelines to companies in areas that might be at 
higher risk of being exposed to corrupt acts, particularly in the defence 
sector. In addition, the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggested that further 
steps must be taken to ensure more transparent and dissuasive sanctions in 
out-of-court settlements. 
 
In the light of the banking and large cooperative scandals in the UK prior to 
2014, the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggested that the UK needs to 
further strengthen its accountability of the governance of banks. Those 
features, including more enforcement of the sanctions when wrongdoing 
occurs and the UK should ensure that the beneficial owners of UK 
registered companies are fully declared. The steps suggested by the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report are observed as important for the UK in order to 
tackle bribery and corruption within its financial sector, which came under 
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high scrutiny after the criticisms that the Financial Services Authority 
received and its subsequent abolition that came in April 2013.  
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report finds that the United Kingdom needs to 
pay more attention to encourage higher standards of integrity for elected 
officials and address political corruption. Furthermore, the EU Anti-
Corruption Report suggested that the UK needs to take additional efforts to 
cap down donations to political parties, impose limits on electoral campaign 
spending and ensure practical monitoring instruments in overseeing, and 
prosecution of potential violations of campaign spending. The EU Anti-
Corruption Report also suggested that the UK needs to consider lowering 
the thresholds for the reporting of financial holdings and for the registration 
of received gifts for public office holders. Furthermore, the EU Anti-
Corruption Report suggested that the UK provides clear guidelines on what 
is and what is not acceptable as gifts for Members of Parliament.  
 
Finally, the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggested that the UK has to 
carefully address the issues classified by the Leveson Inquiry concerning 
the legitimate collaboration between the press and the police. The EU Anti-
Corruption Report suggested that there must be a clear time limit set by the 
UK for the employment of former police officers by the media industry. In 
the sections below, there will be a further illustration of the current 
regulation and legislation on areas selected by the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report.     
 
4.2.2 Political Corruption in the United Kingdom 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report finds that the UK needs to pay additional 
attention to political corruption. The EU Anti-Corruption Report suggested 
that the UK has to take additional steps in capping down donations to 
political parties and encourage higher integrity for elected officials. 
Furthermore, the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggested that the UK could 
make further efforts to limit the electoral campaign spending and develop a 
practical monitoring instrument to supervise any violations of campaign 
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spending. In addition, the EU Anti-Corruption Report finds that there must 
be a clearer time limit set when former public officials can be employed by 
the media industry.  
 
The issue of party finance that the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggested 
that the UK has to improve is a complex issue and it has been debated to 
great length on how to reform it in the UK political discourse. Sir Hayden 
Phillips, in his comprehensive review of party finance found that, in the last 
20 years, there has been an intermittent but persistent debate about how to 
reform the funding of political parties.296 Furthermore, this debate must be 
reflected in a wider perspective based on the ongoing changes in the 
environment of the political parties according to Johnston and Pattie.297 
Johal, Moran and Williams’s study of the post 2008 financial crisis 
discovered that the continuous crisis of party funding in the UK has opened 
a window to allow financial interests to have a strong influence in the 
parties.298 On the other hand, the Committee on Standards in Public Life 
found that all parties require their leaders to spend time soliciting those 
individuals or organisations for the funds they need in order to survive.299 If 
one may reflect upon the context of the financial crisis and more general 
paradigms raised by the Committee on Standards in Public Life findings, it 
is somewhat straightforward to come to the notion that this dependency 
cannot be beneficial for democracy.300 As a result, political finance in the 
UK may be hinted through the lens of institutional corruption.  
 
Also the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggests dependency as an issue, but it 
is important to ascertain the degree to which dependency causes harm. In 																																																								
296 VanHeerde-Hudson, J and J. Fisher (2013), ‘Parties heed (with caution): Public 
knowledge of and attitudes towards party finance in Britain’, Sagae Journals Party 
Politics, 19(1), pp. 41-60.  
297 Johnston, R and C. Pattie (2007), ‘Funding Local Political Parties in England and 
Wales: Donations and Constituency Campaigns,’ British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations 9(3), pp. 365 -395.  
298 Sukhdev, J. and, M. Moran and K. Williams (2015), ‘Power, Politics and the City of 
London after the Great Financial Crisis’, Journal of Government and Opposition, 49(3), 
pp. 400-425 
299 Committee on Standards in Public Life (2011), Political Party Finance: Ending the Big 
Donor Culture. Thirteenth Report (Cm 8208 London, Nov), p. 105.  
300 Committee on Standards in Public Life (2011), Political Party Finance: Ending the Big 
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Fisher’s account this is not always clear, but rather ambiguous  regarding 
party election spending, because even though there is evidence that levels 
of campaigning are noticeably linked with turnout, 301  the paradigm 
suggesting that political party spending has an encouraging effect on 
electoral prosperities is difficult to prove.302 On the basis that the electoral 
result of spending appears somewhat ambiguous, one might reason that 
fundraising is not basically such a significant activity for parties after all. 
However, the opposite argument is supported by the fact that a yearly 
donation of £50,000 to the Conservative Party confers membership of the 
so-called Leader’s Group, with a right to meet the Party leader - at the time 
David Cameron and other senior figures from the Conservative Party at 
dinners, post-Prime Minister’s Questions lunches, drinks receptions and 
important election events.303 From this position, it is clear that there exists a 
disparity that arises from a party’s need to secure funding. However, it 
raises serious questions about the possible favouritism that might involve in 
return to these generous donors.    
 
However, the actual harm caused by dependency which is the concern of 
the EU Anti-Corruption Report might not be the most problematic issue. As 
Lawrence Lessig notes, once a dependence is established, even perfectly 
benign behaviour could become corruption in the form of trading of 
influence. 304  Despite a significant legislative overhaul in 2000 by the 
Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, the public in the UK 
remains concerned about the dependence of the parties on donors.305 In 
Johnston and Pattie’s account, this concern relates to the possibility, if not 
actual influence, that donors may have on party policies and 																																																								
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programmes.306 In other words, the likely possibility of having an unhealthy 
dependency, just as the EU Anti-Corruption is concerned among the 
political parties in the UK, is a sufficient ground to not trust in the political 
system. In this view, institutional corruption occurs within the UK political 
system and, as a consequence, has an influence in key economic processes. 
This weakens the effectiveness of an institution and also weakens the 
public’s trust of the institution.307 
 
In 2000, the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act was adopted 
to regulate party finance in the UK. The 2000 Act established for the first 
time an electoral commission, regulation of donations and limited election 
spending.308 Since the Act was adopted, various amendments have been 
made to the PPERA, particularly in response to a scandal in 2006. Where it 
appeared that political parties had been receiving loans at lower than 
commercial rates as a way of avoiding requirements to declare donations, in 
exchange for which it was claimed by some of the loan donors to be put 
forward as nominations for peerages. In Fisher’s account, the House of 
Lords appointments committee rejected all nominations. Nevertheless, the 
loans for peerages were succeeded by a lengthy and expensive police 
investigation, but eventually no charges were made.309 Following from this 
scandal, regulations were amended to include loans in the classification of 
regulated donations.  
 
The examples above show that campaign spending limits have been a long-
standing and dominant feature of British political finance long before the 
EU Anti-Corruption Report was introduced. According to Ewing’s 
observations, a dual role to these limits could be found; firstly, as a policy 
for dealing with electoral corruption, and secondly as a method of 																																																								
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encouraging equality of electoral opportunity.310 If the first of these two 
functions is based on the basis of old governance regulations against 
individual corruption, it appears that the second needs additional attention. 
Fisher presents the potential significance of spending limits by supporting 
that uncontrolled funds are superior to any other form of resources that go 
into political life. 311 This is because money could acquire almost all of the 
resources that are given by the electorate. 
 
Alongside spending caps, transparency is also another key issue of the 
British Political establishment, which also the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
indirectly mentions. According to guidelines from the Electoral 
Commission, the Political Parties and Elections Act 2009 asks that political 
parties declare all donations or loans of more than £7,500.312 According to 
Fisher, only three donations of over £1 million were made with a further 
five over £100,000. Fisher found that the top three Conservative donors 
accounted for almost £8.5 million.313 Edmond J. Safra Centre for Ethics’ 
research on the Electoral Commission’s database found that there were 46 
donations, excluding those from public funds of over £100,000 made to the 
three main political parties.314 It is not really clear if these two research 
findings are comparable in order to suggest an increase in large gifts over 
time, but it is a clear indication that the dependence of the Conservative 
Party on large individual donors went from three in 2001 to eight in 2011, 
compared with only one individual donating to the Labour Party and none 
to the Liberal Democrats.315  
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4.2.3 Implementing a Donation Cap in the UK  
 
The discussion of campaign spending ceilings, voluntarism in party income 
and a lack of regulation generally to party finance has been dominant in UK 
political finance for over a century and the suggestion in the EU Anti-
Corruption Report for a donations cap is a reiteration of what the general 
debate is in the UK.316 However, after the introduction of PPERA in 2000, 
the discussion of increased regulation has been more central to the UK 
agenda in addressing the issue. For example, while Fisher found that more 
comprehensive proposals, such as far-reaching state funding would have 
been less likely to obtain support in 2000 when the PPERA was adopted.317 
The latest Thirteenth Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life 
notes that the only safe way to eliminate big money from party funding is to 
put a cap on donations, set at £10,000.318 All the same, some agreement on 
a £50,000 cap had even been reached but later collapsed in October 2007. It 
could be noticed that such a £50,000 cap would have been significantly 
higher than in most other systems that limit donations.319  
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report rightly makes the case for a cap in party 
donations. However, for the UK to agree on such issues raises some 
important issues. One of the key challenges for reaching agreement on a 
cap on donations is how to replace the lost funds in order that the parties 
maintain their capability to achieve their roles in the political system. As a 
general suggestion for the possibility of eliminating large donations, parties 
would increase their democratic base by increasing their efforts to involve 
more political supporters. However, this could provide some compensation, 
but a cap could mean that parties could reach far more comprehensively 
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from state funding.320 The Committee on Standards in Public Life supports 
such a shift of caps and has estimated the cost of replacing the lost funding 
at around £23 million per annum, equivalent to approximately £50 million 
per elector per year.321 This figure seems to be fairly modest if it decreases 
the dependence of political parties on third-party donors and subsequently 
improves public trust in the institution of government. In other words, such 
changes would in turn reduce and eliminate institutional corruption.  
 
4.2.4 Integrity in Elected officials 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report suggested that the UK should increase 
further the integrity of elected officials. Traditionally, the UK has been 
considered as having in place high standards of ethics and integrity within 
public life. Almond and Verba stated that the UK enjoys the model of a 
civic culture for fairness, impartiality, consensual with active and educated 
citizens contributing in public life. 322  Integrity and ethical standards in 
public life in the UK were considered to be a model standard, because many 
scandals have in fact been isolated from the public. They were dealt quietly 
and have been isolated by the public such as the historical cases of Stanley 
in 1948, Profumo in 1963 and Poulson in 1972. 323 The UK made a strong 
commitment in establishing high ethical standards and integrity amongst its 
public office holders, and in particular the civil servants are mostly noted 
for their commitment to core values of integrity, objectivity, honesty and 
independence. This is imbedded in the hallmarks of a professional system 
following the 1854 Northcote-Trevelyan report.324 The ‘Haldane model’, 
based on the eponymous 1918 report, supported the development of close 																																																								
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relationships between civil servants and ministers’ departments. Even so, 
the constitutional convention held into account mainly the ministers for all 
their ministry’s actions, the development of expert parliamentary select 
committees after 1945 began to also hold other public officials to account 
over policy matters.325  
 
Lord Adonis described in his account that the UK is widely seen as the 
model of the non-corrupt industrial democracy. 326  Nonetheless, this 
observation has come under increasing scrutiny as a series of political 
scandals have enfolded in recent years. That said, most of these scandals 
have been coterminous with the development of what Hood and Lodge 
have characterised the ‘civil service reform syndrome’,327 a development 
that originated under the Conservative administration of 1979–97, and 
continued with the Labour administration of 1997–2010. However, since 
the MPs' expenses scandal, the UK is perceived to be more corrupt in its 
political system. The report by Transparency International reveals that UK 
crashed dramatically from 11th to 20th in the league table of countries 
perceived to be the cleanest in the world after the scandal was revealed.328 
The MPs' expenses scandal was considered to be one of the most 
controversial Parliamentary events of its modern times. A recent report on 
UK corruption by Transparency International UK revealed that the British 
public views political parties to be the most corrupt sector in the UK, and 
Parliament to be the third most corrupt sector. These events had a profound 
impact on public perceptions of MPs and led to the Parliamentary Standards 
Act 2009.329  
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Historically, the UK’s parliament had a high reputation and the UK was 
placed well in international corruption indices. However, the numerous 
scandals lately in the UK have indicated serious faults in the political 
system, growing particular concerns about the regime for parliamentary 
expenses, lobbying of politicians by those who could buy access that can 
influence legislation, policy decisions and spending priorities. The political 
corruption scandals in recent years in the UK have lowered public 
confidence in not just those individual politicians that were involved, but 
also in political institutions as a whole. The danger is that the public will 
start to cease respecting the decisions made by Parliament and government 
as legitimate and fair. This exemplifies a serious threat to UK 
democracy.330 
 
Thus, the EU Commission recommends in the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
that the UK should address the issue of increasing the integrity of public 
officials. The debate in British public life has many elements and they 
concern conflicts of interest, trading of influence, party finance and post-
employment of office-holders. Most of the time, the debate and the 
literature evaluate the issues of ethics and integrity in the UK. The EU Anti-
Corruption Report takes up these issues and reflects to the UK, thereby 
supporting ongoing efforts of reforming and strengthening public standards. 
 
4.2.5 UK attitude to Ethics  
 
Ethics are generally defined as a set of principles that provide a structure 
for appropriate action in accordance with that set of principles. Ethical 
issues in the UK are perceived to be those issues that are distinct from law, 
politics or society, that are concerned with right and wrong activities, and 
outcomes for the organizations or individuals and that they work for.331 
Recent history in the UK has experienced various examples of unethical 																																																								
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behaviour, from the scandals implicating property development and local 
authority contracting in the 1960s, the so-called Poulson Affair to more 
modern event concerns with ‘cash for questions’ that saw the end of the 
Conservative government in 1997, thus leading to the establishment of the 
Committee on Standards in Public Life and the drafting of the Principles of 
Public Life, the so-called Nolan Principles.332  
 
It is important to define the discussion about ethics in the UK, as it helps to 
understand the discussion about corruption in politics. Political behaviours 
are culturally and socially defined in different ways in different local, 
national or international settings. Some national cultures see certain forms 
of political behaviour as corrupt acts, such as patronage and clientelism, 
while others see these as acceptable instruments of political association. 
Even so, there can be value clashes within societies that might constitute 
different acts as unethical or even corrupt. This is because values might 
change over time and the values of the public might change as to what is 
acceptable or not. This has also occurred in the case of the UK. In the last 
fifteen years, the public responded to a series of questionable acts of 
parliamentarians and the increasingly high concern by the public and the 
media, have led the UK to reform standards of public behaviour. However, 
such a process has not been as straightforward or fully effective as the EU 
Anti-Corruption suggests.  
 
Acts that are seen as unethical in the UK include acts such as harassment or 
bullying. Huberts, Pijl, and Steen in their account classify as unethical 
behaviour acts that violate the integrity of a public office holder if their 
behaviour contained acts that can fall under fraud, corruption, theft, 
conflicts of interest, improper use of authority, misuse of information and 
discrimination.  However, it is not always clear as to what might constitute 
unethical behaviour, as it sometimes also falls under the classification of 
being illegal or inappropriate behaviour. Thus, there is frequent overlap as 
ethical issues are regulated by legislation. Furthermore, what might be seen 																																																								
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as unethical behaviour varies among cultures and states. For example, there 
still exist grey areas between what constitutes a gift or a bribe, despite 
numerous legislative attempts to define borderlines. As is shown for the UK 
in the EU Anti-Corruption Report, a clear list is needed as to what 
constitutes a gift and what the Members of Parliament cannot accept as 
gifts.   
 
The discussion raised above of when does a gift become a bribe, raises 
complex issues of cultural relativity, especially in the context of the EU 
with its 27 Member-States representing a large variety of national and 
cultural diversity. However, there are also common problems that are only 
given particular meanings locally. In other words, inequality or injustice are 
common problems that occur in different forms at local level. This is 
manifested when developing codes of conduct for government ministers, 
MPs, civil servants and judges. Most codes of conduct include a register of 
interests, either as an important part of the code or as a separate document. 
Such a register of interests exists to ensure transparency, mainly where 
there might be possible conflicts of interest.333 This issue was also included 
in the EU Anti-Corruption Report for the UK. Therefore, the gifts that have 
to be registered include those given to family members. However, 
classifying family can be difficult and complex. For instance, the family 
members might not benefit from the post or position of the registree. In a 
Western perspective family members mean the partner and children of the 
registree, and those who live in the same home. In other cultures, the notion 
of the family is not only extensive, but it is probable that the head of the 
family will seek to favour those extended members. Therefore, it would be 
unrealistic to expect one homogeneous culture or set of principles to be 
applied across all administrations in the UK that is fast becoming 
multicultural.334  
																																																								
333 Auby, J. B, Breen, E. and Thomas Perroud (2014), Corruption and Conflicts of Interest: 
A Comparative Law Approach. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, p. 88.    
333 Rhodes, R (2015), ‘Recovering the Craft of Public Administration’, Public 
Administration Review, 76(2), pp. 638–647. 
334 Auby, J. B, Breen, E. and Thomas Perroud (2014), Corruption and Conflicts of Interest: 
A Comparative Law Approach. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, p. 88.    
	 122	
4.2.6 Foreign bribery in the United Kingdom 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report for the UK suggested that the UK has to 
take further preventive measurements to effectively address risks of foreign 
bribery. Furthermore, the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggested that the 
UK should consider developing sector-specific guidelines to companies in 
areas that could be at increased risk. That said, the UK has implemented the 
OECD convention on combating bribery of foreign public officials and it 
has implemented the most recent legislation in its history which was 
recommend by the OECD, the UK Bribery Act 2010, which addresses the 
risk of foreign bribery. The UK’s Bribery Act is a broad amendment of all 
UK bribery statutes and it applies to foreign as well as domestic bribery.  
 
The UK Bribery Act has broader territorial jurisdiction and it is built upon 
the most extensive foreign act prior to date, which was the US Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA The UK Bribery Act applies to 
bribery and corruption in both the public and private sectors. Furthermore, 
it also penalises acts that facilitate payments and corporate offences of 
failing to prevent bribery by someone carrying out the services on behalf of 
a commercial cooperation. Under the UK Bribery Act, it is a strict liability 
offence. Its implementation created a responsibility to implement, preserve 
and enforce effective anti-bribery policies and procedures. Moreover, 
groups that pay a bribe will be liable for a bribe paid on their behalf, except 
if they can prove that they had applied sufficient procedures designed to 
prevent bribery. The bribery of foreign public officials is also a punishable 
office and the Act contains specific offences for senior company officials of 
agreeing to or overlooking bribery. Under European legislation, companies 
sentenced due to an offence of fraud, bribery or money laundering are 
excluded from tendering for public contracts.  
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The UK Bribery Act 2010 received Royal assent in April 2010 and entered 
into force in July 2011.335 The legislation implements the UN Convention 
against Corruption 2003. It replaces a number of out of date statutes in 
England and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland, which also include the 
Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889, Prevention of Corruption Act 
1906 and 1916. In addition, it also repeals the provisions contained in part 
12 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 336  relating to 
bribery of foreign public officials and abolishes the common law offence of 
bribery. 
 
The UK Bribery Act was established to improve the UK anti-corruption 
regulations and laws in order to prevent the risk of bribery by UK 
businesses around the world. 337  The UK Bribery Act's extraterritorial 
jurisdiction has more far reaching implications for UK businesses, 
companies, their subsidiaries and supply chains. In addition  to 
criminalising bribery, the legislation has made a new offence of failing to 
prevent bribery. However, a business can escape possible prosecution if 
they can prove that it carried out sufficient procedures to prevent the 
possibility of bribery. All the same,  the UK does not have a satisfactory 
record of prosecuting cases of bribery in international business. This raises 
some questions if this legislation does not put enough pressure on UK 
businesses. They also leave the responsibility of fighting bribery to less 
resourced business associates and supply chains in emerging countries to 
tackle the issues related to corruption and bribery. 338  
 
The Bribery Act designed two general offences of bribery:  an offence of 
bribery of foreign public official and an offence of failure by a business to 
prevent bribery being conducted on their behalf. Section 1 of the UK 																																																								
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Bribery Act339 creates the offence of bribing another, and Section 2 of the 
UK Bribery Act340 creates the offence of being bribed. Section 6 of the UK 
Bribery Act 341 creates the offence of bribing a foreign public official and 
Section 7 of the UK Bribery Act 342 creates a new offence of failing to 
prevent bribery. The UK Bribery Act does make a definition of bribery 
explicitly, but it does explain the actions as being believed to constitute an 
act of bribery. This means that there are essentially two definitions of 
bribery set out in Sections 1, 2 and 6. The first requires the intention to 
induce or reward inappropriate conduct and the second does not. Thus, it 
has an implication for profitable organisations in prepare appropriate 
procedures and policies, since one has clear criminal implications and the 
other does not. Nonetheless, there is no clarification in the UK Bribery Act 
as to why the same offence of bribery can be committed under such 
different conditions. Gift-giving, hospitality and facilitation payments made 
by organisations or their agents and other liaisons acting on their behalf are 
prohibited.343 
 
The UK Bribery Act enforces penalties on individuals and business 
organisations found guilty of bribery offences. Under Sections 1, 2 and 6 an 
individual is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a maximum term of 
twelve months, or a monetary fine, and in some cases to both. On 
indictment, an individual could face up to ten years’ imprisonment. Under 
Section 7 of the UK Bribery Act organisations can be liable to unlimited 
fines by the authorities. The Bribery Act does not accept civil remedies.344  
What is interesting about this part of the legislation is that it provides a 
legal defence for a commercial organisation, if it can show that it had 
proper procedures in place to prevent bribery being made on their behalf. In 
addition, the UK Bribery Act provides a legal defence for bribery 																																																								
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committed in relation to the intelligence services or armed forces shown 
that there are arrangements in place to ensure that such action is necessary 
for the purpose of persons carrying out these tasks.345 
 
The Secretary of State for Justice, under section 9 of the UK Bribery Act, is 
mandated to publish guidelines about procedures that commercial 
organisations can put in place to prevent bribery.346 The guidelines do not 
suggest any specific procedure and there is no regulatory framework to 
monitor compliance. It simply sets out six general risk-based principles that 
are made to be flexibly in order to let the organisations make their own 
appropriate guidelines and procedures. The guidelines do not impose any 
direct obligation on organisations. The principles are as follows:  
 
  4.2.7 Risk-based principles for preventing bribery  
 
Principle 1 Proportionate 
procedures 
Principle 2 Top level commitment 
Principle 3 Risk assessment 
Principle 4 Due diligence 
Principle 5 Communication 
(including training) 
Principle 6 Monitoring and review 
 
Source: Ministry of Justice347 
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The above principles seem to represent an approach to the design of anti-
bribery procedures and for policies of compliance purposes. However, from 
a legal perspective, there are some concerns with both the guidelines and 
the substance of the law. The respondents of the International Bar 
Association, in the discussion about the guidance, note that the principles 
do not contain the rule of law, a fundamental legal principle which is 
essential for effective enforcement and legislative control.348 Its presence 
would enable commercial cooperation to be more effective in fighting 
corruption. Furthermore, the UK Bribery Act appears to lack suitable 
substance. In particular, in Section 6 of the UK Bribery Act, the penalty of 
criminality is too low. As there is no need for any element of unforeseen 
intent in order for an offence to be committed under Section 6 of the UK 
Bribery Act, any expenditure intended to promote a business's goods or 
services, whether small or large, might be criminalised.349 Although the 
Serious Fraud Office has suggested that prosecutors will use their own 
discretion to ensure that only those abusing corporate hospitality and 
marketing will be pursued, such flexible measures do not stipulate the 
necessary legal conviction.350 Thirdly, business organisations are going to 
face problems in drafting clear procedures and policies that will be 
compliant with the Bribery Act, as the wording of the Bribery Act prohibits 
such expenditure. Regardless of prosecutorial discretion, any promotional 
expenditure relating to a foreign public official would, in any case, breach 
Section 328 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, except when a business 
gets consent from the Serious Organised Crime Agency, which is very 
unlikely and impractical. 351 
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4.2.8 Bribery of foreign public officials  
 
Section 6 of the Bribery Act 2010 cites that a person who bribes a foreign 
public official indirectly or directly with intent to obtain or maintain 
business or take an advantage in the conduct of business is to be found 
guilty of an offence of bribery. The bribe might be given in the form of an 
agreement of a financial exchange or other advantage to encourage the 
official to omit the performance of his or her public functions or influence 
the performance of a role. The Bribe Payers Index (BPI) 2011352 ranked the 
UK 8th out of the 28 leading economies whose businesses are least 
anticipated to pay bribes overseas. The BPI score is on a scale from 0 to 10. 
A high score suggests that the likelihood of companies from that country 
engaging in overseas bribery is low. The UK's BPI was 7.9, 8.6 and 8.3 
during 2006, 2008 and 2011, respectively.353 However, there is a suggestion 
that UK businesses often use bribes to circumvent national laws and 
regulations by bribing foreign public officials to get contracts or speed up 
the processes of the services that they are demanding. They allegedly pay 
bribes to officials in customs and tax revenue authorities, police, the 
judiciary, registry and permit offices.354 They cite the TI-UK Report, where 
30% of directors in the UK reported that their businesses used liaisons to 
avoid anti-corruption laws abroad.355 These claims are supported by various 
high profile cases involving UK businesses including the famous ‘British 
Aerospace Systems’ defence contracts around the world including Saudi 
Arabia, Tanzania and South Africa, the Lesotho Highlands Water Project in 
Southern Africa and TSKJ Consortium in Nigeria.356 The main argument is 																																																								
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that there is a poor record of the UK prosecuting bribery cases in 
international business. 
 
The cases Serious Fraud Office investigates and prosecutes are of foreign 
bribery related cases except for defence related contracts, because they are 
the dealt by the Ministry of Defence. This division has developed a conflict 
of interest as observed by the BAE (British Aerospace) Systems case.357 
The company was investigated for false accounting and alleged bribery. 
The Saudi Arabia case was eventually dropped on the grounds of national 
security interest. This was despite the fact that the OECD Convention on 
bribery mentioned that prosecution must not be dropped due to national 
security reasons.358 One justification was that a shortage in the law made it 
problematic to determine corporate criminal liability, as there needed to be 
a directing connection of the business involved in the corrupt act. There 
were also theories that investigations were withdrawing due to lack of 
political will and blackmail. 359  Whereas in the Tanzanian case, it was 
argued that that restitution cannot be made since there were no victims of 
crime. Leaving aside these allegations, BAe continues to attain contracts 
from foreign governments. 360  The Director of the SFO put forward an 
insightful question that reflects a deeper underlying socio-economic 
motivation in the way that governments prosecute and settle cases of 
corruption: What is the right approach for a prosecutor dealing with a 
prosecution of a corporation while recognising that, behind the corporation 
lie employees, pensioners, customers, families and others whose livelihood 
depends upon the corporation?361  
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Therefore, the UK's foreign policy on international corporations has been 
mostly impractical and insufficient in fighting corruption. The lack of 
implementation of anti-corruption measurements in the UK is also 
reflective of the strong corporate lobby in pursuit of international trade and 
the government's plea for less regulation. Although the UK is a signatory to 
a number of regional anti-corruption and international conventions, the UK 
has not strengthened their importance by establishing its own strategies to 
support these measurements and such also reflects on the EU anti-
corruption report. A report by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office cited 
that one of the UK's international priorities is to help UK businesses to win 
contracts in foreign markets and lobby against regulatory and political 
barriers.362  Corporations are encouraged to self-regulate using voluntary 
measurements and guidelines such as the UN Global Compact's tenth 
principle against corruption, the International Chamber of Commerce rules 
against extortion and bribery and the Extractive Industry Transparency 
Initiative. The UK considered them to be examples of best practice.363 The 
government makes a case that these voluntary measurements and guidelines 
play a significant role in trying to discover innovative solutions to problems 
preventing corruption and other issues encountered by international 
businesses from working in diverse business environments.364 
 
The OECD has been critical about the UK's reluctance to prosecute bribery 
offences referring to outdated laws, vague fragmentation of investigative 
and genuine efforts, and overlapping powers.365 Besides, the SFO, the City 
of London Overseas Crime Unit and Serious Organised Crime Agency all 
deal with overseas corruption and money laundering cases. In addition, the 
OECD also showed concerns about the UK's lack of experts and 																																																								
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transparency in dealing with bribery cases. From 1997 to 2008, the UK had 
not investigated a single case of bribery of foreign public officials.366 The 
first conviction was made in 2009. Under enormous pressure, the 
government issued the Foreign Bribery Strategy 2010 that set out how the 
government planned to address and administer the growing challenges of 
enforcement and establish a clear legal, regulatory and policy framework 
for action against foreign bribery. 367  The Bribery Act is part of the 
legislative reforms towards meeting these challenges. The White Economic 
Crimes Agency was set up to improve implementation and enforcement 
efforts. Even so, it’s mandate is to pay mainly attention to economic 
issues.368 
 
4.2.9 Improving the Accountability in the Governance of Banks 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report for the UK suggests briefly that the UK 
should further strengthen the accountability of governance in banks, 
including stricter enforcement and implementations. The financial crisis of 
2008 exposed significant shortcomings in governance within banks and the 
culture and behaviour, which underpinned it within the system in the UK. 
As a result, in June 2012 the Parliamentary Commission on Banking 
Standards (PCBS) was appointed to conduct an inquiry into the professional 
standards and culture within the UK banking sector. The Commission was 
appointed as a result of the London Interbank Offered Rate rigging scandal, 
which was followed by the financial crisis and a series of high-profile 
conduct failures within the UK banking industry.  
 
The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards published its 
findings and recommendations on 19th June 2013. The report highlighted 
many shortcomings and, in its conclusion, stressed that a lack of 																																																								
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accountability contributed heavily to the mismanagement of key risks and 
led to public distrust in the industry. The PCBS made a number of 
recommendations in relation to improving individual accountability in the 
banking sector which were incorporated into the Financial Services 
(Banking Reform) Act 2013. At the same time, the Financial Conduct 
Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority also released a joint 
consultation on the implementation of new remuneration rules (FCA/PRA 
CP15/14), which seeks to introduce changes to structure. The regulators see 
the two consultations as a package that will reinforce the trend of greater 
responsibility and accountability across the financial and banking industry.  
 
The collapse of financial institutions, followed subsequently by the spread 
of the financial crisis, triggered the policy-makers to re-examine the 
supervision of banks and to develop more accountability for the restoration 
of financial stability.369 At an international level since 2008, there has been 
a lot of emphasis and work put into addressing the causes of the financial 
crisis and the supervisory shortcomings. 
 
In 2007 in the UK, the financial crisis started with the unexpected failure of 
Northern Rock, and spread throughout the UK banking system. This 
resulted in the collapse of a number of other financial institutions, the bail 
out of the Royal Bank of Scotland, the acquisition of HBOS bank by 
Lloyds, amongst other things came as a result of failures of the financial 
system. 370  The turmoil of the banking and financial sector led to an 
understanding that there is a loophole in the overall structure of financial 
regulation. 371  Thus, the regulatory reform for banking and finance was 
placed on top of the political agenda in the UK. In 2010, the newly elected 
Coalition Government revealed its strategies for a broad overhaul of the 
regulatory structure and put forward an ambitious programme for reforms, 																																																								
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hoping to prevent potential crises for the future and restore public 
confidence. 
 
The adoption of Financial Services Act 2012 was the UK’s official 
response as the result of the crises occurred, which came into force on the 
1st April 2013. 372  The new legislation saw the split of the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) into two separate authorities: the Prudential 
Regulation Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). 
In addition, a new committee, the Financial Policy Committee (FPC), was 
established within the Bank of England (BoE) in order to perform macro-
prudential oversight functions.373 
 
4.2.10 A review of the failures of the financial system  
 
The Labour Government that come into power after the 1997 elections 
announced its objective to engage in a radical reform of the financial 
services regulatory structure that would strip the Bank of England of its 
supervisory responsibilities.374 Subsequently, this led to the introduction of 
the FSA, which became the UK’s single regulator. Thus, the Treasury, the 
BoE and the FSA mutually shared responsibility for financial stability in 
the UK.375 The Bank of England Act 1998 and the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) gave the legal bases on which this multilateral 
regulatory structure was certified. The joined roles of the three institutions 
were imbedded in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that made the 
background structure for co-operation between the three institutions in 
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order to achieve the common objective of financial stability.376 The Bank of 
England was responsible for keeping the stability of the monetary and 
financial system. The Treasury was responsible for supervising the 
multilateral organisation of the three institutions’ regulatory framework and 
for authorising support operations in case of a potential crisis with 
responsibility for sagacious supervision, in addition to conducting business 
aspects in assigned to the FSA.377 
 
It was observed at the time that the consolidated model of supervision and 
regulation would be a model for improving the dynamics within the 
financial services sector. The arrangement and overlap of practicality and 
conduct of business regulatory goals, rather than the distinction amongst 
them, made strong claims that the joint regulatory structure was the most 
appropriate model in resolving effectively and efficiently situations of 
ambiguous objectives. 378  Thus, coordinated institutions were considered to 
be more efficient to evaluate the big picture of the financial industry, and 
increase effectiveness by preventing duplicated support functions. 379  
However, post 1997 the climate of financial stability was steady and the 
UK’s approach to regulation was considered important in making the UK’s 
financial markets prosperous at the time. 
 
However, a decade later, during the 2008 crisis the whole financial system 
was put to test and it was found to be inadequate. The extensive mandate of 
the FSA, which included both prudential regulation and conduct of 
business, was evidenced to be too ambitious to be efficient.380 The financial 
crisis showed that assigning financial regulation of the entire financial 
system in the hands of one institution led to failings of numerous 																																																								
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objectives. Conduct of business supervision became the top priority of the 
FSA and this was done at the expense of prudential supervision.381 
 
In addition, there were serious problems with macro-prudential analysis. 
Such a lack of macro-prudential strategy and the failure to utilize macro-
prudential instruments to detect systemic risks that occurred according to 
Turner were ‘far more important to the origins of the crisis than any 
specific failure in supervisory process relating to individual firms.’382 Also, 
the FSA’s approach to macro-prudential supervision was rather unclear. It 
was mainly dependent on tick box compliance with regulations, while an 
adequate in-depth and strategic analysis which is key in terms of the 
effectiveness of prudential regulation was put on the sidelines, consequently 
leading to significant loopholes.383 
 
The crisis highlighted the significant weakness of the coordinated system as 
a whole, rather than the FSA.384 The multilateral agreement was upheld to 
have numerous inherent failings in dealing with the financial crisis.385 The 
system’s successful stability was mainly dependent upon a robust 
cooperation between the FSA, the BoE and the Treasury. During the 
financial crisis, it became clear that the association between the three 
organisations was not working sufficiently. The triple authorities did not 
have a defined management structure and there were difficulties in respect 
to the communication amongst the three institutions. Furthermore, among 
the most significant shortcomings of the triple structure was that the Bank 
could exercise a veto authority over the Treasury’s recommended programs, 
thus making coordinated action between the Bank and the Treasury 																																																								
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difficult. 386  Therefore, the three institutions did not operate as 
collaboratively as they could have.  
 
Furthermore, the actual structure of the multilateral arrangements between 
the bodies was flawed; the FSA, which was the authority to supervise 
individual banks was different from that of the Bank of England, the 
institution having the necessary funds and means to act as the lender of last 
option upon a possible failure of a particular bank. Thus, as the Bank had 
legislative responsibility for financial stability, it had inadequate 
instruments to deliver on them.387 
 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time, Darling, noted that the 
problem was that the system had been operating for over a decade in good 
terms and it was not anticipated that there would be a crisis.388 The financial 
system was thought to be operating effectively during the ten years that 
preceded the financial crisis. The Bank of England had focused mainly on 
its monetary policy duties, and even though it was in charge of supervising 
the financial stability, it never seemed necessary for the Bank to understand 
the dangerous relationships within the Banking system. At the same time, 
the FSA had mainly focused its concern with consumer issues instead of 
observing the systemic risks, while the Treasury had not considered 
financial regulation as a main priority.389 
 
It would be inadequate to say that the failing of the tripartite system was the 
main reason why the banking crisis occurred. Most experts argued that the 
roots of the crisis have a global origin - particularly due to the global 
economic imbalances, the failure to understand and assess risk, the 																																																								
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continuing figures of debt across the financial system, as well as the failure 
to guarantee capital liquidity.390 Certainly, there were major shortcomings 
in the way the tripartite system treated the causes of the crisis and these 
failures have significantly contributed to the magnitude of the crisis. If a 
different regulatory model would have been in place, it is very questionable 
whether it might have coped with such enormous forces.391 
 
4.2.11 UK responses to the EU Anti-Corruption Report  
 
In assessing the UK, the first analysis that can be drawn in this case study is 
that the EU’s efforts in supporting anti-corruption policy in the UK is very 
different to	 Romania and Albania, as well as the degrees of relationship 
with the European Union.  
 
The interplay between the European Union and the UK in developing anti-
corruption policy is different to other EU Member States insofar as the EU 
mostly supports the UK’s efforts in developing their own anti-corruption 
policy without demanding importing separate standards. This assessment is 
also reflected in the recommendation that the EU Commission has 
recommended to the UK in the EU Anti-Corruption Report.  
 
The topics that the EU Commission has recommended in the EU Anti-
Corruption Report for the UK all concern ongoing efforts of developing a 
coherent anticorruption strategy in the UK.  These include the risks of 
foreign bribery and providing sector-specific guidelines to companies in 
areas that might be at increased risk, strengthening accountability in the 
governance of banks, capping donations to political parties and providing 
guidance on acceptable gifts for Members of Parliament and implementing 
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the Leveson Inquiry recommendation on the limits on the employment of 
former police officers by the media.392  
 
In December 2014 the UK responded to most of the recommendations 
made in the EU Anti-Corruption Report by introducing the UK’s first ever 
‘UK Anti-Corruption Plan’. The UK Anti-Corruption Plan for the first time 
introduces the UK’s anti-corruption efforts under one cross-departmental 
national action plan for the next two years.393 However, it is important to 
mention that the UK enhanced its efforts of fighting corruption not only by 
responding to the recommendations made in the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report, but by also responding to global as well as civil society demands, in 
particular demands made by Transparency International in 2011 to develop 
an Anti-Corruption National Action Plan. 394  In reflexive governance 
perspective, the EU Report had an amplifying effect on the UK in making 
commitments to address corruption in many policy fields that go beyond 
those mentioned in the recommendations of the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report.  
 
The UK Anti-Corruption Plan represents an important step forward in the 
UK’s efforts to fight corruption. It reveals political will to acknowledge 
corruption as a serious threat.  The UK Anti-Corruption Plan was well-
received and civil society organisation TI-UK has given a qualified 
welcome to the launch of the first ever UK Anti-Corruption Plan, which is a 
60-page document containing 66 Actions. The UK Anti-Corruption Plan 
recognised in its content the threat corruption poses to the UK’s economy 
as well as to society, thus shifting the long-standing narrative in which  the 
research shows above that corruption happens only overseas but not much 
in the UK. The content of the UK Anti-Corruption Plan has managed to 																																																								
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establish a coordinated strategy to tackle corruption by drawing widely on 
findings from several government departments, law enforcement agencies, 
business community and civil society research – especially from 
Transparency International UK. 
 
Thus, it can be said that the UK has responded positively to the 
recommendations of the EU Anti-Corruption Report in taking concrete 
action. The steps taken by the UK reflect successful reflexive governance in 
form of regulation of self-regulation. In a Report issued by the UK 
Government in May 2016 on the progress of the UK Anti-Corruption Plan, 
concrete steps were shown in implementing the 66 actions that the UK 
Anti-Corruption Plan set out in which 62 actions having been delivered thus 
far. 395  In regard to the recommendations that the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report made to the UK, they are fully integrated throughout the different 
priorities in the UK Anti-Corruption Plan. The Report issued for the 
progress made in the implementation of the UK Anti-Corruption Plan, as 
will be shown below have mostly been delivered, in particular those 
recommendations suggested by the EU Anti-Corruption Report.      
 
The Home Office has established a new offence of ‘police corruption’, 
which came into force on 13th April 2015. This offence, carrying a 
maximum penalty of 14 years imprisonment, makes it an exclusive offence 
for a police officer. 396  Here, the UK has taken some steps in the 
recommendations made by the Leveson inquiry to regulate in some form 
police corruption, which were also supported in the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report. However, regarding the time limits on the employment of former 
police officers by the media has had yet to clearly outline in the next follow 
up report. The other recommendation concerns the conduct of Members of 
Parliament on registration of received gifts, and provides clear guidance on 																																																								
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acceptable gifts; the UK Anti-Corruption Plan progress report suggests that 
the House of Commons approved the revised Guide to the Rules relating to 
the conduct of Members on 17th March 2015.397 Furthermore, the UK has 
taken steps in ensuring that the beneficial owners of UK-registered 
companies are declared, which was also a brief recommendation of the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report. The report issued by the UK Government in May 
2016 on the progress of the UK Anti-Corruption Plan suggests that the UK 
will implement a central register of UK company beneficial ownership 
information after the necessary primary and secondary legislation are in 
place. This is subject to Parliamentary timetable which might pass by the 
end of 2016.398  
 
The UK Anti-Corruption Action plan is a clear success story of the 
reflexive governance of the EU Anti-Corruption Report. The report issued 
by the UK Government in May 2016 on the progress of the UK Anti-
Corruption Plan responds positively to Transparency International 
recommendations and strengthens communication and involvement of 
society in policy-making. 399  The UK Anti-Corruption Plan takes into 
account the sound research produced by Transparency International UK in 
the Defence Companies Anti-Corruption Index 2015, in which TI-UK 
provided an analysis of what the biggest defence companies do and fail to 
do to prevent corruption.  
 
Overall, the UK has responded positively to the recommendations of the 
EU Anti-Corruption Report produced by the EU Commission and has 
exhibited promising efforts in making use of the reflexive governance 
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theory. This is in striking contrast to the widespread negative attitude in the 
UK towards EU policies.  
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4.3 Romania 
  
4.3.1 The EU Anti-Corruption Report for Romania  
  
The EU Anti-Corruption Report country chapter for Romania finds that 
petty and political corruption remain a systemic problem. Whilst some anti-
corruption reforms have been pursued over the years, their result proved to 
be ineffective and easily reversible. The EU Anti-Corruption Report finds 
that when it comes to prosecution of high-level corruption cases in 
Romania, the political will to address corruption and promote high 
standards of integrity has been inconsistent.400 Nevertheless, the EU Anti-
Corruption Report for Romania finds some positive steps in the efforts to 
fight the systemic problem of corruption. The EU Commission suggested 
that Romania should build on the progress that it has made so far under the 
CVM in addressing corruption.  
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report for Romania has identified four key areas 
which it suggested for further improvement. The four outstanding areas that 
the Report calls for further attention are mainly about the dysfunctional 
impact that corruption has in the judiciary, politics, the healthcare system 
and public procurement - that is an area of particular interest for the EU 
Commission in all of the EU Member States.401 The EU Commission, under 
the EU Anti-Corruption Report, mainly suggested that further policy action 
must be taken by Romania to increase the efficiency of preventing 
corruption in the four identified areas. 
 
According to Marian Enache’s account, the judicial system in Romania is 
vulnerable to falling victim to corrupt practices.402 Despite the structural 
development that the judiciary went through as part of the EU integration 
process, Romania to this date still cannot not meet the standards of 																																																								
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efficiency, independence and impartiality required to be a Member of the 
European Union. The justice system, together with the political system in 
Romania according to Martin Mendelski,403 remains as one of the most 
visible sectors which are prone to corrupt practices. Further reforms and 
restructuring of the judiciary to prevent corruption and persecute high 
corruption cases are stipulated in the EU Anti-Corruption Report country 
chapter for Romania, as well as the January 2016 CVM report. The need to 
develop and implement a set of adequate corruption-combating policies and 
strategies in the justice system has become increasingly imperative and 
reforming the justice system has been a large part of the EU and Romanian 
relationship in preparing the country for EU membership.404 In Sebastian 
Văduva’s account, despite the many studies and strategies supported by the 
EU Commission in Romania, according to the public and non-governmental 
organisations, the judiciary is still far from ensuring integrity and 
independence of the judiciary.405  
 
As a result, the EU Anti-Corruption Report country chapter for Romania 
suggested that the country must ensure that all necessary guarantees remain 
in place to protect the stability, independence and maintenance of the track 
record of anti-corruption institutions and the judiciary concerning non-
partisan investigations and effective court proceedings regarding high-level 
corruption cases,406 in particular to those elected and appointed officials. 
Furthermore, the report suggested implementing preventive measurements 
accompanied by an effective sanctioning regime to strengthen the integrity 
standards in the judiciary. Thus, it would require including all the relevant 
stakeholders in the judicial system, such as the Superior Council of 
Magistracy, the Judicial Inspection, magistrates’ associations, courts and 
prosecutors’ offices according to the EU Anti-Corruption Report country 																																																								
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chapter for Romania.407  
 
In Michael Hein’s account, Romania has been going through two essential 
phases in reforming the judicial system. Firstly, the enactment of the new 
Constitution of Romania in 1991; secondly, the accession of Romania to the 
European Union.408 The EU has played a role as an external driver for 
judicial reforms in Romania, especially since the introduction of the CVM 
in December 2006. The judicial reform actions were subjected to 
benchmark-based monitoring since the CVM was introduced and focused 
on several projects of judicial strengthening.  These included the judicial 
capacity-building of specific judicial bodies, the unification of the 
jurisprudence of courts and prosecutor offices, strengthening of the public 
ministry’s institutional capacity, improvement of the system of Romanian 
judicial statistics, strengthening of the probation system and improvement 
of the management and media training for magistrates. 409  However, in 
terms of judicial improvement, the Commission has mixed views in its 
evaluation of the post-accession phase. The CVM and the EU Anti-
Corruption Report, as well as researchers on the field of anti-corruption, 
also note such an observation.410 Meanwhile, strengthening the judiciary 
continues to be a point that the EU asks for more support in regards to 
human resource and integrity shortcomings in the Romanian judicial 
system. The third section of this chapter will analyse in more depth the 
issue of corruption in the judicial system in Romania and draws analysis on 
the historical factors in more depth.  
 
In Iuliana Precupetu’s account, the political system has similar corruption 
problems to the judicial system and has dominated Romanian political 
discourse for many years and become a structural feature of post-socialist 																																																								
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transformation in Romania.411 The large majority of the political elite has 
continuously opposed the prosecution and conviction of corrupt offenders 
in Romania. After a long constitutional conflict that seriously inhibited the 
fight against political corruption between 2006 and 2009, law enforcement 
agencies started to experience some success in prosecuting high 
government officials that misused their public power for personal gain. 
Nevertheless, the extent of political corruption remains consistently high 
and punishing public office holders against corruption remains relatively 
low in Romania.412 
Thus, the EU Anti-Corruption Report country chapter for Romania 
suggested that Romania should implement a comprehensive code of 
conduct for elected officials and ensure consistent accountability tools and 
sanctions for corrupt practices, conflicts of interest and incompatibilities.413 
Furthermore, the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggested that Romania 
should consider developing an ethical code for political parties and take 
into consideration establishing an ethical pact between political parties to 
encourage more high standards of integrity. The EU Anti-Corruption 
Report country chapter for Romania also suggested that Romania should 
ensure that all the decisions concerning lifting of immunities are rational 
and taken promptly. 414  On a final point, the Report suggested that the 
political elite should (not?) try to obstruct justice and fully cooperate with 
law enforcement.  
In Alina Mungiu-Pippidi’s account, she identifies three sets of factors in 
regards to the high-level corruption in the political system. 415  Firstly, 
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political culture is regarded as one of the main factors that causes 
corruption in Romania to the extent in which it predetermines the ways in 
which political elites socialise.416 Secondly, researchers find the influence 
of communist legacies as an explanation for the degree of corruption, 
because of the governance nature that had been more autocratic, 
undemocratic, unaccountable and not transparent.417Thirdly, poor economic 
development in Romania is also observed as a central explanatory factor for 
corruption. Thus, the poor wages for civil servants, difficulties in political 
party funding and the lack of sufficient resources for anti-corruption 
policies lead to a higher degree of political corruption in Romania.418 These 
three factors still contribute to the high level of corruption in the political 
system in Romania and the EU Anti-Corruption Report country chapter for 
Romania acknowledges that the political culture that is characterised by an 
antagonistic relationship between state and society, in which the political 
elites are viewed to misuse their public office. As a result, the EU 
Commission suggested further action to tackle corruption in the political 
system. In the next section of this chapter, the corruption in the political 
system will analyse the challenges that have occurred in the fight against 
corruption in the Romanian political system since the introduction of the 
CVM in 2006.419  
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, public procurement has been given 
prominence by the EU Commission in the EU Anti-corruption Report in 
assessing costs of corruption for the EU economy. 420  The costs of 
corruption in public procurement vary considerably between each Member 
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States and public procurement in Romania accounted for 11% of GDP.421 
The EU Anti-corruption Report, together with the Europe 2020 strategy, 
considers tackling corruption in public procurement as an important factor 
to improve the business environment and to enhance the performance of 
businesses in the EU.422 In line with this focus on public procurement, the 
EU Anti-Corruption Report country chapter for Romania suggests public 
procurement as a main area of concern.  
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report suggests that Romania should consider 
developing uniform and effective prevention tools within contracting 
authorities and public procurement supervisory bodies, with a particular 
focus on conflicts of interest. Furthermore, the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
suggested that Romania should ensure that there is a systematic monitoring 
and transparency of the implementation of large-scale public contracts, 
especially those projects that are EU-funded. The EU Anti-Corruption 
Report suggests for Romania that there should be a constancy of the legal 
framework on conflicts of interests and the incompatibility rules related to 
elected representative officials. The EU Anti-Corruption Report also 
suggested that Romania develop a more efficient system to detect and 
sanction conflicts of interest in public procurement. Furthermore, the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report also suggests that Romania should establish an 
effective control mechanism targeting the allocation of government funds to 
local administrations and state-owned companies, by implementing 
safeguards against discretionary allocation to the detriment of the public 
interest - i.e. strengthening anti-corruption tools for public procurement 
processes within state-owned companies.  
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report country chapter for Romania and research 
finds that public procurement is a sector that is vulnerable to corruption in 
Romania and EU funds can be an area vulnerable to corruption.	 Mihály 																																																								
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Fazekas argues that external funds, such as EU funds, may deteriorate the 
quality of government and as a result increase the risk of corruption in 
member states, such as the example of Romania.423 Fazekas suggest that 
there are three reasons for this. Firstly, EU funds are often spent on public 
projects, such as road construction, where public discretion is fairly high 
and spending is more likely linked to corruption than non-discretionary 
spending. Secondly, EU funds offer a large pool of public resources for rent 
extraction of public agencies. Thirdly, EU funds weaken the link between 
domestic civil society, taxation and policy performance. Some of these 
reasons have been witnessed in Romania and, in the next section of this 
chapter, there will be an evaluation and analysis of the issues that concern 
public procurement in more depth.424  
 
Healthcare system is characterised as a sensitive issue in Romania because 
of bad management and underfunding. Since the collapse of communism, 
there has been increasing use of informal payments and corruption to get 
access to healthcare treatment in Romania. 425  Healthcare is one of the 
sectors where informal payments are often used in Romania and it has been 
noticed by the EU Commission and the literature to be problematic, because 
of the social impact in Romanian society. Patients give doctors, nurses and 
hospital staff money or gifts for services in exchange for health services.426 
As a result, the EU Anti-Corruption Report country chapter for Romania 
acknowledges that the country has severe problems cornering with informal 
payments in the public healthcare system and suggests Romania to take 
further action to tackle the informal payments in the public healthcare 
system.   
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The EU Anti-Corruption Report suggests that Romania must consider 
implementation of more effective strategies to reduce the level of informal 
payments in the public healthcare system, by considering to improve the 
working conditions for medical staff and their wages.427 Furthermore the 
EU, in its Anti-Corruption Report, suggests that Romania ensure 
operational independence of the integrity department within the Ministry of 
Health and allow the integrity department to supervise the budgetary and 
procurement aspects. Furthermore, the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
suggested that the Romanian Ministry of Health should take into 
consideration the internal follow-up of the department's findings.428 In other 
words, it should engage in regulation of self-regulation more effectively. 
This is a clear example where the EU Anti-Corruption Report supports 
Romania to engage in a reflexive governance exercise.        
 
The Romanian health system suffers from a range of difficulties including 
extensive management deficiencies, inadequate or lack of medical 
equipment, as well as limited or no access to medical care in rural areas. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the use of informal payments is 
widespread in the country and interactions between health professionals are 
filled with informal payments, which constitute corruption by patients. 429  
Employees in medical centres and hospitals in Romania also act as 
gatekeepers to health facilities, treatments, and non-medical care such as 
food or clean sheets. In Romania, offering gifts and even paying bribes is, 
therefore, quite common practice in the healthcare systems. Thus, the 
distinction between both is often quite narrow. 430  However, the same 																																																								
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behaviours that are observed as corruption by some researchers may be 
interpreted as mere acts of gratitude by others. The healthcare sector-related 
research often uses the concept of ‘informal payments’ to label the 
exchange of money, gifts or services between patients or their families and 
healthcare personnel. 431  The next session investigates the exchange of 
informal payments in Romania and the factors behind such common 
practices of informal payments in the public healthcare system, as well as 
the interest by the EU Anti-Corruption Report to address informal 
payments.  
 
To sum up, the EU Anti-Corruption Report future steps recommendations 
for Romania are mainly focused on four key areas that need further 
attention. The EU Anti-Corruption Report views the investigations and 
effective court proceedings of high-level corruption cases and strengthening 
the integrity standards in the judiciary to be of great importance. 
Furthermore, the Report finds that Romania should implement a 
comprehensive code of conduct for the elected officials, developing an 
ethical code for political parties and ensure that lifting of immunities are 
taken promptly that there is no obstruction to justice. The Report also finds 
to a great extent that Romania should establish an effective control 
mechanism and procurement supervisory bodies concerning the allocation 
of government funds to local administrations and state-owned companies to 
be made public. Finally, the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggests that 
Romania should address corruption in the healthcare system and implement 
effective strategies to reduce the level of informal payments.  
 
The following section will analyse the recommendations for Romania made 
in the EU Anti-Corruption Report in the light of the long-term efforts and 
interactions of the EU Commission and the various Romanian governments 
that have focussed on fighting corruption. It will become apparent that the 
four key areas addressed in the EU Anti-Corruption Report are linked to 																																																								
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ongoing discussions as part of special monitoring of Romanian policy 
developments. Of particular relevance in this context is the Cooperation and 
Verification Mechanism (CVM).    
 
4.3.2 The EU anti-corruption strategy towards Romania  
 
During the pre-accession stage, Romania was regularly ranked as one of the 
most corrupt countries in Central and Eastern Europe and one of the most 
corrupt EU candidate countries at the time according to Transparency 
International. As a result, Romania was considered to be a challenging case 
for accession to the EU and regularly lagged behind all other EU candidate 
states.  Even though Romania was considered to have a serious problem 
with corruption, it did receive full EU membership in January 2007.  
 
The accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 completed the enlargement 
in the CEE that began in 2004, but it also marked the start of a policy 
change in evaluating anti-corruption reform post-accession as both 
countries possess significantly high levels of corruption. As was illustrated 
in Chapter one, the EU did not apply any instrument to monitor progress in 
fighting corruption within the CEE countries after their accession in May 
2004.432  
 
Since 2005, when the Treaty of Accession with Romania and Bulgaria was 
signed, one could observe a change in the Commission’s strategy in 
pushing for rigorous anti-corruption policies and preventive measurements 
before a country joined the EU.433 Corruption at this stage emerged as one 
of the most serious issues and was regarded as an obstacle for accession 
into the EU. The Commission at this stage also started to monitor Romania 
more thoroughly than the other CEE states that joined the EU in 2004. One 
can distinguish two reasons for a different approach that the EU 																																																								
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Commission took for Romania. One, it is easier to monitor only two 
countries in contrast to eight counties. Secondly, the issue of corruption was 
much more serious in the case of Romania.434  
 
Another factor that contributed to a trickier approach by the Commission in 
regards to Romania was the change of political climate within the EU. The 
rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in the Dutch and French referendums 
indicated a public disapproval of various aspects of EU policy, including 
that of the enlargement policy.435 In a more difficult political environment, 
the EU Commission was under pressure to require for more tangible 
evidence that there was a strong commitment from Romania to fight 
corruption. In addition, the EU Commission had more experience from the 
previous enlargement in putting more pressure to tackle corruption in new 
Member States and it recognised at an earlier stage their anti-corruption 
policy shortcomings. The EU Commission also had more experience in 
monitoring new Member States to guarantee that the appropriate 
implementation of anti-corruption measurements was effective and new 
Member States were able to adopt good governance tools. Thus, the 
strategy towards Romania was reinforced in two ways. Firstly, the EU 
Commission introduced a tool for possible postponement for the accession 
of Romania. Secondly, the EU Commission introduced a Verification and 
Cooperation Mechanism to monitor progress in the area of anti-corruption 
reform after the accession process was finished by Romania. 436 
 
The postponement clause, as Lazowski argued, served as a tool to discipline 
Romania in their very last phase of the pre-accession.437 The postponement 
clause was also part of the special list for anti-corruption commitments to 
be followed, even after the accession negotiations were closed for 																																																								
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Romania.438 The EU Commission presented only Poland with one special 
recommendation in the previous round of enlargement in introducing 
liability of legal persons for corruption.439 By contrast, the list presented to 
Romania clearly suggested that the EU Commission took a much tougher 
stand in developing policy to fight corruption in the round of the 
enlargement in 2007. Thus, the EU policy against corruption was emerging 
at this time as the first sign of a separate EU anti-corruption policy field.  
 
Despite continuous problems with corruption and the lack of progress 
observed in the EU Commission’s reports about Romanian’s effort to tackle 
corruption, to delay the accession of Romania until 2008 would have 
carried significant political risks. Thus, the EU acknowledged all these risks 
and decided not to delay the accession of Romania, even though corruption 
was high and Romania did not fulfil the EU membership criteria as 
Noutcheva noted.440 The EU Commission found itself in a position where, 
on the one hand, it could not delay the accession of Romania without losing 
its political credibility. On the other hand, the accession of Romania with 
high levels of corruption and inadequate structures against organised crime 
could undermine the functioning of the EU. 
 
The EU Commission found itself under pressure and ultimately opted for a 
third scenario. It decided to establish a regime of post-accession monitoring 
mechanisms called the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, which no 
new Member State had faced after joining the EU. As illustrated in Chapter 
1, this new development also marked the very first post-accession 
conditionality that new Member States were obliged to respond. Thus, 
Romania was accepted to join the EU under the condition that they would 
meet certain key anti-corruption standards and benchmarks after accession 																																																								
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to the EU.441 Below is an analysis and illustration of the Cooperation and 
Verification Mechanism, which marked a key aspect of the EU support to 
develop a coherent anti-corruption policy field in Romania.  
 
4.3.3 The Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification (CVM) for 
Romania  
 
The CVM is an anti-corruption mechanism, which was designed to keep the 
reform momentum in Romania and avoid reversal of the rule of law 
reforms, and implement key anti-corruption measurements. The monitoring 
mechanism allows the EU to retain some leverage in the area of anti-
corruption policies after Romania accessed to the EU. It has been noted that 
the EU acted on a hypothesis that, on balance, it may be preferable to work 
with them when they are inside rather than to try to push for anti-corruption 
reforms from the outside.442 Every six months, the Commission issues a 
report on Romania that evaluates the progress on the bases of the 
established benchmarks and stresses the important issues that are necessary 
to be addressed before the next report.443 These monitoring reports have 
been acknowledged for being very detailed and for following the progress 
of administrative reforms, judicial improvements and political 
developments. These monitoring reports have played a vital role in 
gathering information about the government reforms in Romania.444  
 
The main report is published in the summer of each year and contains a 
detailed evaluation of progress and recommendations for further anti-
corruption reforms in Romania. Each winter, the EU Commission publishes 
an interim report providing a technical update on important developments 																																																								
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that occurred in the last six months.  However, the interim report does not 
include an evaluation of progress accomplished. The progress report that is 
issued in the summer remains the main point of reference for the 
assessment of progress in Bulgaria and Romania. 445  The CVM was 
supposed to come to an end after five years in 2012. However, the 
Commission decided to leave the CVM in place, even with the introduction 
of the EU Anti-Corruption Report, in order to keep the pressure on 
Romania to enhance the rule of law and establish a comprehensive anti-
corruption policy field.  
 
The CVM for Romania contains some objectives knows as benchmarks in 
which Romania is evaluated on. The EU Commission reports to Romania 
are issued on the degree in which these benchmarks have been achieved. If 
they are not achieved, the EU Commission offers technical assistance to 
Romania to fulfil these objectives. The Commission established the 
following four benchmarks, which mainly focus on the function of the rule 
of law in which Romania is evaluated that:446 
(1) Ensure a more transparent and efficient judicial process, notably by 
enhancing the capacity and accountability of the Superior Council of 
Magistracy. Report and monitor the impact of the new civil and penal 
procedural codes. 
(2) Establish, as foreseen, an integrity agency with responsibilities for 
verifying assets, incompatibilities and potential conflicts of interest, and for 
issuing mandatory decisions on the basis of which dissuasive sanctions can 
be taken. 
(3) Building on progress already made; continue to conduct professional, 
non-partisan investigations into allegations of high-level corruption. 
(4) Take further measures to prevent and fight against corruption, in 																																																								
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particular within local government. 
All the same, these so-called four ‘benchmarks’, as listed above for 
Romania, established by the EU Commission for Romania are not in 
essence benchmarks. Typically, a benchmark is a standard of best practice 
against something that can be measured. 447  The EU Commission’s 
benchmarks under the CVM resemble more targets that Romania should 
meet rather than a standard against in which objectives could be measured. 
Furthermore, the CVM does not give any tools for assessing or measuring 
progress which are normally an important part of any benchmarking 
instrument.448 
What in fact the CVM provides is a set of targets, most of which are 
expressed in a rather abstract manner. For instance, ‘continue the reform of 
the judiciary’ or ‘take further measures to prevent and fight corruption’. 
Patrycja Mason’s analysis shows that drawing up such general targets 
clearly indicates that the CVM is more of a political instrument rather than 
a technical mechanism.449 This analysis shows whether or not Romania has 
adequately addressed the benchmarks. The wide definition of the 
benchmarks leaves the door open for the EU Commission to put certain 
targets throughout its regular reports under the CVM. Even continuing 
beyond the seven years it was initially designed to serve as an instrument.  
An expert reviewer of the Commission, Belgian prosecutor Willem de 
Pauw, stated in a CVM report mentioned by The Economist, that ‘the 
Romanian judiciary system appears to be unable to function properly when 
it comes to applying the rule of law against high-level corruption’ and the 
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situation would soon revert to the pre-accession level of 2003.450 De Pauw's 
report also suggested that the apparent paradox that the judges cannot be 
accused for this situation, as it would be illogical to impute to the judiciary 
a lack of ‘corruption awareness’. The fight against corruption is generally 
defined as a policy imperative with which judicial function has nothing to 
do. Judges apply the law independently and impartially to individual 
cases.451 
 
The benchmarks set out for Romania refer to certain shortcomings in the 
areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption; failure to 
sufficiently address these issues would have resulted in the activation of the 
justice and home affairs (JHA) safeguard clause. 452  However, the EU 
Commission did not activate any clause and the Commission’s decision not 
to trigger any of the safeguard measures is related to the scope of the 
explicit threats and more accurately to the penalising power of the remedial 
and preventive sanctions established by the safeguard clauses. The remedial 
and preventive sanctions are considered to be limited and inadequate - some 
Member States have even pushed for its activation. The Dutch Minister of 
EU affairs Timmermans sent a letter to the former Justice Commissioner 
Barrot, asking the Commission to consider activating the JHA safeguard 
clause if the reports fail to register sufficient progress.453 This was even 
though the applicability of their sanctions expired at the end of 2009. 
 
In Romania, the political will to tackle domestic institutional reform has 
been uneven since before it joined the EU and the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report 2014 also suggests that it is uneven. There was a surge in activity in 
the run-up to accession, but much of the political elite responded by closing 
ranks and working to dilute or remove the curbs on corruption that were 																																																								
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implemented at that time. Unlike in CEE states, where new parties 
exploited the failure of the government to fight corruption, in Romania 
some of the old parties worked to push the issue under the rug. 
Nevertheless, when the EU has put strong pressure on Romania, the 
government has responded under the CVM, mainly by passing legislation in 
the parliament.454 Mihaiela Ristei supports such an analysis, as in Romania 
there has been progress in the fight against corruption when EU leverage 
and electoral pressures have created political incentives for some domestic 
elites to spearhead reforms, but not mostly because of the CVM.455 This is a 
clear example that there is not much of the theory of reflexive governance 
approach. The former Romanian justice minister, Monica Macovei, 
recommended that the reforms of the judiciary and the fight against 
corruption should continue after accession to the EU and that the post-
accession monitoring process was needed to keep the pressure.456 
The CVM overall has helped the Commission to monitor the progress of 
important cases and put pressure on the judiciary and the parliament to act 
appropriately. However, the progress in respect to fighting corruption still 
remains very slow. Many corruption cases never go to trial. The 
Commission has called for urgent action to fast-track trials that risk being 
finished, because it’s been a long time since the alleged crime.457 The work 
of government representatives in various areas still remains poor, since 
accountability is mostly absent and political allegiance is the leading 
determinant of success.458 The CVM, however, has shown important factors 
that helped to draw a general picture of the issue of corruption in Romania, 
and was the basic model for establishing the EU anti-Corruption Report.  																																																								
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However, the CVM, as an incitement to cover the years, has only offered 
temporary results by push Romanian and does not solve the problem in the 
long term. The fact that the CVM was extended beyond the five-year 
objective that was initially designated and also since it is being used still as 
a tool by the Commission; even with the EU Anti-Corruption Report in 
place, it shows that it is not as effective in the long future. The decision on 
the CVM foresees that the mechanism can be applied until all the 
benchmarks set under the mechanism are satisfactorily fulfilled. However, 
even after ten years of accession of Romania to the EU, the benchmarks are 
still not fully met. It is not realistic to expect that the problems of corruption 
will be cured anytime soon in Romania; the fact that it is distinguished as 
systematic possesses many policy challenges for success. Even if the 
sanctions were applied to Romania, they would affect innocent citizens and 
companies, as the court judgments affecting their legal position will not be 
recognised elsewhere in Europe. 
In summing up the EU anti-corruption policy towards Romania, it can be 
argued that much of the relationship between Romania and the EU has been 
based on establishing key anti-corruption measures to fight corruption more 
effectively in many sectors. Thus, much of the relationship is characterised 
on Romanian implementing key measures and reforms that the EU 
requested in the CVM and the pressures that the EU Commission puts on 
the Romania Government to implement those reforms. The EU 
Commission also supports in many cases Romania in developing an anti-
corruption policy field, but the support is not based on the theory of 
reflexive governance up to this point. This is because the theory of reflexive 
governance requires the EU Commission and Romania to engage in a 
dialogue for establishing an anti-corruption policy. Furthermore, the theory 
of reflexive governance requires  more engagement of civil society and a 
multi-level approach to establish an anti-corruption policy field. So far, 
much of the discussion has been dominated by the EU Commission 
requiring and pushing Romania to implement key reforms, which ultimately 
would contribute to establish an anti-corruption policy field. The next part 
evaluates the recommendation that the EU Anti-Corruption Report made 
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for Romania, and what progress Romania has made since the Report was 
issued. Furthermore, the next part will analyse if the EU Anti-Corruption 
Reports’ recommendations made for Romania embody elements of the 
theory of reflexive governance.   
4.3.4 The EU Anti-Corruption Report for Romania  
The EU Anti-Corruption Report recommendations for Romania are mainly 
focused on four key areas as stipulated in the introduction. Those include 
addressing corruption in sectors such as the judiciary, politics, public 
procurement contracts, and the healthcare system.  
4.3.4.1 The Judicial System  
The EU Anti-Corruption Report suggested that Romania must still work on 
safeguarding the stability and independence of the judiciary. Furthermore, 
the EU Anti-Corruption Report emphasised that Romania should continue 
to keep the track record of anti-corruption institutions and ensure that there 
are non-partisan investigations regarding high-level corruption cases. The 
Report also highlighted that there should be evidence and track records in 
tackling corruption and prosecutions of elected and appointed officials in 
particular. Furthermore, the EU Anti-Corruption Report recommended that 
Romania implements coherent preventive measurements, supplemented by 
an effective sanctioning regime in order to strengthen integrity in the 
judiciary. This is specifically aimed at all the relevant stakeholders in the 
judiciary, such as the Superior Council of Magistracy, the Judicial 
Inspection, magistrates’ associations, courts and prosecutors’ offices.  
Corruption is viewed as a serious threat to judicial performance in CEE 
states overall and, in particular, challenge the post-communist transition. 
Many countries found judicial corruption to be an obstacle for European 
membership and had to go through immense restructuring to adopt 
preventive tools to combat corruption in the justice system.459 This included 
implementing anti-corruption policies and strategies in conjunction with the 																																																								
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EU to address the issue of corruption in the judiciary more coherently. 
However, not all efforts have been very effective and Romania is an 
example of a country that, even after joining the EU, still has high levels of 
corruption in the judiciary. In particular, this applies proportionally to the 
rule of law.460 Corruption and applying the rule of law are also a high 
political debate, and political battle at times between the EU and Romania, 
as the political elite has put consistent pressure on the justice system and 
attempts to control the judiciary in Romania. On those bases, the EU made 
the recommendations in the EU Anti-Corruption Report for the judicial 
system in Romania. However, it must be noted that the recommendation in 
the EU Anti-Corruption Report is rather a reiteration of the same issue 
concerning the judicial system in Romania that has been raised in the CVM 
since its first publication in 2007.  
Defining corruption is a difficult task and research has been unable to find a 
common working definition as illustrated in Chapter one. Defining judicial 
corruption can also be more challenging still when it comes to finding a 
common definition. However, according to Buscaglia, judicial corruption 
can be more specifically defined: as the use of public authority for the 
private benefit of court personnel when this use undermines the rules and 
procedures to be applied in the provision of court services.461 In analysing 
the complicated relationship between judicial institutions and corruption, 
researchers distinguish between different types of judicial corruption, such 
as administrative corruption, operational corruption, 462  functional and 
dysfunctional corruption.463 In the case of Rumania, there is an issue with 
administrative and operational judicial corruption, which the EU Anti-
Corruption Report also observed to be highly problematic.  
In Romania and in most of the CEE countries, there is a distinct appeal for 																																																								
460 Carp, R (2014), ‘The Struggle for the Rule of Law in Romania as an EU Member State: 
The Role of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism’, Utrecht Law Review, 10(1), pp. 
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the political networks to increase their pressure and control the judicial 
system. The external pressure used on judicial personnel, which takes the 
form of judicial corruption, is applied in order to either lower the legal 
penalties or change the court decision.464 Therefore, having control of the 
judiciary can provide great advantages to political networks, such as 
political influence on key decisions and protection. In Buscaglia’s account, 
such corrupt acts, which encompass politically motivated court decisions, 
are returned as favours for career development in the judicial system as a 
result of their corrupt acts and favouritism to political networks.465 Such 
acts are fairly complex and despite the hidden character of operational 
corruption, academics have identified several indicators such as: conflicting 
and overlapping authority, political power-struggles over access to 
resources, manipulating and denying of truthful information, and personal 
relationships of necessity and loyalty. In other words, there is a weak 
separation between civil service and party politics, a weak 
professionalisation of the public institutions, and a lack of administrative 
accountability and transparency. These acts are also a testament to the 
deficient political control in most post-communist states.466 
 
Further indicators also recognised: the delay of judicial decisions, extended 
undue procedures, and occasionally judges reject laws on the basis of 
unconstitutionality. In Heron and Randazo’s account regarding judicial 
corruption, they observed that judges picked indirect strategies as a way to 
review legislation, rather than declare the whole statute to be 
unconstitutional. However, judges have on occasion struck down portions 
of the law as unconstitutional and unlawful. 467  Thus, the judicial 
dependence on outside pressure is diminished in the Romanian justice 																																																								
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system.  
 
Thus, one could say that the judiciary in Romania is both a perpetrator as 
well as a victim of corruption. In Romania, political networks may find the 
financial and power gain from corruption irresistible and; it has been 
demonstrated that it has been the case over the years with different 
governments. Once corrupted, the political networks challenge to reduce 
the effectiveness of the legal and judicial systems through manipulation of 
resource allocation, and appointments to key positions. For example, just 
four months after Romania joined the EU, the minister of justice, Macovei, 
was dismissed from office.  This was despite the fact that the EU regarded 
that Macovei did a good job in pushing for anti-corruption reform in the 
judiciary. 468  Another example was President Traian Bilsescu, who was 
impeached twice and although he survived both referendums, the 
impeachment procedures - particularly the latter on 10th July 2012 - resulted 
in high political and economic costs for Romania.469 Therefore, reducing 
resources will make it difficult for the legal system to fight corruption and it 
will give more room for corruption to increase. As a result, a weak judicial 
system becomes open to corrupt practices and one could interpret that the 
EU Anti-Corruption Report has reflected on such a rationale. Thus, the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report suggested for Romania to address more effectively 
corruption in the justice system.  
 
Nonetheless, it must be noted that, as further explained in Chapter One, 
reinforcing the performance of the judicial system will depend a lot on the 
will and application of the rule of law proportionally. Independent and 
professional behaviour by the judiciary will translate into respect for the 
rule of law and institutional suitability.470 This, however, would require 
political will to build both structural and institutional mechanisms to protect 																																																								
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the independence of the justice system. Without strengthening the 
institutional side of the judiciary and the independence from political 
networks, it would be hard to implement the integrity that the EU Anti-
Corruption Report calls for the Romanian justice system. The following 
section will evaluate the issues concerning corruption in the Romanian 
political system, which one could observe to be linked with the other 
sectors that politics tries to control. Prado identifies this as an obstacle to 
strengthening the rule of law itself.471 
 
4.3.4.2 The Political System 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report suggested that Romania has to implement a 
far-reaching code of conduct for the elected officials. Furthermore, 
Romania needs to establish accountability tools and sanctions for corrupt 
practices and conflicts of interest. The Report also suggests that Romania 
should ensure that all the decisions concerning lifting of immunities are 
correctly reasoned and taken promptly. Thus, there should be no obstruction 
of justice by the political elite. The EU Anti-Corruption Report also 
identified that Romania must consider developing an ethical code for 
political parties and encourage high integrity standards within the political 
system. 
 
The Romanian political system and elites have been under the EU 
monitoring scrutiny for corruption for a long period and are under suspicion 
of not playing by the rules. This explains many of the political scandals 
related to bribery and corruption. Furthermore, governments are either 
voted out of office or resign due to corruption related issues. This was 
shown in November 2015, when the government of Victor Ponta fell and a 
team of technocrats came in led by Dacian Ciolos, a former European 
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commissioner. The Ciolos-led government will be in charge for a maximum 
of one year before new elections are held in December 2016.472  
 
The CVM report that came out on 27th January 2016 was positive for the 
Ciolos-led government, when the European Commission First Vice 
President Frans Timmermans noticed that ‘Romania and Romanians have 
shown their willingness to fight corruption and to protect the independence 
of the judiciary. The mass demonstrations against corruption have shown 
how these issues matter to Romanian citizens. Over the last year we have 
seen the professionalism, commitment and good track record of the 
judiciary and the anti-corruption prosecution and reforms being 
internalized.’473 
 
The resignation of former Prime Minister Ponta in November 2015 and his 
government had a positive impact in improving the CVM that was issued in 
early 2016. However, the EU Commission stated that the reform of the 
judiciary does not enjoy the full consensus necessary to assure sustainable 
progress and required full participation by the political parties to get 
consensus.474 Thus, highlighting that even in 2016, after ten years of the 
CVM, the judicial independence and respect for court decisions continue to 
be challenging in Romania. This is an indication that, since the EU Anti-
Corruption Report was issued, there has not been substantive reform in 
ensuring the independency of the judicial system because of a lack of 
political will.  
 
The first high profile case of fighting corruption in the ranks of politics was 
when the High Court of Cassation and Justice sentenced the former 																																																								
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Romanian Prime Minister Adrian Nastase to two years in prison.475 The 
court also banned Nastase from running for public office. Then, former 
Prime Minister Nastase was found guilty of having illegally funded his 
presidential election campaign in 2004. He used his position as the head of 
the Romanian government to illegally collect about €1.6 million from 
various companies by officially announcing their payments as attendance 
fees for a governmental symposium.476 The Romanian political system in 
the last few years  has turned out to be a period of some success in fighting 
corruption. In particular, from April 2011 until October 2013, the Court 
handed down no fewer than eleven verdicts in corruption cases against 
former members of government.477 Since 2011, there is evidence that high 
elected public office holders were successfully put on trial for the first time 
since the collapse of communism. These positive developments were 
promising evidence to the EU that Romania had the will to tackle 
corruption in the political system. Also, it brought some public trust to the 
Romanian judiciary and holding their elected officials accountable.478 
 
Some of the political cases that were subject of investigations, as 
highlighted above, are an indication of the seriousness of the corruption 
imbedded in politics. In Romania in the last ten years, there were no less 
than two Prime Ministers, 21 ministers and 19 secretaries of state subject to 
investigation by the prosecution offices for acts committed in the exercise 
of their public office.479 The EU, civil society actors and media began to 
dominate the political discourse in Romania at the beginning of the year 
2000480 as a result, numerous laws and regulations have been implemented 																																																								
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and amended, as well as new state institutions being established to fight 
political corruption more efficiently.481 
 
The EU has given technical assistance and support to the Romanian anti-
corruption institutions over the years and these bodies have developed their 
own dynamics since 2005. The research can observe that there is an 
institutional independency of the Romanian law enforcement bodies, which 
is supported by the fact that these anti-corruption institutions have 
investigated corruption-related cases committed by members of all political 
parties.482 These developments are viewed as positive, but one could argue 
that they were rather superficial to only get into the European Union.   
 
Since Romania joined the EU, there have been some attempts to develop an 
effective anti-corruption policy, but the general political environment in 
Romania has been characterised by instability, which has had a negative 
impact in building on the progress. In particular, the years 2009 to 2011 
were dominated by a deep economic and financial crisis and it prompted 
governments to take radical steps to obtain IMF bailout loans. This led to a 
serious loss of popular confidence and culminated in massive street protests 
which saw a change of two governments in 2009 and 2012.483 As a result, 
still after four years of political instability in Romania, the fight against 
corruption was undermined.  
 
However, after the Government of Ponta came into power the fight against 
political corruption was relatively stable, even though there were many 
institutional changes due to changes of administrations, which contributed 
to the instability and failure to prioritise the fight against corruption. 
However, as described in the section about the judiciary above, insufficient 																																																								
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anti-corruption measures still remain as the court proceedings frequently go 
on for many years. This is caused as a result of the numerous occasions for 
procedural delays.484 However, it is also due to the lack of capacity in the 
justice system and courts frequently hesitate to sentence high-level and high 
profile corruption cases to long term sentences. The judgments in such 
high-level corruption cases frequently remain below the legal minimum and 
about 60% of the sentences are suspended according to the CVM.485 Thus, 
such practices on the part of the courts will have no significant deterrent 
effect and it will be rather superficial. That said, this problem is also due to 
the fact the judiciary itself is highly affected by corruption, as shown in the 
section above. Only from 2010 to 2013, four out of about one hundred 
judges were charged with peddling judicial influence and taking bribes.  
 
As a result of these compliances, three important improvements of the legal 
framework were made to prevent corruption in politics. Firstly, an 
amendment to the Constitutional Court Law in September 2010 was made 
to eliminate the rule which specified that, during concrete review 
proceedings the related case before the Constitutional Court, which was 
pending before an ordinary court had to be suspended.486 Secondly, in July 
2011 the ICCJ, which is the High Court of Cassation and Justice in 
Romania, decided by an interpretative ruling that, for the length of a 
tangible review before the Constitutional Court, the statute-barred period of 
the related case has to be extended. 487  Thirdly, in October 2010, the 
Romanian parliament approved a law known as the ‘Small Reform Law’ 
according to Hein, which amended the codes of procedure in order to 
accelerate judicial proceedings.488 Also, in 2012 and 2013, another four 																																																								
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new codes and procedural codes came into force that simplified the 
proceedings and made it easier to start proceedings to prosecute politicians.  
 
In 2012, the government approved a new ‘National Anti-Corruption 
Strategy 2012–2015’ drafted by the parliament, which mainly answers the 
demands and recommendations put forward by the EU Commission and 
declared that they would no longer misuse their immunity rights that they 
enjoyed from prosecution. In the National Anti-Corruption Strategy, the 
parliament formulates the objective to strengthen the integrity of its 
members. In particular, this is done by amending the regulations of the 
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate and other legislation in this field, in 
order to put on the agenda of the first plenary session requests for lifting 
immunity of Parliamentarians and solve these requests in a maximum of 72 
hours .489 The EU Anti-Corruption Report, in facts, calls for an application 
of such a rule and that is why it is mentioned as a key issue to be addressed 
by Romania.  
 
Nevertheless, the government has tried to influence some decisions of the 
prosecutors and, on purpose in 2012, by delaying the nomination of the new 
Prosecutor General attached to the ICCJ and the DNA Chief Prosecutor. 
Since the regular term of the incumbent Prosecutor General was to end in 
October 2012 and that of DNA Chief Prosecutor Daniel had already expired 
in February 2012, the Ponta Government delayed the appointment 
procedures during the summer of 2012 until trying to impeach President 
Basescu.490 In doing so, the government attempted to clear the way for an 
appointment of prosecutors that was much less committed to build on the 
previous records and be close to the Ponta Government.  
 
After the failure of the presidential dismissal of Basescu, it was not until 
May 2013 that the then Prime Minister Ponta and President Basescu 																																																								
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reached an agreement on the appointment of the two leading prosecutors. 
The appointed ones were rather portrayed as the ‘president’s candidate’, 
who became the DNA Chief Prosecutor and the ‘government’s candidate’, 
who became the ICCJ Prosecutor General.491  
 
The academic discourse in Romania finds that such acts are motivated by 
the political elite in further politicizing the judicial system. However, what 
is clear is that, even in some prior successful anti-corruption policies, 
politicians from all parties use allegations of corruption for other political 
purposes and these patterns have been highly visible in post-communist 
transition states. The following section will evaluate the issues concerning 
corruption in public procurement in Romania.  
 
4.3.4.3 Public procurement 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report suggested that Romania has to take into 
account the development of effective tools within contracting authorities 
and public procurement supervisory bodies. The Report suggested that 
Romania should, in particular, focus on conflicts of interest at local and 
regional level, as corruption in public procurement in Romania is an area of 
particular concern to the EU.  
 
According to the 2015 flash Eurobarometer survey on corruption relevant to 
businesses,492 more than 34% of EU companies and 51% of Romanian 
inner companies that participated in public procurement say corruption 
prevented them from winning a contract. A 2005 survey done by the World 
Economic Forum, in a sample of 125 countries, placed Romania among the 
last 25 countries concerning the frequency of bribery and additional 
payments in public procurement. Thus, compared to ten years ago, 
Romania has not made enough progress considering all the financial 																																																								
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assistance that it has received from the EU. However, at that time Romania 
was the only EU candidate country to be placed with such a poor ranking, 
while most of the EU Member States were placed among the best 25 
performers.493 The 2015 flash Eurobarometer survey shows that nearly 74% 
of the Romanian population believes that contracts are not awarded in a fair 
and transparent way.494 However, the CVM reports are the best source to 
offer a perspective about corruption in public procurement for Romania.  
 
If one analyses the CVM reports from 2010 to 2014, because the 2016 
report is mainly based on judicial independence and judicial reform, there 
are several common ideas present. Firstly, all the CVM finds that progress 
seems very inadequate in the prevention and sanctioning of corruption 
related to public procurement in Romania. The EU Commission finds that 
the progress made against high-level corruption in general has not been 
matched in public procurement. Secondly, nearly all of the CVM reports 
and also the EU Anti-Corruption Report issued in 2014 address similar 
shortcomings. Those include frequent changes of the legal framework and 
an institutional set-up that lacks sufficient capacity, as well as the lack of 
key tools for effective controls such as an inclusive register of public 
tenders, weak protection of public procurement against conflicts of interest; 
few cases of conflicts of interest are pursued in public procurement. 
Thirdly, almost all of the CVM reports, including the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report, put emphasis on creating ex-ante verifications in order to detect 
conflicts of interest in the early stages of the award procedure.495  
 
The reasons why public procurement procedures in Romania are highly 
dysfunctional and corrupt are because of the absorption of Structural Funds. 
Recent studies show that the spending of EU funds across many new and 
old Member States is a contributing factor to public procurement 																																																								
493 OECD (2013), Integrity in Public Procurement – Good Practice from A to Z, Paris: 
OECD. 
494 National Survey on Public Procurement (2013) Retrieved from 
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495 Sjafjell, B and A. Wiesbrock (2016), Sustainable Public Procurement Under EU Law: 
New Perspectives on the State as Stakeholder. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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corruption.496 The researcher argues that this is in the context in which EU 
funds amount to 1.9% to 4.4% of the GDP and well above 50% of public 
investment, even if only a fraction of these amounts is impacted by 
corruption. The EU Commission criticised Romania and pushed for an 
enforcement of instruments to protect EU funds that were contributing to 
public procurement contracts. In June 2013, the Romanian government 
replied to the requests and critiques coming from the EU Commission and 
adopted a joint ministerial order regarding the support of the guide 
encompassing the central risks identified in the field of public 
procurement.497  
 
An example of these risks is unjustified shortening of deadlines as a result 
of the publication of notice of an intention to purchase. Use of an 
accelerated award procedure can be done only if the emergency situation is 
clearly justified by the contracting authority and it is not connected to its 
own fault.498 This involves putting in place an award criterion, i.e. the most 
economically advantageous tender, with the inclusion of irrelevant or 
unquantifiable evaluation factors. Automatic exclusion of the lowest tender 
occurs, as this is often done based on the justification that such a low price 
will most likely generate problems during the execution of the contract.499  
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report suggested that Romania build upon these 
guidelines and make a proper application. However, as the EU Anti-
Corruption Report suggested, there are conflicts of interest in awarding 
public procurement contracts in Romania and appropriate measurements 
should be taken to prevent such acts occurring. In assessing the problem as 																																																								
496 Fazekas, M., Tóth, I. J., and P.L. King, L. P. (2014), Are EU funds a corruption risk? 
The impact of EU funds on grand corruption in Central and Eastern Europe. Budapest: 
Corruption Research Centre, pp. 1-23. 
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already mentioned above and in the EU Anti-Corruption Report, conflicts 
of interest represent one of the most widespread forms of corruption in 
public procurement in Romania. In March 2013, the president of the 
National Agency for Integrity for Romania, while attending the conference 
‘Combating criminality in the field of public procurement, an operational 
approach’ referring to an internal study conducted by the Agency, declared 
that at the level of local and county authorities, conflicts of interest are no 
longer controlled by the state authorities due to a legal framework which is 
outdated and does not meet the challenges in practice.500 According to the 
researcher, more than 78 elected officials at the local level were found to 
have received and earned public money through public procurement corrupt 
practices. 
 
In the field of conflicts of interest, the legal and institutional framework has 
constantly changed in the last ten years. Currently, the Romanian national 
public procurement legislation does not include a clear definition of 
conflicts of interest. Instead, the law mentioned several situations that can 
lead to a case of conflicts of interest.501 In regard to the persons involved in 
verifying and evaluating the candidates for tenders, the conflict might be 
created by an interest that can influence the impartiality and objectivity of 
those persons throughout the evaluation process.502 The most recent piece 
of legislation addressing the issue of conflicts of interest cited that the 
conflicts of interest should be understood broadly as a conflict between the 
professional duties and the private interest of a public servant in which it 
could be observed as having the potential to obstruct upon the independent 
and objective execution of duties.503 In the light of this wide definition, 																																																								
500 Freedom House (2013), Public procurement. An operational approach, [Online], 20 
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even non-patrimonial interests have the potential to influence the behaviour 
of a person. However, very often the NGOs and the press monitoring the 
field of conflicts of interest have identified situations presenting conflicts of 
interest in public procurement. 
 
Researchers find the current legal framework in Romania needs a complete 
makeover; this has also been suggested by the president of the National 
Agency for Integrity.504 Such chances that are needed are observed also in 
the CVM Report of 2014, as well as in the EU Anti-Corruption Report. The 
legal and institutional frameworks in place, as found in the research, can no 
longer provide results in the fight against corruption. The 2014 CVM report 
suggests that Romania should pay more attention to the prevention side in 
order to reduce the continuous vulnerability of public procurement 
procedures towards corruption, and it should establish early detection tools 
of conflicts of interest through an ex-ante verification procedure of conflicts 
of interest. 505  This means a combined framework and the cooperation 
between National Agency for Integrity, the national entity involved in 
monitoring and sanctioning conflicts of interest in Romania and the 
governmental agency responsible with monitoring procurement procedures.  
 
What is clear from the research, the CVM Report and the EU Anti-
Corruption Report, is that potential conflicts of interest should be identified 
and avoided in advance before contracts are awarded. Thus, a legal 
obligation on public procurement authorities to respond to problems 
identified in both reports will be key to make the system work more 
efficiently. However, as the previous section on political corruption in 
Romania showed, during the past five years governments have been very 
unstable and thus the priority has been more on the judiciary and reforming 
politics rather than paying more attention to implement new laws to prevent 																																																																																																																																																																												
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clearly conflicts of interest and fight corruption more effectively in public 
procurement. The next section evaluates the other key area that the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report identified to have severe problems with corruption.   
 
4.3.4.4 Threat of Corruption in the Healthcare 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report suggests that Romania should implement 
effective strategies to cut the level of informal payments in the public 
healthcare system, by considering improving wages and working conditions 
for medical staff in order to prevent some forms of corruption. Also, the 
Report suggests that Romania could ensure operational independence of 
departments within the Ministry of Health and allow for them to control the 
budget and procurement.  
 
Informal payments in the health care system are becoming an increasingly 
debated topic, especially in developing and transitional countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe, and Romania is no exception. Lewis defines informal 
payments as “payments to individual and institutional providers, in kind or 
in cash, that are made outside official payment channels or are purchases 
meant to be covered by the health care system. This encompasses envelope 
payments to physicians and contributions” to hospitals, as well as the value 
of medical supplies purchased by patients and drugs obtained from private 
pharmacies, but intended to be part of government-financed healthcare 
services. Such informal payments are a form of corruption”.506 
 
The health care systems are still underdeveloped across the Central and 
East European region. This issue involved in the health care system in 
Romania is complex as in most CEE states, which also encompasses issues 
related to other areas such as governance, laws, economic and socio-
political situation, including levels of corruption, as well as cultures of 
moral and financial incentives in obtaining services at state facilities. In 
Romania, out-of-pocket payments have become a common feature for 																																																								
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health care delivery, which is in major contrast to the free-of-charge service 
provision during Communist times. 507  Patients are now paying either 
formally or informally to have access to or satisfactory quality for health 
care. Although some governments in Romania have ignored the existence 
of informal practices in the health care sector, now there is a recognition by 
the EU, which is included in the EU Anti-Corruption Report, to drive 
Romania to adopt strategies to eliminate informal payments in the health 
care system, which the EU perceives will reduce the level of corruption. 
Surveys conducted in Romania find that around almost 56% have paid a 
bribe to have access to healthcare.508 The research and reporting on the 
issue of corruption in healthcare is still not as advanced as in other areas 
such as shown above in politics or the judiciary, as corruption in healthcare 
has not been to the concern of the government nor the agenda of the EU to 
make strategies to implement preventive mechanisms. Even so, the issue is 
complex and recent reporting on the issue finds that corruption in 
healthcare has become part of the system and is systematic. 
 
Firstly, doctors in much of Central and Eastern Europe argue that abysmal 
wages in official health-care systems leave them no choice but to demand 
payments on the side. In Romania, resident doctors at public hospitals earn 
just about €200 per month, while specialists earn up to €500.509  Thus, 
unsurprisingly, about 7,000 Romanian doctors, that are about 30% of the 
doctors in the Romania, have emigrated according to the head of the 
country’s college of physicians.510 Just in Britain’s National Health Service 																																																								
507 Bartlett, W., Božikov, J and B. Rechel (2012), Health Reforms in South East Europe. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 130– 147. 
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offer bribes and low-paid doctors accept them. The Economist, 24 March 2015, [Online] 
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alone, it is estimated that more than 2,000 Romanian doctors are 
employed.511  
 
This is one of the leading factors as to why informal payments occur in the 
Romanian healthcare system and the situation has got even worse in 
Romania compared to other EU countries because the country’s health-care 
system is underfunded, and its drug regulation is inadequate. Maria Barbu, 
a Romania doctor, reported in the Independent in 2014 that she searched for 
work and the hospital manager wanted €5,000 to hire her in a small town of 
8,000 inhabitants.512 She furthermore gave an insight that, at every step of 
Romania’s doctors and nurses’ careers, they must contend with a system 
that is accused of rewarding bribery and nepotism instead of being based on 
merit. Research finds that not many of them hold out against this 
corruption. However, doctors at times also pay money under-the-table in 
order to secure employment and promotion in the healthcare system.513 This 
shows why many doctors supplement their income by receiving bribes and 
advance or keep their job.  
 
According to Teodora Menea, at the same time patients are willing 
participants in the bribe-ridden economy, pressing money upon doctors out 
of gratitude or fear in order to get access to healthcare.514 Also, given the 
fact that the very nature of receiving healthcare can be detrimental to 
someone’s life, patients are willing participants in the bribe as long as their 
health improves. Thus, Menea argues that there has also been a culture of 
																																																								
511 Campbell, D., Siddique, H., Kirk, A. and J. Meikle, (2015), NHS hires up to 3,000 
foreign-trained doctors in a year to plug staff shortage’. The Guardian, 28 January 2015, 
[Online] Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/jan/28/-sp-nhs-hires-
3000-foreign-doctors-staff-shortage 
512 The Economist (2015), Patients bearing gifts. In central and eastern Europe, patients 
offer bribes and low-paid doctors accept them. The Economist, 24 March 2015, [Online] 
Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21647087-central-and-eastern-
europe-low-paid-doctors-accept-bribes-and-patients-offer-them-patients-bearing (Accessed 
18 April 2016 
513 Karklins, R (2016), The System Made Me Do it: Corruption in Post-communist 
Societies. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 219.  
514 Manea, T (2015), ‘Medical Bribery and the Ethics of Trust: The Romanian Case’. 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 40(1), pp. 26–43.  
	 177	
social acceptance of informal payments in healthcare and this poses a 
policy challenge for Romania.515  
 
Despite the difference in the overall perceptions regarding cash and in-kind 
informal payments discussed above, some research finds certain positive 
and indifferent attitudes towards both types of payments in Romania, 
though the largest cluster groups are based on negative attitudes.516 The 
research analysis finds that, despite the overall public support for the 
eradication of informal patient payments, these payments are inevitable due 
to the low funding of the public health care sector. This was also the case 
with the cancer drug crisis in Romania, where cancer patients struggle 
every day to find the drugs their life depends on and the government, after 
facing strong public pressure, lent €800,000 to Unifarm, the Romanian state 
company in charge of acquiring and distributing drugs to medical 
institutions around the country to reduce the crisis.517 Thus, informal patient 
payments fill the gaps in the public health care system.  
 
Aside from the impact at an individual level, informal payments also have 
affected the performance of the health care system in Romania as seen 
above. The effect is observed in their influence on the distribution of 
services as shown by the example of the supply of drugs shown above and 
resource allocation. Furthermore, the informal payments are contributing to 
the obstruction of health care reform, since they create a strong incentive 
for individuals in high hierarchical positions to block reform attempts. This 
discussion has been summed up by Gaal and McKee, who proposed two 
alternative hypotheses: donation and fee-for-service. 518  The donation 
hypothesis rests on socio-cultural and ethical explanations and involves a 																																																								
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voluntary action on the patient’s part, whereas the fee-for-service 
hypothesis stresses shortage and always involves a certain degree of 
pressure. As has been witnessed, coercion is not automatically or mainly 
external but also internal. Although the two hypotheses seem conflicting 
and mutually exclusive, they could co-exist in Romania as an alternative519. 
Thus, policy efforts to address them may benefit in considering these 
alternative hypotheses. 
 
The research finds that there is no strategy in Romania, nor is there enough 
literature addressing the issue of corruption in the healthcare system. Filiasi 
suggests that the Health Ministry does not have a human resources strategy 
and a clear strategy for the healthcare system. 520  Furthermore, Filiasi 
suggests that the Ministry of Healthcare does not collect statistics to show 
how medicine has changed since and the head of the medical watchdog 
indicates that the government rejects the criticisms of the underperforming 
and corrupt system in healthcare.521 Therefore, despite the fact that informal 
payments have been reported in Romania, there is still a lack of institutional 
initiative to address the issue of informal payments in the health care 
system. The EU Commission’s reports criticise Romania for not making 
enough judicial changes and efforts to fight corruption. Since 2007, when 
Romania joined the EU, more than €12 million from the EU budget have 
been invested to support the fight against corruption and judicial reform in 
Romania522. The health care system, on the other hand, seems especially 
affected by everyday bribery or informal payments. Thus, the situation is 
quite paradoxical, because Romanians show concern about this kind of 																																																								
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small bribery, but at the same time regularly practice it and this makes it 
harder for policy success. Thus, these informal payments and forms of 
corruption have an impact on patients, healthcare providers, and the system 
as a whole, but at the same time there is not a coherent development to 
address the issue of informal payments in Romania’s health care sector.  
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4.4 Albania 
 
4.4.1 1990 – 1997: Corruption as a new political chest game 
 
Albania was the last country in South and Eastern Europe in the 1990s to 
experience the fall of communism.523 Albania struggled to create stable 
democratic institutions and proper governmental structures as it was one of 
the poorest communist countries in Europe and it arguably had the most 
oppressive communist regime in the entire region. The high degree of 
oppression under communist rule effectively eliminated all forms of 
opposition and dissidence. Thus, this slowed down the later transition to 
pluralism and democracy. Then, in 1991, Albania established itself as a 
parliamentary representative democratic republic. 524  The Prime Minister 
became the head of government and the President the head of state. Power 
is shared between both the government and parliament. The governments 
since 1992 have been dominated by the Democratic Party and the Socialist 
Party.525 
 
Post-communist politics in the 1990s was characterised by a high degree of 
political conflict, weak internal party democracy, electoral fraud, 
parliamentary boycotts, and continuously changing rules of the election 
game in almost every parliamentary election. A corruption discourse 
emerged in the government of the Democratic Party, the Albania 
Conservatives (non-communist party) and the newly reformed Socialist 
Party (the old communist party), which constantly blamed each other for 
being more corrupt. However, the notion of corruption was new then to the 
public sphere in Albania; at that time, some members of parliament 
opposed the introduction of a legal definition by arguing that, at this point, 
they still did not know its relevant legal meaning. 																																																								
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Corruption made its first appearance in Albanian legislation in 1991 as a 
phenomenon that supposedly undermines the freedom and independence of 
the country. The National Intelligence Service was assigned to fight 
corruption under this provision. Corruption appeared for the first time in 
February 1992 as an offence under the Albanian Criminal Code, under the 
heading of ‘Political Corruption’ as ‘receiving, or accepting to receive, for 
oneself or for others, a financial or other reward in order to carry out 
actions that go against the national interests (of Albania) 526  The 
Communist Party that governed Albania during the transition phase 
introduced this article. 
 
The concept of ‘national interest’ was a term used in the communist era in 
which it had two meanings. One is national interest in the context of 
international politics, meaning the interests of a nation state on the 
international stage.527 This concept must be contrasted with group interests 
or international interests. The other is state interest or interests of state as 
the highest level in national politics, meaning governmental interest or a 
government that represents the people’s interest. 
 
Thus it makes it difficult to measure and clarify what can constitute going 
against the national interest in exchange for financial gain and how 
corruption was viewed as a crime against the national interest in Albania 
under the criminal code in 1992. What is peculiar is that corruption at this 
time was viewed in the legislation as a phenomenon that undermined the 
freedom and independence of the country and the National Intelligence 
Service would fight it. 528  This indicates that Albania was still not 
developing proper structures to deal with the issue of corruption and was 
mainly borrowing phrases from the legislation established by the 																																																								
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communist regime. This marked the start of the Albanian political process 
to cope with hurdles of the communist past in their fight against corruption. 
Public officials had to adapt to the post-communist political ethos, 
according to which personal favours from governmental and private sources 
are no longer acceptable.529 However, what is clear is that Albania still 
relied on the National Intelligence Service at this stage, personnel from the 
secret police structure from the communist era to deal with corruption, 
rather than an established agency to deal with corruption related cases.    
 
During the beginning of the post-communist era - 1990 to 1997 - corruption 
became a common topic in the political debate, mainly used for labelling 
and denigrating the communist elite. The Democratic Party adopted the first 
anti-corruption legislation after the collapse of communism. It was a 
Presidential Decree in 1992 requesting for the declaration and verification 
of wealth for both private businesses and public officials during the period 
1990-1992.530 The Democratic Party supported the Presidential Decree and 
hailed this effort as a key piece of anti-corruption legislation, because 
according to the Democratic Party Government at the time, ‘the book of red 
corruption in Albania was quite thick’.531 Red corruption referred to the 
enrichment of the former communists transformed into capitalists; thus, the 
discourse was to denigrate the previous communist elite as a corrupt 
clique.532 This marked the start of the post-communist political battles to 
use corruption to fight political opponents and distinguish themselves from 
the communist elite that ruled Albania for almost 50 years. A similar 
political tactic is witness also in many Central and Eastern European 
countries.  
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The legislation in 1992 became a central tool when the conservative 
government pushed for prosecuting the communist elite mainly for the 
mismanagement between 1990 – 1992 on the bases of committing financial 
crimes during the transition phase.533 This tactic against the old communist 
elite was to hold them to account, but not for their political action during 
the communist era. Instead for financial crimes and, therefore, corruption 
was frequently used to refer to the communist elite action between the 
transition phases, 1990-1992 for the betrayals of the national interest in 
exchange for financial gain. A conservative Minister issued a report on the 
government mismanagement during 1990-92 and this document became the 
principal piece of evidence in the trial against the last communist leader, 
Ramiz Alia and the newly elected chairmen of the Socialist Party Fatos 
Nano, who were convicted and jailed on corruption charges.534 
 
The Report that was used, since the primary evidence was prepared in just 
over one month in which it became the basis for evidence to charges 
members of the old regime, in particular the last communist leader Alia.535 
The report was an overview of an audit of the luxurious spending of the 
communist elite during the transition phase from 1990 – 1992. Evidently, 
Berisha - the new conservative leader - felt that, in a nation so stricken by 
poverty and shortages, the public would be more inclined to support actions 
that focused on financial abuses. 536  One could observe that the 
Conservative Government at the time after the transition phase had more 
interest in two things. Firstly, to distinguish themselves and the New 
Democracy Party as non-communist; secondly, to fight their new political 
opponents – in particular, the then chairman of the Socialist Party Nano, 
rather than actually developing an anti-corruption policy field.  
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As a result, President Berisha, who was also the leader of the Conservatives 
at the time, picked ordinary economic issues related to corruption, rather 
than serious political crimes that could be referred during communist times. 
It is clear that, up to this time, the anti-corruption policy field had started to 
slowly emerge with the introduction of the legislation advertising 
corruption as being against the state interest. However, at this stage it was 
not intended to build an anti-corruption policy field, but rather to use 
corruption to fight political opponents, regardless of which party was 
leading the country after the 1992 general elections. 
 
This was demonstrated in the trial of the last communist leader Ramiz Alia, 
where he was brought to trial on the basis of corruption, rather than the 
crimes for which he would have been responsible during the communist 
era.537 The intention and efforts of the non-communist Berisha was not to 
develop an anti-corruption policy. Although he wanted to develop a track 
record in tackling high-profile cases related to corruption, it was mainly 
intended to denigrate and destroy key former members of the previous 
politburo. As observers suggested, President Berisha’s government then did 
not intend to tackle corruption, nor to develop a comprehensive anti-
corruption policy field.  
 
His intention to push for investigating and imprisoning former members of 
the politburo was based on two reasons. Firstly, because President Berisha 
personally wanted the last communist leader Alia, the wife of the former 
communist leader Enver Hoxha, and the leader of the Socialist Party Nano, 
jailed because they symbolised the communist era in the eyes of many 
Albanians and had to be prosecuted for their leading roles during 
communist Albania.538 Secondly, the Berisha Government wanted to clearly 
distinguish themselves to the international community as non-communist. 
Corruption here was used as a tool to jail and sentence key members of the 
previous politburo. The wife of the former communist leader Enver Hoxha 																																																								
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was sentenced in 1993 for nine years, the opposition and Socialist Party 
leader Nano was sentenced to twelve years in prison in 1994, and the last 
communist leader Alia was placed under house arrest in August 1992. 539 
Later on, his detention was converted into imprisonment in August 1993. 
However, they all went free after 1997 and Nano was compensated for the 
politically motivated prison sentence.   
 
They were imprisoned on the basis of the abuse of power and 
misappropriation of state funds during 1990 – 1992. 540  The Parliament 
commission that investigated the activity of the Government of Albania 
from 1990 – 1992, suggested that the Government at the time abused 
humanitarian aid given by the Italian state during the economic crisis that 
lasted from 1990 until early 1992. Thus, using corruption at this stage was a 
way to imprison the old communist leadership, rather than prosecute them 
for their involvement in communist administration or crimes that they 
committed during communist times.541 By contrast, the circumstances to 
imprison the opposition and Socialist Party leader Nano for corruption were 
not mainly driven on an anti-corruption agenda that the government was 
perusing, but rather political motivations. The Vienna-based International 
Helsinki Federation for Human Rights claimed that the jailed opposition 
leader was convicted in politically motivated trials and appealed for release 
of the opposition and Socialist Party leader.542  This is a clear example 
where the government at the time was not focusing on developing an anti-
corruption policy field, but uses corruption as a means to jail and prosecute 
political opponents, including the leader of the opposition. As a human 
rights activist observed, the Conservatives in government did not simply 
want to fight corruption at this stage, but win the upcoming elections by 
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intimidating the opposition. 543  This was clearly evidenced in the 1996 
Preliminary elections, where the conservatives won an absolute majority 
and the election was highly disputed. Human Rights Watch, UN, OSCE, the 
Council of Europe, the European Union and the United States government 
called the Albanian government to declare the Albanian 1996 Preliminary 
elections invalid due to electoral violations and election fraud.544   
 
After 1995, corruption shifted as a topic related to administration. In 
particular, bribery in the public sector became a concern in early 1993 and 
in 1995 since Albania started to privatise state entities.545 The Albanian 
government presented changes to the Albanian Criminal Code as a response 
to the mounting concern about bribery of public officials. By adding to 
Article 109 of Albanian Criminal Code that: ‘bribe-presenter is freed from 
criminal charge when he/she reports the act of bribe giving before the start 
of a legal investigation’.546  The purpose of this change was to encourage 
the reporting of bribery in the public sector, because bribery was 
understood as corruption. In 1995, the High State Audit was criticised by 
the public and members of parliament for ignoring claims that corruption 
had a huge dimension in Albania at this time. This ranged from smuggling 
of petrol and weapons to former Yugoslavia and the Middle East, and 
corruption was used as a tool to pass through the border and later also 
contributed to the rise of the Ponzi schemes in Albania.547 Corruption at this 
stage started to be spread out in the black market and informal economy. 
The director of the high state audit in Albania at the time acknowledged 
that bribery was a problem in the state agencies and had started to be a 
common practice. There were claims that government officials fixed and 																																																								
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lowered prices in relation to the liberalised prices of the free market to get 
financial gains.548 There was a tendency for the use of corruption and it 
started to emerge in the economy and marked the start of a discourse where 
corruption was used in the financial sector. However, there was no intention 
to develop an anti-corruption policy field to address these allegations. They 
were accepted by public officials, reported in the media, but no one was 
prosecuted for corruption at this stage. Corruption in public administration 
and the informal sector was not viewed as a fundamental problem at this 
stage. Corruption took central stage only in the political discourse where it 
was used to balm and fight political opponents. However, the emergence of 
corruption in the black economy and in the financial sector had a huge 
impact on how Albania reacted after the collapse of the Ponzi scheme in 
March 1997 and those events shaped how corruption was treated after 1997 
in terms of developing an anti-corruption policy field.549  
 
During the last period of post-communist Albania, corruption did not have a 
unified meaning, covering bribery, smuggling, crime, moral degeneration, 
speculation about alleged corrupt activates. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
draw some key elements in the way that corruption was used for political 
purposes during 1990–1997 in Albania. The first anti-corruption legislation 
was a decree that called for the declaration and verification of wealth for 
both private businesses and public officials. Thus, this concerned both 
private and public forms of corruption. The anti-communist discourse, 
which dominated in 1992 to 1997, was driven based on a political 
motivation to destroy the communist leadership and their senior associates. 
During 1991 to 1997, the phrase ‘corruption’ was primarily linked with the 
transition phase from communism to post-communism and there was no 
proper cohesion on developing an anti-corruption policy field. As shown 
above, there was a growing discussion of corruption during the period 1990 
to 1997, but there was not any clear intention to develop an anti-corruption 																																																								
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policy field. It was only after 1998 that there was an emergence of the anti-
corruption policy field in Albania.  This was as a consequence of the 
collapse of the Ponzi schemes- known as the Pyramid schemes in Albania - 
and the support of international actors to pay closer attention to anti-
corruption policy shortcomings in the country. 
 
4.4.2 International support to fight corruption in Albania, 1997-2009 
 
During the period of 1997 to 2009, Albania witnessed the first attempts to 
develop a proper anti-corruption policy field. There were internal as well as 
external factors that drove Albania to shape an anti-corruption policy 
targeting the fight against corruption at different levels. The new Socialist 
government that was elected in 1997 made fighting corruption as their key 
political agenda once in government. In 1998 the Albanian government, 
with the assistance of the World Bank, introduced the first Albanian anti-
corruption strategy.550 The Albanian government followed the agenda of the 
World Bank in 1998 to fight against corruption. That said, there were three 
reasons why the Albanian government introduced the anti-corruption 
strategy in 1998.  
 
Firstly, the Socialist government wanted to distinguish themselves from the 
previous Conservative government in their efforts to fight corruption and 
wanted  to strengthen their anti-corruption credentials once they were in 
government to the Albanian electorate. Secondly, the international actors - 
mainly the World Bank and IMF - had important leverage on Albania at 
that time and targeted in restructuring Albania’s finances, as well as the 
government’s structure, as a result of the collapse of the economy in 1997. 
Thirdly, the collapse of the Pyramid scheme in 1997, which was the main 
factor for the collapse of the economy, the civil unrest, the political turmoil 
that resulted in new elections to solve the crises – was also the main factor 
to acknowledge corruption as a central problem that needed to be addressed 
accordingly through a comprehensive anti-corruption policy. Under 																																																								
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pressure, the Socialist government at the time had to respond to these issues 
and adopted an anti-corruption strategy in 1998.  
 
The Pyramid scheme, as the main factor for the social, economic and 
political turmoil, saw Albania go through a large reconstruction and, in fact, 
start building governmental structures from the beginning. Following 
intense economic reforms after 1992, many considered Albania as a 
successful model in much of the literature on the economics of transition 
states as the classic example of sound post-socialist economic policies in 
line with the ‘Washington consensus’.551  However, this positive progress 
was rather misleading when the Pyramid scheme collapsed in 1997.  
 
The Pyramid schemes had been operating in Albania for some time since 
1992 on an ever increasing scale, and their collapse pulled the country 
within weeks into chaos, widespread violence, plundering, and food 
shortages. The common perception of this incident was unexpected from an 
analytical point of view. Although Albania's IMF-inspired economic reform 
policies had been widely acknowledged for its good post-communist 
performance, the unexpected collapse of the Albanian economy was 
observed firstly as a result of the country’s false understating of 
capitalism.552 
 
The Pyramid scheme were schemes, companies and firms, which registered 
as foundations or charities, but started banking as Ponzi methods. This 
informal structure of the economic sector was not considered problematic 
by the financial authorities in Albania at this time and corruption was not an 
issue. The money-borrowing firms, which were the Pyramid scheme that 
did not have to report on their sources of capital and loans, were not 
recorded in their balance sheets. These firms, in contrast to schemes 
presenting themselves as 'charity foundations', made up for a large part of 
the Albanian economy during the period 1992 –1997. They took part in 																																																								
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business trading, tourism, oil, property markets, transport and food 
processing.553 The main advantage that Pyramid schemes attracted to savers 
was the high interest rates. In late 1996 in Albania, the profit was around 50 
per cent monthly in these banking firms. The Albanian Conservative 
government at the time lent some state credibility to these schemes, even 
though the IMF and World Bank had warned and recommended the 
Albanian government to closely supervise this foundation. Albanian 
citizens that invested in these schemes felt that the government supported it 
because the executives of these pyramid schemes were closely associated 
with key members of the government, and the government backed this 
scheme publicly. What is key to note is that most of this Pyramid schemes 
supported and financed the Democratic Party campaign in the 1996 general 
election. The schemes had accumulated more than US$ 1.2 billion, or 50 % 
of GDP, excluding accrued interest at the time of estimation.  
 
Therefore, it was important for the Socialist government to introduce an 
anti-corruption strategy and to develop an anti-corruption policy field in 
addressing many key issues that related to the collapse of the economy in 
1997. Moreover, key international actors pushed for reforms to reconstruct 
Albania’s administrative structures. Corruption was observed as a general 
problem that allowed for the pyramid schemes to rapidly grow and not be 
properly supervised by the government. Furthermore, the pyramid schemes 
- through corruption - got support from the conservative government and 
observers understand that the government did not act earlier due to the 
influence that these schemes had in Albania. By the end of 1996, the IMF 
had realised the dangerous magnitudes that Pyramid schemes had 
accumulated, and warned the Albanian government against them, as the 
World Bank had been doing publicly since mid-1996 and earlier in 
government circles.554 However, since the Parliamentary elections were in 
1996, the conservatives in government refused to act before the elections, 
as it feared that it would have an impact on their general election results. 																																																								
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For these reasons, the Socialist government wanted to clearly distinguish 
themselves as being against the Pyramid scheme in 1998. Thus, separating 
themselves from the policy under the conservatives that were soft on the 
Pyramid scheme.  
 
After the collapse of Pyramid schemes in 1997, other international actors 
besides the World Bank influenced the Socialist government to establish an 
anti-corruption policy field.  Research by the World Bank found that bribes 
were widespread in Albania and this finding was also supported by USAID. 
USAID funded programmes, initiatives and outreach programmes to 
educate Albanians against corruption. It also funded research to identify 
Albanians’ attitudes with regards to corruption. The international 
community, after the collapse of the Pyramid schemes, felt that it was 
crucial to educate Albanian society in the proper meaning of corruption 
through public-awareness campaigns that emphasised corruption and 
bribery, in particular corruption related to the public sector. Furthermore, 
the international actors saw this period as an opportunity to engage civil 
society in assisting to shape policy on anti-corruption.  
 
As a consequence, the Albania government introduced changes to the 
criminal code in 2004. The definition of corruption that entered the 
Albanian Criminal Code was provided by the Council of Europe, which 
defined corruption as ‘any irregular benefit or a promise for such benefit, 
for oneself or for other people … in order to carry out or neglect an action 
which pertains to his or her function’.555 The title of Article 259 of the 1995 
Criminal Code was changed from ‘Asking for a Bribe’ to ‘Passive 
Corruption of Persons who Exercise Public Duties’. 556  In other words, 
‘bribery’ was replaced by ‘corruption’. Corruption here became restricted to 
the public sector and was equated with bribery.557  
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Up to this point Albania was monitored by the IMF, the World Bank, and 
the Council of Europe to implement a number of internationally 
recommended reforms that sought to further integrate Albania into the 
global market and make it more open to international capital. However, for 
the EU’s integration prospects, Albania had to address corruption more 
critically and establish a comprehensive anti-corruption policy field. The 
European Commission found that the lack of tackling corruption was 
largely due to the lack of political will to address corruption as an issue 
from the Albanian political class. A review of the international anti-
corruption effort in Albania argued that the politicians directly or by 
collusion with criminals, and/or business people steal from the public purse 
or engage in a range of corrupt strategies. The European Commission 
around this time started to fund projects against corruption in Albania, 
which was implemented by the Council of Europe. Through these types of 
projects, the EU and other international actors that were active in Albania 
found that civil society perceived that Albania’s efforts in fighting 
corruption were superficial. There was no way for Albania to cure itself of 
corruption, for it was widespread in every aspect: institutions, politicians, 
and culture. This meant that the only hope was the intervention and 
assistance from the outside. There were many reasons why the Albanian 
anti-corruption policy and efforts were not sufficient: mainly, the lack of 
political will, the socio-economic issues, and its limited administrative 
capacities to address corruption as a problem.          
 
In 2006 Albania signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement with 
the European Union and this marked the start of the influence of the EU to 
support a far-reaching anti-corruption policy field that would address many 
parts of Albania’s governing structures.  The Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement entered into force in 2009. This agreement was a new process 
and commitment between the EU and Albania. The Association agreement 
consisted of new contractual relationships with trade preferences and 
financial assistance to support the countries’ progress in meeting the 
requirements for EU future membership. In this context, the Stabilisation 
and Association rests on four building blocks: 
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1) Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), which consists of a legally 
binding agreement between the EU and each country in the SAP; 
2) Bilateral Free Trade Agreements between all countries participating in the 
SAP; 
3) Trade preferences, which unilaterally grant almost totally free access to EU 
markets for goods from the Balkans; and 
4) Financial assistance planned in consultation with the partner countries, EU 
member States and the international community. 
The beginning of EU-Albania relations, formal negotiations for a bilateral 
Stabilization and Association Agreement began in 2003 and until it came 
into force in 2009. The SAA foresees the establishment of an Association 
Agreement, which will be implemented progressively over a maximum 
transitional period. The EU-Albania SAA is extensive and, like all other 
SAAs, is based largely on the Europe Agreements. It covers a wide range of 
areas from political dialogue to regional cooperation, and from freedom in 
the movement of goods, services, workers and capital to mutual co-
operation in justice and home affairs. 
 
The Stabilization and Association Agreement was not specifically aimed at 
Albania as well as the effort of the EU to develop at this time an anti-
corruption policy field. The intention of the EU, as was highlighted in 2003 
in the EU-Western Balkans summit, was as a result of the Thessaloniki 
Declaration to integrate the Western Balkans states into the European 
Union. The EU at this time had an interest to keep stability in the region by 
offering EU integration – rather than develop an anti-corruption policy field 
in the Western Balkans. 
 
The Thessaloniki Agenda highlighted the various challenges faced by both 
the EU and the countries of the region, ranging from security issues, the 
consolidation of democracy and the rule of law to economic development 
and regional cooperation. However, organised crime and corruption were 
observed by the EU as stated in the Thessaloniki Declaration as a real 
obstacle to democratic stability, the rule of law, economic development and 
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development of civil society in the region and is a source of concern to EU 
security.  
 
Once the Stabilisation and Association Agreement entered into force in 
2009, Albania was subject to a more rigorous evaluation through the so-
called Progress report on an annual basis in which it made key 
recommendations on specific policy fields. Corruption quickly after 2009 
became a key topic every year in the progress report. Thus, it marked the 
emergence of the EU supporting and requesting Albania to introduce 
tangible measurements to prevent and fight corruption in more concrete 
terms. Since 2010, Albania has engaged more closely with the EU in 
establishing an anti-corruption policy	 fields by introducing fundamental 
changes – 
mostly changing legislation, developing new structures to address 
corruption and anti-corruption plans, which all lead to the emergence of a 
broader anti-corruption policy field covering many sectors that were seen to 
be prone to corruption. Furthermore, fighting corruption is also a way of 
passing other key legislation and structural changes to the government.       
 
4.4.3   The EU conditionality and domestic obstacles in develop an anti-
corruption policy in Albania 
 
Post-communist Albania has proven to be one of the most challenging cases 
for fighting corruption and organised crime, reforming the public 
administration and the judiciary. Since the successful integration of the 
Central and Eastern European states into the European Union, the EU wants 
to try to replicate a similar success in the Western Balkan states. However, 
the long-standing ethnic disputes, the widespread corruption and organised 
crime, lack of functional democracy and institutional, weak civil societies 
and the failure of the full integration of Bulgaria and Romania, have created 
many barriers for the EU policy’s success in the Western Balkans region. 
The EU established an instrument called the Stabilization Process for the 
Western Balkans and it was adopted at the Western Balkans Summit in 
2003 for the EU key interest in integrating the Western Balkans region into 
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the European Union.  
 
Albania signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement in 2006 and it 
came into force in 2009. Since the Stabilization and Association Agreement 
came into force, Albania has been subject to closer monitoring by the EU in 
developing meaningful and long-term sustainable reform for the purpose of 
the European integration process. Since 2009, corruption has been 
characterized and focused more closely in developing an anti-corruption 
policy field with the assistance of the EU, as well as other international 
organisations. In contrast to the first and second period after 2009, the 
debate about the issue of corruption in Albania has shifted more closing to 
policy-making. Furthermore, after 2009, the EU has pushed Albania in a 
direction to establish a policy field that would address corruption in 
different areas, especially in the judiciary for the sole purpose of joining the 
European Union.  
 
The EU has produced annually a Progress Report about Albania where it 
evaluates the Albanians’ efforts to address key reforms for the purpose of 
their European integration process. The EU in their Progress Report, since 
it started to evaluate Albania more closely, found that corruption is a 
problematic issue that must be addressed before Albania has any chance of 
becoming an EU member state in the future. In the latest EU Progress 
Report for Albania issued on the 10th of November 2015, it was clearly 
stated that Albania must address five key priorities for opening the 
negotiation process for EU membership.  
 
Those areas are on public administration, judiciary, fight against corruption, 
fight against organised crime and human rights. These areas are observed 
by the EU to be fundamentally important for reform in order to have any 
EU accession success. Corruption is raised as a leading problem in 
reforming the public administration, judiciary and fight against organised 
crime. Before evaluating these key areas, which the EU observes to be 
highly problematic due to the high level of corruption, it is important to 
highlight first the Albania-EU relationship that lead up to this point where 
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both the EU and Albania are working to establish an anti-corruption policy 
field in the country.       
 
4.4.4 Albanian relations with the European Union 
 
Albania has been an official candidate for accession to the European Union 
since June 2014 and a member of NATO since 2009. The support for 
membership in the EU and NATO is amongst the highest in Europe, 
making this the least controversial issue in Albania. Almost all political 
parties are in agreement on EU membership just as they were on NATO. 
This makes these two issues completely uncontroversial and non-opposing. 
Opposing EU membership would be politically suicidal for any political 
party, taking into account the high support for European integration among 
Albanian voters in general. The objective of full EU membership is not 
questioned, but there are divergent opinions about how to reach it. The 
political parties frequently try to win votes by promising that they will be 
the one to lead Albania into the EU quicker than their political opponents.  
 
Following traditional patterns of confrontation, as was observed in the two 
previous periods of post-communist Albania, in addition to corruption, 
delaying any EU related policy or reform has become a characteristic of 
political debate since 2009. The 2013 election was evidence that the 
Democracy Party that governed Albania from 2005 to 2013 was not able to 
obtain the EU candidate statutes and had scandals related to corruption. On 
23rd June 2014, under the Greek EU Presidency, the Council of the 
European Union agreed to grant Albania candidate status, which was 
endorsed by the European Council a few days later. As a result, since June 
2014 Albania has been a candidate state for EU and has engaged with the 
EU in a high dialogue discussion since 2014 to develop policies that are key 
in fulfilling the five main priorities. Before discussing the key priorities that 
are related to corruption and leading towards developing an anti-corruption 
policy filed in Albania with the assistance of the EU, it is important to 
highlight in a chronological order Albania’s relations with the European 
Union to understand how far it took to get into a dialogue for establishing 
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an anti-corruption policy.  
 
4.4.5 Chronology of the relations of Albania with the European Union 
 
A Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Albania were 
signed in 1992, and Albania became eligible for funding under the EU 
Phare programme.558 The Phare programme is a pre-accession instrument 
for the European Community's financial and technical cooperation with the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Its objectives concentrate on two 
key priorities. Firstly, helping the administrations of the countries to acquire 
the capacity to implement the Community acquis and to assist the national 
and regional administrations. Furthermore, Phare programme supported 
regulatory and supervisory bodies in the candidate countries to familiarise 
themselves with Community objectives and procedures. Secondly, helping 
the countries to bring their industries and basic infrastructure up to 
Community standards by mobilising the investment required, particularly in 
areas where Community rules are increasingly demanding, for instance the 
environment, transport, industry, product quality, and working 
conditions.559 
 
The EU Council of Ministers in 1997 adopted a regional approach, aimed at 
strengthening stability in South-Eastern Europe and promoting cooperation 
between the states in the region. It marked an important development for 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia (FYROM), as the 
approach established political and economic conditionality as the basis for a 
transparent policy towards the development of bilateral relations in the 
fields of trade, financial assistance and economic cooperation, as well as of 
contractual relations for the development of bilateral relations between 
these states and the EU.560 
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In 1999, the EU proposed the new Stabilisation and Association Process 
(SAP) for five countries of Southeastern Europe, including Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, and currently Kosovo under resolution 1244 
of the United Nations Security Council. 561  Accordingly, the European 
Union started to develop new contractual relations with these countries for 
stabilisation and association agreements. From 1999, Albania started to 
benefit from Autonomous Trade Preferences with the EU, by extending 
generalised tariff preferences to Albania. Thus, Albania started to benefit 
from unilateral trade concession under the EU’s autonomous trade 
measures – AMTs.562 In the year 2000, an extension of duty-free access to 
the EU market was also established for products from Albania. By 2005, 
the EU was Albania’s main commercial partner, representing about 74 per 
cent of Albania’s total imports and around 85 per cent of the total exports, 
making Albania one of the highest EU trade-depended countries.563  
 
The European Council in June 2000 identified that all the Stabilisation and 
Association Process (SAP) countries are potential candidates for EU 
membership. At the Zagreb Summit in November 2000, the SAP was 
officially recognised by the EU and the Western Balkan countries, 
including Albania.564 In 2001, the EU established an instrument called the 
Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development, and Stabilisation 
(CARDS) programme specifically designed for the SAP countries to 
support projects previously funded by the PHARE programmes.565  The 
programme was the main financial instrument of the EU's Stabilisation and 
Association process (SAP A total of €5.13 billion was secured for all 
CARDS actions during 2000-2006, as after that day it will be replaced by 																																																								
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the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), which will cover both 
candidate and potential candidate countries.566 
 
The Commission recommended in June 2001 for the EU to engage in the 
negotiations of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with 
Albania.567 At the European Council in 2001, they asked the Commission to 
present a draft negotiating directive for the negotiation of a Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement with Albania.568 In October 2002, directives for 
the negotiation of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Albania 
were adopted on 31st January 2003 and the Commission officially launched 
the negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the 
EU and Albania. 569  In June 2003 at the Thessaloniki Summit, the 
Stabilisation and Association Process was defined as the EU policy for the 
Western Balkans and the EU perspective for these states was confirmed. 
Thus, countries participating in the SAP started to be eligible for EU 
accession and would join the EU once they would become ready.570 The 
Council of the European Union in December 2005 made the decision on the 
principles of a revised European Partnership for Albania. On 12th June 
2006, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement was signed at the 
General Affairs and External Relations Council in Luxembourg.571 
  
The European Commission on 9th November 2006 decided to start the visa 
facilitation negotiations with Albania, and in 13th April 2007 the visa 
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facilitation agreement was reached.572 The signing by EU Commissioner 
Franco Frattini cited that this is the first step towards full abolition of the 
visa requirements and the free movement of Albanian citizens in the EU is 
a positive step towards future integration into the EU. The visa facilitation 
agreement entered into force on 1st January 2008 and on 7th March 2008 the 
EU Commissioner Franco Frattini opened with Albania a dialogue towards 
the liberalisation of the visa regime between Albania and the EU.573 The 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement ratification process by all the 
Member States was completed on 14th January 2009 and on 1st April 2009 
the Stabilisation and Association Agreement entered into force. Albania 
then formally applied for membership in the European Union on 28th April 
2009.574  
 
The Council of the EU asked the European Commission on 16th November 
2009 to prepare an assessment on Albania's readiness to start accession 
negotiations with the EU. The Commission submitted the questionnaire on 
accession preparation to the Albanian government.575  Albania submitted 
answers on the 14th April 2010 to the European Commission's 
questionnaire, but the EU did not grant candidacy status in December 2010 
due to the long-lasting political row in the country, as well as the high 
levels of corruption.  
 
The European Commission proposed visa free travel for Albania on 27th 
May 2010. The adopted proposal will enable citizens of Albania to travel to 
Schengen countries without needing a short-term visa.576 The Council of 
the European Union on 8th November 2010 approved visa-free travel to the 
Schengen Area for Albanian citizens. The visa-free access to the Schengen 																																																								
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area entered into force on 15th December 2010 and on 10th October 2012 
the European Commission recommended that Albania be granted EU 
candidate status, subject to the completion of key measures in certain areas. 
 
The Albanian parliament in August 2012 rejected a proposal by the EU to 
abolish immunity for parliament members, ministers, key judges and 
individuals in some other public offices. The EU required this to be 
abolished, along with eleven other key issues. As a result, the candidate 
status was further delayed for Albania.577 A constitutional amendment was 
unanimously passed in September 2012 that limited the immunity of 
parliamentarians and other key positions that had immunity in Albania.578 
The EU Commission saw the immunity of high public office holders as an 
obstacle in terms of prosecuting high-level officials against corruption 
related cases and pushed Albania to lift the immunity of public office 
holders.  
 
The European Commission evaluated the progress of Albania in October 
2012 to comply with twelve key conditions to achieve official candidate 
status and start accession negotiations. Only four key priorities were found 
to be met, while two were well into progress and the remaining six were in 
moderate progress.579 The report suggests that, if Albania managed to hold 
a fair and democratic parliamentary election in June 2013, and also 
implemented the remaining changes to comply with the eight key priorities 
even though not fully met, then the Council of the European Union would 
recommend granting Albania official candidate status. Albania held a 
general election on 23rd June 2013, generally regarded as free and fair – 
thus satisfying the EU request which would recommend Albania for EU 
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candidate status.580 On July 17th, the EU delegation to Albania cited that 
Albania had met many of these conditions, and could become an official 
candidate by December 2013. 
 
The European Commission on 16th October 2013 issued its annual report 
and concluded that the Albanian election was held in an orderly manner in 
which progress was made in meeting other conditions. As a result, the EU 
Commission recommended granting to Albania the EU candidate status.581 
The EU Parliament meeting on 5th December 2013 suggested that the 
Council should acknowledge the progress made by Albania by granting it 
EU candidate status without undue delay. However, several EU member 
states, in particular Denmark and the Netherlands, remained opposed to 
granting Albania candidate status until it demonstrated that its recent 
progress could be sustained. Thus, at its meeting in December 2013, the 
Council of the European Union decided to postpone the decision on 
candidate status until June 2014 to see evidence of whether recent progress 
could be sustained and there was a clear effort to fight corruption and 
organised crime in particular.582 Under the Greek EU Presidency on 24th 
June 2014, the Council of the European Union agreed to grant Albania the 
EU candidate status, which was endorsed by the European Council a few 
days later. This did coincide with the 10th anniversary of the ‘Agenda 
2014’, proposed by the Greek Government in 2004, as part of the EU-
Western Balkans Summit in Thessaloniki, for boosting the integration of all 
the Western Balkan states into the European Union.583 
 
At the fifth High Level Dialogue meeting between Albania and EU in 
March 2015, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement informed Albania that, 
for the EU to open accession talks, Albania was still required to meet two 																																																								
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key conditions.584 Firstly, the government needs to reopen political dialogue 
with the parliamentary opposition. Secondly, Albania must deliver quality 
reforms for all five earlier identified areas – i.e. reforming the public 
administration, rule of law, fighting corruption and organised crime, and 
respect of human rights.585 This official stance was fully supported by the 
European Parliament through its pass of a Resolution comment in April 
2015, which essentially approved with all conclusions drawn by the 
Commission's 2014 Progress Report on Albania. 586  The Government 
outlined the next step would be to submit a detailed progress report on the 
implementation of the five key reforms to the Commission in Autumn 2015 
with hopes to start the accession negotiations process in late 2016.587 
 
The Commission's 2015 Progress Report on Albania issued on 10th 
November 2015 emphasises the importance of addressing these five key 
priorities and gave recommendations as to what Albania should do that will 
help with the EU accession negotiations process. 588  From the EU 
Commission's 2015 Progress Report on Albania, it can be observed that 
corruption is a problem especially in the public administration sector and 
the judicial system. In the following section, there will be an analysis and 
overview on how the EU has identified these areas and whether Albania has 
developed an anti-corruption policy field with the assistance of the EU in 
the public administration and the judiciary.  																																																								
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4.4.5.1 Reforming the Public Administration 
 
The European Commission suggested that Albania has to reform its public 
administration, because corruption is a prevailing issue. Furthermore, the 
Albanian public administration is not impartial from political affiliations. 
The EU suggested steps that are necessary to make progress in reforming 
the public administration to prevent corruption and establish a professional 
public administration in Albania. The Commission suggested in the joint 
EU and Albania working groups that Albania needs to adopt a Public 
Administration Reform (PAR) Strategy to ensure financial sustainability. 
Further efforts must be made by Albania in implementing the amendments 
to the Civil Service Law (CSL) and ensure transparency, objectivity and 
meritocracy in selection procedures for low and middle level managers. In 
other words, recruitment should be done on the bases of merit, not on 
political affiliation, as the current practice leads to corrupt practices by 
close network groups. In addition, Albania needs to ensure that further 
training is provided to all human resource management units, including in 
the new local government units for a collective and clear implementation of 
the applicable legislation. The EU is paying key attention to the application 
of the legislation in Albania, not the lack of any legislation or clear policy. 
Furthermore, Albania lacks the proper application of the Law on the 
Organisation and Functioning of the Public Administration to establish 
efficient public administration structures, and make efforts to reduce 
corrupt practices in the public administration.  
 
The Commission recommended Albania to take concrete measurements to 
enhance the independence and the monitoring capacity of the Ombudsman 
and the Supreme State Audit in their areas of competence, and ensure 
proper follow-up to their findings and recommendations. The Commission 
has also recommended that Albania will need to ensure that the draft Code 
of Administrative Procedures is fully in line with EU/SIGMA best 
practices. Albania was also encouraged to take steps for a full 
implementation of the Law on High State Control, as well as further 
measurements for strengthening the capacity and independence of the 
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Supreme State Audit Institution. Furthermore, the Commission encouraged 
Albania to address existing challenges related to independent institutions by 
exploring the option of putting in place a horizontal legal framework. This 
procedure would enact the appointment and dismissal of directors of 
independent institutions, a merit-based, transparent selection process of 
their members, and guarantees their institutional autonomy.  
 
All of the recommendations in the latest progress report made by the 
Commission for reforming the Public administration in Albania can be 
understood as requiring Albania to adopt EU good governance norms. The 
EU, in other words, hopes to see that there is more transparency, non-
politically influenced independent institutions, open government, and an 
effective civil service in Albania in which staff are recruited in an open and 
merit-based selection policy. This approach is also contributing to the 
broader frame of establishing an anti-corruption policy filed in Albania by 
addressing key areas such as the public administration. Albania is a 
challenge case in reforming the administrative structure and preventing 
corrupt practices, as the research will show in the following part. There are 
some limitations insofar as the recommendations by the EU can play a 
supporting role in Albania to make concrete changes in reforming the 
public administration and reducing the level of corruption. Nevertheless, 
there is an opportunity to develop an anti-corruption policy field that will 
also reform sectors such as the public administration.    
 
Post-communist Albania has proven to be a challenging cases for successful 
administrative reform and fighting corruption within the system, because 
from the first election in 1992 up to the last election in 2013, every political 
party that comes to power fills the state institutions with its own people.589 
Thus, the change of the administrative structure inherited from the 
communist regime has developed in a way closely related to the legacy of 
the one party-state, which dominates all levels of state administration to the 																																																								
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political party in government. The European Union recommendations for 
the development of a permanent and professional administration regulated 
by specific laws has still to come to terms with the paradoxical reality of 
continuing politicisation of the post-communist administration in 
Albania.590 
 
The electoral victory of the Democratic Party in the first phase of post-
communist Albania brought the radical anti-communist agenda to the very 
heart of the post-communist administration programme. Although the first 
Democrats government contained a group closely-related to the former 
regime, most communist-era employees were widely seen as a bearer of 
that system and not suitable for any kind of partnership for the new regime 
created after 1992.591 Given the lack of independent employees, the next 
step was to fill state structures with anti-communist activists who lacked 
any relevant experience and specialities. The post-communist regime had 
limited options of independent professionals and expertise, but a new 
administration containing party loyalists and anti-communist activists was 
possibly even more poorly-equipped to handle the challenges of transition 
than the prior communist-era administration would have been.592 
 
The influence of the anti-communists in reorganising the state 
administration was mainly facilitated by the absence of a proper framework 
for guaranteeing the independence and safeguarding of public employees 
from any undue political influence. The notion of separating the 
administration from the party in government, not to even mention a career 
management system, was completely foreign to the Albanian establishment 
after the mid-1990s, when the government approved the first-ever civil 
service law. Until its acceptance, the working status of all public employees 																																																								
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was regulated by the temporary amendments of the communist labour 
code.593 The labour code permitted the administrators of state institutions, 
who were by definition political appointees, to fire any workers under their 
responsibility whenever they thought it was necessary. However, since the 
same administrators were also allowed to elaborate on reform needs, there 
were practically no provisions to protect state employees from potential 
arbitrary decisions by their administrators.594 Thus, during the first stage of 
transition between 1992–7, practices established during decades of one-
party rule remained. The next stage of reforms between 1997 and 2000 
when the Socialist Party came to power after the elections of 1997 with the 
intervention of the international community, was keen to bring the patched 
system together and started to reform the public administration. In 1997, the 
World Bank, EU, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and 
the International Monetary Fund designed a joint Strategy for Recovery and 
Growth, which highlighted public administration amongst the key elements 
for future reforms.595 In particular, the World Bank underlined reforms in 
governance as one of the central pillars of its intervention and the most 
significant challenge facing the government of Albania.596 The government 
at the end of 1997 formally approved a new Strategy for State Institution 
and Public Administration Reform (SIPAR), which were entirely funded by 
foreign agencies. Also, international bodies supported and drafted new 
legislation to regulate different aspects of state bureaucracy in the period 
1997–2000.  
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However, it must be noted that, once in power, the Socialists saw the 
inherited administrations as politically biased and changed them with their 
own supporters in key state positions. Although no official data were made 
public, the estimations that only during the first year of Socialist 
government, 1,500 - nearly 15 per cent of the total public employees - were 
released and changed with the incoming party’s loyalists.597 Again, most 
employees were once again replaced with people chosen on the basis of 
political connections, rather than the professional expertise needed to carry 
out the job. The existing legislation, effectively used by the outgoing 
majority, allowed for a similar reshuffling of the old administration in 
favour of Socialist loyalists and politically suitable candidates.  
 
This practice has been witnessed again after the 2005 elections. A 
parliamentary report prepared by the opposition in 2006 revealed that, after 
the elections, the Democratic Party that won the 2005 election had 
approved an internal instruction on the prioritization of candidates that have 
played a distinctive role in elections for employment in state 
administration.598 Numerous sources claimed that, only within the first year, 
around 4,500, or almost half of the overall state administration, were 
dismissed. 599  The releases included around 1,300 out of 2,500 civil 
servants. Most places left vacant were filled with political activists. The 
Parliamentary report, which builds on information provided by State 
Department statistics, listed a range of cases where public employees were 
recruited in clear contradiction of the requirements for the position.600 This 
practice was further confirmed after the 2009 elections with the inclusion of 
new coalition parties, which have seemingly placed their own supporters in 
the ministries and institutions managed by them. One of the scandals 																																																								
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disclosed by the media in 2011 showed the chairman of the coalition party 
at the time – instructing its Minister to recruit ‘school friends’ in well-
placed positions within the public administration.601 Similar practices have 
also been witnessed again after the 2013 elections, when the Socialists were 
elected to government. 
 
This has become a characteristic in Albania and the party or coalition that is 
in government makes full use of legal loopholes and inventive strategies 
that stretch the laws in order to fill state institutions with politically 
affiliated candidates. At present, civil servants are typically recruited 
through temporary contracts and not permanent positions. 602  A prime 
ministerial decree approved in 2004 allows for temporary contractual 
appointments of civil servants, but limited them to exceptional cases of 
replacement for up to three months. Though employed through the 2004 
decree, contractual employees often keep the position for longer periods, 
typically until confirmed in the same role through an open recruitment 
process, which is in fact used to legitimize positions distributed through 
temporary contracts rather than accept new candidates. An example is the 
Ministry of Interior, where all 111 winners of recent open competition have 
been in a working relationship with the institution before. Such practices at 
the border of legality have served to undermine the procedures for merit-
based appointments.603 The repetition of political control, even when civil 
service rules were in place, shows the effective resistance of entrusted 
political interests against legal measurements that seek to reduce the system 
of politicization.  
 
Many civil servants that have been fired or replaced have been accused of 
being corrupt or engaged in some form of corrupt activity. Nonetheless, not 																																																								
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many civil servants have been prosecuted and sentence for engaging in 
bribery or corrupt activities. The accusations are dropped once they are 
replaced or a new government takes charge. The changes and replacements 
in key posts of the government with party loyalists make it hard to 
determine corrupt practices and identify where corruption takes place. This 
is because the civil servants that are appointed in key posts could engage in 
corruption practices, for example giving state contracts, or operating in 
closed a network, which makes it hard to detect corrupt activities in the 
public administration, let alone fighting corruption within the public 
administration.   
 
Therefore, the EU is keen to push Albania for administrative reforms to 
reduce the corrupt activities and establish an independent public 
administration at the same time, which is not influenced by parties that are 
in government. The EU has pushed Albania to involve the recruitment of 
administration to enact formal legislation and specific personnel 
management rules in order to build a professional state administration. The 
EU had previously been involved in the international initiatives to rebuild 
the Albanian state. However, EU leverage was initially limited to the 
control of assistance and pressure of aid conditionality applied in concert 
with other foreign donors. The promise of enlargement policies has 
activated the policy of EU conditionality and a progressive range of 
requirements related to public administration.604 In addition, the SAP II 
provided new instruments, targeting of specific areas of reform, monitoring 
the state of compliance, a new programme of aid and assistance, and 
upgrading of the institutional relations depending on the state of reforms to 
ensure that the target countries comply with required reforms.605 However, 
the task of transforming the public administration, the lack of reformist 
elites and the undeveloped institutional infrastructure have inhibited a 
meaningful transformation of the state administration into a depoliticised 																																																								
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and professional administration as required by the EU.  
 
In terms of developing an anti-corruption policy field, there are some 
grounds for developing a policy that will address the level of corruption 
within the system. However, the close network group that each government 
brings to the public administration makes an attempt to reduce the level of 
corruption hard to break through. From a reflexive governance theory point 
of view, the EU recommendations and conditions to reform the public 
administration are based on some ongoing efforts from Albania to form a 
professional administration. Nevertheless, it is not clear and one cannot 
clearly determine whether Albania has the will to establish a professional 
public administration that is detached from the political parties that govern 
Albania. There is an ongoing support by the EU in terms of co-finance 
training to establish a professional public administration and learning from 
other best practice in the EU. It is safe to evaluate that the EU and Albania 
are not clearly engaging in a reflexive governance approach, because the 
EU has requested for Albania to implement key legislation that will protect 
civil servants. Even so, in terms of developing an anti-corruption policy 
field, it is reflexive because Albania acknowledges that there is an issue 
with corruption in the public administration in terms of high level of corrupt 
practices. The EU is assisting Albania to reform the public administration 
also to prevent corruption and, as a result, contributing to establishing a 
broader anti-corruption policy field that also pays attention to corruption in 
the public administration sector.  
 
In addition to reforming the public administration and addressing the issue 
of corruption, the EU has identified in its 2015 Progress report that Albania 
needs to reform the Justice system, as it is observed to be the most 
problematic sector in Albania and where corruption is broadly widespread. 
Also, the Judiciary has been a key problem in punishing corruption related 
cases.            
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4.4.5.2 Reforming the Justice system  
 
The judicial system in Albania is viewed to be highly problematic and 
corruption is highly widespread throughout the judicial system. Albania, 
some key EU member states such as Germany, the Netherlands, the UK as 
well as the EU have identified that the Justice system is one of the most 
problematic sectors in Albania and the most corrupt sector. Reforming the 
Justice system is the key to any future EU membership and there must be a 
track record in the reform of the justice system. Albania only in July 2016 
passed the judicial reform, which will have an impact on reforming the 
Justice system. The judicial reform that was passed in July 2016 also 
required for constitutional changes, as special institutions are going to be 
set up, which will have conditional powers to also fight corruption. Albania, 
with the pressure of the EU and other international partners - in particular 
the United States government - engaged in a long process that took over a 
year and a half, with an objective to reform the judicial system, as well as to 
build a ground to address and fight corruption in the justice system. This 
reform is anticipated to be a contribution to the broader anti-corruption 
policy that Albania is developing with the assistance of the EU as well as 
the US for the sole purpose of EU membership. 
 
The Judiciary is considered to be one of the most problematic sectors in the 
country and this is also identified by several sources including Freedom in 
the World606 and the Human Rights Report.607 The law on legal aid was 
lately improved, but still access to justice is still very much restricted for 
less fortunate groups of citizens due to high judicial fees, as noted by the 
European Commission's Albania Progress Report.608 This perception is also 
supported by the Global Corruption Barometer 2013,609 which reports that 																																																								
606 Freedom House (2015), Report on Albania, Washington DC; Freedom House. 
Retrieved from; https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/albania   
607 Human Rights (2015), Human Rights Report on Albania, Washington DC; 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/253027.pdf  
608 European Commission (2014), Albania Progress Report, COM (2014) 700 final. 
Retrieved from; http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-
albania-progress-report_en.pdf  
609 Transparency International (2013), Transparency International Global Corruption 
Barometer. pp. 16-17. Retrieved from; 
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more than three-quarters of surveyed citizens perceive the judiciary to be 
highly corrupt.  
 
The EU, as a result, has funded an EURALIUS IV project, ‘Consolidation 
of the Justice System in Albania’, under IPA 2013 funds for Albania 
amounting in total to almost 4 million euros. It started in September 2014 
and will last until December 2017. The project supports the Albanian 
Ministry of Justice, the Office for the Administration of the Judiciary 
Budget, the High Council of Justice, the High Court, the General Prosecutor 
Office, the Courts, the National Judicial Conference, the Parliamentary Law 
Committee, the School of Magistrates, the National Chamber of Advocacy 
and the National Chamber of Notaries in five areas of intervention. 1 
Justice reform and organisation of the Ministry, 2 High Council of Justice 
and High Court, 3 Criminal justice and prosecution office, 4 Judicial 
administration and efficiency, and 5 Legal professions and School of 
Magistrates. These projects are aimed at supporting Albania to reform the 
judicial system and reduce the level of corruption that takes place within the 
justice system. This claim was pointed out by the head of the EURALIUS 
project in Albania.  
 
The head of EURALIUS610 Mission in Albania, in an interview for the 
“Voice of America”, emphasised that the whole judicial system in Albania 
is corrupt. He mentioned that the fact that you know somebody or you pay 
is understood as something very normal in the Albanian judicial system. 
Judges demand money, lawyers give money to judges and even prosecutors 
																																																																																																																																																																												
http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/2013_globalcorruptionbarometer_en?e=24
96456/3903358#search  
610 EURALIUS IV project, “Consolidation of the Justice System in Albania”, funded by 
EU, started in September 2014 and will last until December 2017. With its five areas of 
intervention, the project will support the Albanian Ministry of Justice, the Office for the 
Administration of the Judiciary Budget, the High Council of Justice, the High Court, the 
General Prosecutor Office, the Courts, the National Judicial Conference, the Parliamentary 
Law Committee, the School of Magistrates, the National Chamber of Advocacy and the 
National Chamber of Notaries as its main beneficiaries. The project comprises ten full time 
top experts from EU Member States and Albania, sitting in the premises of the main 
beneficiaries. Retrieved from; http://www.euralius.eu/en/about-us/what-we-do  
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take money, 611  and this makes it extremely difficult in successfully 
reforming the judicial system. Thus, making it very difficult to develop a 
coherent anti-corruption policy to address the issue of corruption in the 
judicial system. The head of EURALIUS believes that the first solution 
would be to have an independent institution, such as the High Council of 
Justice, that should start taking extremely harsh measurements against 
every kind of form of corruption. In addition, the High Council of Justice 
should not be politically influenced and the appointment of judges must 
become transparent. All measurements that have been taken in the last years 
to discipline corrupt actions are not sufficient enough and have mainly been 
just a facade to show to the European Union that Albania is doing 
something about tackling corruption in the justice system, according to the 
head of EURALIUS Mission in Albania.  
   
The chairman of the Albanian parliamentary commission on justice sector 
reform in August 2015 also endorsed the EURALIUS and EU position on 
the justice system, and the claims of dealing with high levels of corruption 
in the justice system. The parliamentary commission on justice sector 
reform acknowledged the current situation to be highly critical and has 
observed that the justice system doesn’t need just a makeover but a 
thorough surgical intervention.612 
 
The EU Commission has suggested that it is critical for Albania to reform 
and tackle the high level of corruption in the judicial system for any future 
EU membership success and this stand has been supported by a few key EU 
member states in particular Germany. The EU Member States have 
highlighted the concerns that investors from EU states are cancelling 
projects that would create jobs because of the corruption that exists in the 
justice system. The Ambassador of the United Kingdom in Albania noted 
that legislation against corruption and bribery in the country makes it 																																																								
611Urias, J (2014), The whole judicial system in Albania is corrupt. VOA, [Online] 29 May, 
Retrieved from; http://www.infocip.org/en/?p=1199 (Accessed 28 Sep. 2016 
612 Bogdani, A (2015), Albanian Justice System Slammed as Totally Corrupt. Balkan 
Insight, [Online] 5 June 2015, Retrieved from; 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/judges-in-albania-pays-up-to-300-000-for-their-
positions-report-says  
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almost impossible to invest in the current corrupt environment in 
Albania.613  
 
The Commission suggested in the joint EU and Albania working groups 
that Albania needs to show progress on the judicial reform in relation to the 
main components of the reform process that Albania will take between 
2016 – 2018. This is particularly true in implementing the constitutional 
changes, criminal justice, legal education, efficiency of justice, legal 
professions, and the fight against corruption in the judiciary.614 The ad hoc 
Parliamentary Committee on Judicial Reform is required to submit a written 
report to the EU Commission upon completion of each of the stages of 
progress on these main components, including on the degree of 
inclusiveness, the participation of key judicial bodies and institutions.615 
This can be observed as a process where Albania -  with the assistance of 
the EU - is developing an anti-corruption policy field that will cover also 
the sector of the justice system. In terms of a reflexive governance 
approach, the EU here is supporting the ongoing efforts that Albania is 
making in fighting corruption in the judiciary. This is even though, as 
pointed out above, the efforts so far have been merely a façade, rather than 
concrete efforts to fight corruption in the justice system.    
 
The Commission has asked Albania to provide information on the state of 
preparation of the Justice Reform Strategy (2014-2020) and on efforts made 
to prepare for sector budget support.616 Albania is required to also report on 
the outcome of the working groups on the Justice Reform Strategy, 																																																								
613 British Embassy Albania (2015), Analysis of the Justice System in Albania-2015, 
[Online] 13 July 2015, Retrieved from; https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-
news/analysis-of-the-justice-system-in-albania-2015 (Accessed 28 Sep. 2016 
614 European Union (2015), Albania Joint Conclusions on the Fifth High Level Dialogue 
on the Key Priorities, 24 March 2015, Retrieved from; 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/albania/documents/press_releases/20150324_5th_hld_op
erational_conclusions.pdf  
615 European Union (2015), Albania Joint Conclusions on the Fifth High Level Dialogue 
on the Key Priorities, 24 March 2015, Retrieved from; 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/albania/documents/press_releases/20150324_5th_hld_op
erational_conclusions.pdf 
616 European Commissiom (2014), IPA (II) Indicative Strategy Paper for Albania (2014-
2020), pp. 16-19. Retrieved from; http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/instruments/funding-by-
country/albania/index_en.htm  
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including the review of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It can be observed 
that the EU is checking Albania, if they can prepare a strategy until 2020 
for reforming completely the justice system. From a reflexive governance 
perspective, the EU is not directly engaging with Albania in a reflexive 
approach, but there are elements where the EU will support in co-financing 
in the preparation of the Justice Reform Strategy. 
 
The Code of Criminal Procedure that the EU is suggesting will include draft 
amendments related to the reduction of the backlog of cases pending at the 
High Court and the imposition of sanctions on lawyers who delay legal 
proceedings, which have been reviewed by the Venice Commission, and it 
suggests that the draft amendments should also be introduced in the Code of 
Civil Procedure. 617  Changes related to the reduction of the number of 
judges in civil and criminal panels at the High Court should also be 
introduced in both Codes. Proposed changes to the Code of Criminal 
Procedure included in the EC non-paper on short-term measures to improve 
investigations and in the recommendations on peer assessment review 
missions on intellectual property rights must also be taken into 
consideration.618 The Commission also expects Albania to adopt, in close 
consultation with EURALIUS, new legislation on the evaluation of judges 
and on judicial administration, and to finalise the on-going evaluation 
process of judges. 619  The EU here is working closely with Albania in 
developing a Code of Criminal Procedure, which could reduce the backlog 
of cases pending at the High Court and perhaps corrupt acts that occur. It 
could be observed that the EU, along with the Venice Commission, is 
supporting Albania to develop this legislation, such can be observed that it 
will help in developing an anti-corruption policy field in Albania.  																																																								
617 European Commission (2014), Democracy though law - Venice Commission, CDL-
REF(2014)015, pp. 2-15. Retrieved from; 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-
REF(2014)015-e  
618 European Commission (2014), Albania Progress Report COM (2014) 700 final of 
8.10.2014. 
619 Strategy on Justice System Reform Strategy Project (2015), Ad Hoc Parliamentary 
Committee on Justice System Reform Group of High Level Experts. pp. 2-4. Retrieved 
from; http://www.euralius.eu/images/Justice-Reform/Strategy-on-Justice-System-
Reform_24-07-2015.pdf 
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Furthermore, the Commission has requested that Albania should publicise 
all court rulings in a transparent way, with their respective reasoning and in 
line with data protection requirements. A searchable database for all 
legislative acts should be set up and become more transparent for the public 
to view.620 In addition, Albania is required to provide training activities for 
judges and prosecutors on the EU acquis and ensure that judges and 
prosecutors are subject to a thorough and systematic declaration and audit 
of assets.621  
 
However, the most important issue for Albania is to establish an 
independent judiciary and reduce the high level of corruption. This is 
viewed as the most challenging aspect and a report presented in July 2015 
by the Parliamentary commission for the justice sector finds some alarming 
concerns, as well as in the EU Progress Report issued in November 2015.  
 
Among the most alarming findings reported in the dossier is the allegation 
that judges pay between €100,000 to €300,000 to the High Council of 
Justice in order to get better posts, such as those judges within rural areas 
where they are able to collect higher amounts of money in bribes.622 The 
336-page dossier suggests that the corruption cycle begins with police 
officers who accept cash to destroy evidence, to prosecutors who accept 
between €1,000 and €2,000 to not press any charges. Furthermore, the 
report finds that paying a judge to change a sentence allegedly costs 
between €60,000 to €80,000. The report, which analyses the operations of 
the Albanian justice system since it was established in its present form in 																																																								
620 European Union (2015), Albania Joint Conclusions on the Fifth High Level Dialogue 
on the Key Priorities, 24 March 2015, Retrieved from; 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/albania/documents/press_releases/20150324_5th_hld_op
erational_conclusions.pdf  
621 European Union (2015), Albania Joint Conclusions on the Fifth High Level Dialogue 
on the Key Priorities, 24 March 2015, Retrieved from; 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/albania/documents/press_releases/20150324_5th_hld_op
erational_conclusions.pdf  
622 Analysis of the Justice System in Albania (2015), [Translate: ANALIZË E SISTEMIT 
TË DREJTËSISË NË SHQIPËRI] Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee on Justice System 
Reform Group of High Level Experts. pp. 10-21. see more; 
http://shqiptarja.com/pdf/new/analiza_e_sistemit_te_drejtesise.pdf (Accessed 20 Oct. 2015 
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1998, also claims that there is compelling evidence that some judges take 
bribes from both sides in court cases. 623  Among the publication’s 
recommendations is the removal of the country’s president as the head of 
the High Council of Justice in order to guarantee the independence and 
impartiality of the courts, and to de-politicize the selection process used to 
appoint High Court judges.624 
 
To sum up, the judicial system is observed and, based on evidence that is 
highly problematic, corruption appears to be widespread thought the justice 
system. Albania has made some efforts to tackle the high level of 
corruption in the judicial system, but as observed they are very modest and 
not sufficient enough in addressing the issue of corruption. Thus, there are 
some efforts to develop an anti-corruption policy in Albania, with support 
from the EU, to address key outstanding issues related to corruption. The 
EU has engaged in some aspects in a reflexive governance approach with 
Albania to develop the grounds for an anti-corruption policy to tackle the 
issue of corruption by giving assistance for further training, supporting 
legislation, facilitating peer review to learn from best practice and co-
financing with the Albanian government strategies for the next two to six 
years. These efforts and ongoing activities are a sign that Albania, together 
with the EU, are developing grounds to establish an anti-corruption policy 
field that will address corruption in the justice system. The efforts that 
Albania has made so far have been observed as insufficient in fighting 
corruption and developing a coherent anti-corruption policy field that 
addresses corruption in the judicial system, and other key sectors. 
 
 
 																																																								
623 Analysis of the Justice System in Albania (2015), [Translate: ANALIZË E SISTEMIT 
TË DREJTËSISË NË SHQIPËRI] Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee on Justice System 
Reform Group of High Level Experts. pp. 10-21. see more; 
http://shqiptarja.com/pdf/new/analiza_e_sistemit_te_drejtesise.pdf (Accessed 20 Oct. 2015 
624 Analysis of the Justice System in Albania (2015), [Translate: ANALIZË E SISTEMIT 
TË DREJTËSISË NË SHQIPËRI] Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee on Justice System 
Reform Group of High Level Experts. pp. 42-43. see more; 
http://shqiptarja.com/pdf/new/analiza_e_sistemit_te_drejtesise.pdf (Accessed 20 Oct. 2015 
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4.5 Concluding Remarks on the Country Studies  
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report and the EU overall had a positive impact in 
supporting the national anti-corruption discourse in the countries case study 
above in addressing the issue of corruption in terms of developing national 
anti-corruption policy. The UK and Romania responded positively to the 
EU Anti-Corruption recommendations, but they differ when it comes to 
applying the recommendations into concrete policy actions. In the case of 
the UK, over the two years of operation of the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
it had a positive impact in introducing the recommendations into the 
national anti-corruption policy. The UK in December of 2014 published its 
first UK Anti-Corruption Plan and in its progress update on the Plan in May 
2016 emphasised that of the 66 actions proposed in the Plan  62 actions 
were delivered. The EU Anti-Corruption Report played a vital role in this 
process in the UK and therefore it can be concluded that it overall had a 
positive impact. The UK engaged in reflexive governance in developing its 
UK Anti-Corruption Plan.  
 
In contrast, in the case of Romania, the EU Anti-Corruption Report over the 
course of two years had rather limited results in implementing the Report’s 
recommendations into concrete policy actions. The efforts by Romania 
since the Report was published were focused mainly on strengthening 
Romania’s National Anticorruption Directorate. Furthermore, the political 
turmoil in November 2015, with the collapse of Victor Ponta’s government 
because of allegation to corruption and the formation of a technocratic 
government led by Dacian Ciolos, a former EU Commissioner, which will 
run the government until parliamentary elections in end of 2016, have 
contributed to the difficulties in implementation of the recommendations of 
the Report in concrete policy actions. Although, in terms of reflexive 
governance approach the Report had a positive impact in that Romania has 
engaged with local actors; local issues concerning corruption addressed in 
the Report were tackled, including the informality and corruption in the 
public health care system. Therefore, the Report had a positive impact in 
terms of reflexive governance by mirroring local issues into a more border 
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EU policy issue cornering Romania. However, in the case of Romania, the 
reflexive governance approach has not been as successful and additional 
hard law adopted by the EU can be recommened to develop anti-corruption 
policy. Romania has mainly responded in develop anti-corruption policy 
only when the EU and international bodies have threatened Romania with 
freezing assists or blocking Romania into the passport-free Schengen zone.  
 
While in the case of Albania, its institutional anti-corruption framework 
introduced with the help of the international community and the EU appears 
to be promising, it can be concluded that they remain largely ineffective 
due to a lack of proper implementation because of machine politics and 
insufficient resources allocated to anti-corruption efforts in Albania. 
Albanian governments since the collapse of communism have not properly 
addressed the root causes of corruption and so far have only adopted laws 
and institutions in line with international standards and the EU requirements 
with little attention whether and how legislation actually are going to work 
on the ground. The Albanian governments were able to tick off EU 
requirements without making serious efforts to make substantive changes in 
terms of developing a comprehensive anti-corruption policy field in the 
country. Albania has made little use of reflexive governance, only insofar 
as involving the civil society and business community in consultation of 
anti-corruption reforms, rather than involving their findings or 
recommendation into concrete action plan. The EU interplay with Albania 
has been based mainly on conditionality set by the Commission. In other 
words the hard law approach associated with accession rather than a 
reflexive governance approach characterises the development of the 
anticorruption policy field in Albania. 
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Chapter 5 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The final chapter summarises results of the foregoing analysis of the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report and it addresses areas of relevance for future EU 
Anti-Corruption polices. It is divided into two parts. The first part evaluates 
achievements in the EU Anti-Corruption Report on efforts to establish a 
comprehensive anti-corruption policy field. The second part of this chapter 
offers recommendations for the second EU Anti-Corruption Report and 
suggests areas that could be given closer attention in future Reports. Both 
sections offer an assessment from the perspective of the theory of reflexive 
governance. My analysis provides examples where reflexive governance 
occurred as a result of the impact that the EU Anti-Corruption Report has, 
how future Reports could be strengthened by making further use of 
reflexive governance mechanisms and how reflexive governance can be 
helpful to Member States in developing their own anti-corruption policies.  
 
5.2 The impact of the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report, published in February 2014 has improved 
EU Anti-Corruption polices in five key areas over the last two years. First, 
the Report has officially recognised additional sectors that are vulnerable 
and prone to corruption practice in the EU and the Member States, in 
particular in the area of public procurement. Thereby the Anti-Corruption 
Report raised the awareness of the policy field of corruption in the EU. 
Second, the Report has offered new insights on the level of corruption and 
the damaging effects that corruption has in the EU and the Member States. 
Third, the Report has contributed to thinking about the effect of corruption 
in economic terms by officially estimated the cost of corruption at EU level, 
which it identified to be at least 120bn euros (£99bn) annually. Forth, the 
Report has allowed the EU Commission to engage in a dialogue with 
Member States and civil society to rethink anti-corruption policy and 
establish the continuous conditions for mutual learning. As a result both the 
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EU and Member States can learn from best practice in designing more 
effective anti-corruption policies and future legislations.   
 
An example where the EU Anti-Corruption Report had an impact was that 
it has raised the profile of addressing corruption from a policy and law 
perceptive, thereby pushing up the agenda for fighting against corruption in 
the EU and the Member States. The EU Anti-Corruption Report itself is a 
key part of the development of an anti-corruption policy field in the EU and 
it can be characterised as a flagship monitoring instrument of the EU 
Commission. The EU Anti-Corruption Report embodies the EU 
Commission’s efforts and commitments to support Member States in 
recognising their anti-corruption policy shortcomings. In analysing this 
example from a reflexive governance perspective, it can be argued that this 
impact has a component of the theory of reflexive governance: innovative 
problem – solving. The EU Commission, through the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report, is supporting Member States to acknowledge their anti-corruption 
policy shortcomings and engaging in an innovative problem – solving 
exercise to enhance their anti-corruption policies and tools. 
 
Another example where the EU Anti-Corruption Report had an impact was 
to identify public procurement as a sector that is highly vulnerable to 
corrupt practices. As a result, the EU Anti-Corruption Report dedicated a 
thematic chapter to public procurement and accepted the policy 
shortcomings to address the high level of corruption at EU and Member 
State level in relation to public procurement.625 As outlined in the second 
chapter, public procurement was selected as a case study by the EU 
Commission to assess the costs of corruption for a sub-sector of the EU 
economy. The EU Commission, under the thematic chapter in the EU Anti-
Corruption Report, can be understood to be trying to trigger a process and a 
dialogue by which governments at different levels - national, regional, local 
and other public bodies and as well as non-governmental organisations, 																																																								
625 Christopher, H. B (2014), ‘Highlight of the EU Procurement Reforms: The New 
Directive on Concessions’, European Procurement and Public Private Partnership Law 
Review. 9(1), pp.1-2. 
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NGOs, academia, media - can engage in shaping anti-corruption strategies 
to prevent corruption in public procurement. Furthermore, the EU Anti-
Corruption Report had an impact by further recognising the level of 
corruption in public procurement and the importance of addressing 
corruption in this key sector of the economy. Public procurement has a 
strong economic significance in the EU, with around 20% of the EU’s GDP 
annually spent by government and public.626 In a global context, public 
procurement represents around one third of public spending in developed 
countries. Therefore, corruption in the domain of governmental contracting 
can have significant economic costs, and it is encouraging in the EU Anti-
Corruption Report for the Member States to strongly acknowledge their 
policy shortcomings in addressing corruption in public procurement. 627 
From a reflexive governance theory perspective, this is an example of the 
reflexive governance component: active participation. Here, in this 
example, it can be argued that the impact has a reflective governance 
approach component, active participation, because the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report has led to wider participation of different levels of government and 
non-government bodies to engage in shaping anti-corruption measurements 
to prevent corruption in public procurement.  
 
Another example where the EU Anti-Corruption Report also made an 
impact is making the EU Member States aware of the risks that corruption 
poses to EU funds. In Mihály Fazeka’s accounts, he argues that EU funds 
can deteriorate the quality of government; as a result, they increase the risk 
of corrupt practices.628 Research suggests that this has been the case in 
many countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. There are three 
reasons for this to occur, according to Fazekas. Firstly, EU funds are often 																																																								
626 PwC (PricewaterhouseCoopers) and Ecorys (2013), Identifying and reducing corruption 
in public procurement in the EU. Development of a methodology to estimate the direct 
costs of corruption and other elements for an EU-evaluation mechanism in the area of anti-
corruption. PwC, Ecorys.  
627 OECD (2013), Government at a Glance 2013. Paris: OECD  
628 Fazekas, M., Chvalkovská, J., Skuhrovec, J., Tóth, I. J., and King, L. P. (2014), ‘Are 
EU funds a 
corruption risk? The impact of EU funds on grand corruption in Central and Eastern 
Europe.’ In 
A. Mungiu-Pippidi (ed.), The Anticorruption Frontline. The ANTICORRP Project, Vol. 2. 
Berlin: Barbara Budrich Publishers pp. 68–89. 
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disbursed on investment projects where public discretion is fairly high and 
it is acknowledged that discretionary spending is more possibly associated 
with corruption than non-discretionary spending. Second, EU funds offer a 
large pool of public resources for rent extraction of public means. Thirdly, 
EU funds contribute to weakening the relation between domestic civil 
society, taxation and policy implementation. 629  Thus, as a result, EU 
Member States are required to make part of their anti-corruption agenda 
also addressing corruption related to EU funds. From a reflexive 
governance theory perspective, this is an example of the reflexive 
governance component: proceduralism. In this example, it can be argued 
that the impact has a reflective governance approach perspective, because 
the EU Anti-Corruption Report suggests that the EU funds are exposed to 
corruption. Therefore, Member States, when designing policy and 
preventive measurements in the future, could also consider to include 
protection of EU funds. In other words, Member States after the EU Anti-
Corruption Report are reflecting in their own anti-corruption policy 
shortcomings in addressing EU funds.  What is more, the Report has 
encouraged Member States, when designing future policy in areas related to 
EU funds, to take into account also including preventative measurements to 
protect EU funds against corrupt practices. Therefore, it can be argued from 
a reflexive governance point of view that the impact here in the EU Anti-
Corruption Report embodies a reflexive governance component: 
proceduralism.  
 
Another example where the EU Anti-Corruption Report had an impact was 
to further highlight the association of corruption in different areas and thus 
undermine policy success. For instance, corruption supports organised 
crime and criminal organisations to thrive in their licentious activities; 
corruption undermines the functioning of the rule of law; a high perception 
of corruption reduces voters’ turnouts in national parliamentary elections 																																																								
629 Fazekas, M., Chvalkovská, J., Skuhrovec, J., Tóth, I. J., and King, L. P. (2014), ‘Are 
EU funds a 
corruption risk? The impact of EU funds on grand corruption in Central and Eastern 
Europe.’ In 
A. Mungiu-Pippidi (ed.), The Anticorruption Frontline. The ANTICORRP Project, Vol. 2. 
Berlin: Barbara Budrich Publishers pp. 68–89. 
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and lowers trust in EU institutions. 630  Member States have taken into 
account and have accepted the association of corruption that it also affects 
other sectors as stipulated in some of the examples above. However, the 
impact of the EU Anti-Corruption Report to this stage has not had a direct 
influence on the Member States to take action to address these sectors more 
promptly. The next part of the chapter evaluates in more depth some of 
these areas that are undermined by corruption and why the EU Commission 
should pay additional focus in the next EU Anti-Corruption Report. From a 
reflexive governance theory perspective, this is an example of the reflexive 
governance component: proceduralism. In this example, it can be argued 
that the impact has a reflective governance approach, because the EU Anti-
Corruption Report suggests that corruption is associated to other areas and 
Member States have acknowledged the effect that corruption has on other 
sectors, as well as to their policy shortcomings as highlighted above. In 
other words, Member States reflect on their own anti-corruption policy 
shortcomings. The Report has encouraged Member States, when designing 
future policy in areas that are recognised as being associated with 
corruption, should take into account to also include preventative 
measurements against corruption. Thus, it can be argued from a reflexive 
governance that the impact here in the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
embodies a reflexive governance component: proceduralism 
 
Another example where the EU Anti-Corruption Report had an impact was 
to officially acknowledge an estimation of the economic costs incurred by 
corruption at the EU level. The Report suggests that corruption possibly 
amounts to €120 billion per year in the EU. The EU Commissioner for 
Home Affairs at the time, Cecilia Malmstrom, considered the high level of 
corruption in Europe as ‘breathtaking’, and the €120bn figure had an impact 
in starting a debate as to what extent the actual cost of corruption is in the 
EU.631  As a result, it encouraged various pieces of research to analyse 
																																																								
630 Holland, R (2014), ‘EU Anti-Corruption Report Shows Long Road Ahead’. Compliance 
Week. Mar 2014, 11(122), pp. 10-12 
631 James Fontanella, K (2014, February 3), Corruption in the EU costs business €120bn a 
year, study finds. The Financial Times, Retrieved from: 
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whether the €120bn figure was accurate. Research by Parliamentary 
Research Services in the 'Cost of Non Europe Report' on Organised Crime 
and Corruption suggests that corruption costs the EU between €179bn to 
€990bn in GDP632 terms on an annual basis.  By contrast, the EU Anti-
Corruption Report suggests just €120bn. The EU Home Affairs 
Commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom, at the time when presented with the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report, suggests that the true cost of corruption could 
probably be much higher than the €120bn officially acknowledged by the 
EU Anti-Corruption Report. This is despite the fact that the estimated cost 
suggested by 'Cost of Non Europe Report' is different to the EU Anti-
Corruption Report, because the Report does not take into account other 
areas that are indirectly affected by corruption. The 'Cost of Non Europe 
Report' looks at costs in terms of lost tax revenues and foreign investment 
as a result of the environment created by corruption in the EU and the 
Member States.  
 
A study conducted by Mungiu-Pippidi applied a different approach in 
calculating the costs of corruption in the EU and concluded that the 
estimate of €120bn in the EU Anti-Corruption Report miscalculates the 
actual costs of corruption. Mungiu-Pippidi argues that the costs are 
probably more in the range of €323bn, which is about three times more than 
the EU Anti-Corruption Report estimation.633 These estimations have led to 
other pieces of research to pay much closer attention to the cost of 
corruption not only in economic terms, but also the social and political 
costs that corruption has in the EU, which the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
fails to address. From a reflexive governance theory perspective, this is a 
clear example of the reflexive governance component: active participation. 																																																																																																																																																																												
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/28f11862-8cf9-11e3-ad57-
00144feab7de.html#axzz46ZcUiQmi  
632 Van Ballegooij, W. and T. Zandstra (2016), Organised Crime and Corruption: Cost of 
Non-Europe Report, Annex II – Corruption. European Parliament, EPRS | European 
Parliamentary Research Service, PE 579.319 - March 2016, pp. 26 – 48. Retrieved from: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/579319/EPRS_STU(2016)579
319_EN.pdf  
633 Mungiu Pippidi, A. (2016), ‘The good, the bad and the ugly: controlling corruption in 
the European 
Union.’ Hertie School of Governance Work Package: WP3, Corruption and governance 
improvement in global and continental perspectives, pp. 11 – 30.  
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In this example, it can be argued that the impact has a reflective governance 
approach component of active participation, because the EU Anti-
Corruption Report officially suggests that corruption possibly amounts to 
€120 billion per year in the EU, which has led to various pieces of research 
and ongoing discussions for evaluating the actual cost of corruption in the 
EU. This has also led people to observe how the EU Commission came up 
with the €120 billion figure and what areas it covered to estimate that cost. 
This actively involved different participants from civil society to contribute 
to the debate by providing research, such as by the Parliamentary Research 
Services in the 'Cost of Non Europe Report' on Organised Crime and 
Corruption, and the work of Mungiu-Pippidi to challenge the Commission’s 
figure. As a result, this led to active participation of wider participants that 
go beyond the EU Commission and Member States. Therefore, the impact 
in this respect has a reflexive governance approach element to it.    
 
Furthermore, the EU Anti-Corruption Report had an impact in supporting a 
dialogue between the EU Commission, Member States and civil society to 
further prioritise anti-corruption policy. Furthermore, it had an impact 
through preventative anti-corruption measurements in other policy areas 
that can contribute to tackling corruption. From a reflexive governance 
theory perspective, this is an example of the reflexive governance 
component: regulation of self-regulation. Here, in this example, it can be 
argued that the impact has a reflexive governance approach, because the EU 
Anti-Corruption policy is encouraging on creating a dialogue between the 
EU Commission, Member States and civil society to further prioritise their 
anti-corruption policy. Thus, the EU Anti-Corruption Report is engaging in 
a regulation of self-regulation process.  
 
Another example where the EU Anti-Corruption Report had an impact was 
in establishing an anti-corruption experience-sharing programme. The 
experience-sharing programme is a positive product by the EU Anti-
Corruption Report. It can be argued that the establishment of the anti-
corruption experience-sharing programme would serve well as a platform 
for interested parties and stakeholders to engage in a dialogue on how to 
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best address challenges identified in the EU Anti-Corruption Report, as 
well as to improve laws and policies by learning from each other’s 
experiences in tackling the issue of corruption more effectively.634 Since the 
publication of the EU Anti-Corruption Report there have been four similar 
events, in a format of a workshop organised in the framework of the 
programme of peer learning under the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
initiatives, covering areas such as asset declaration, whistleblowing and 
healthcare corruption. 635  From a reflexive governance perspective in 
analysing this example, it can be argued that this impact has a component of 
the theory of reflexive governance: collective learning. The EU 
Commission, through the EU Anti-Corruption Report, is supporting 
Member States to engage in collective and mutual learning exercises. The 
EU Anti-Corruption Report provides a platform for learning between 
Member States to learn from each other’s best practice and enhance their 
anti-corruption policy. Furthermore, in this example, the impact of the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report from a reflexive governance theory point of view, 
can be seen that the Report is a form of reflexive governance where 
participants that are actively engaging in enhancing their anti-corruption 
policy shortcomings and engaging in local experimentations as well. 
Thereby, this is a clear example of the impact the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report had in engaging in a process of learning, which is a key component 
of the theory of reflexive governance as stipulated in more detail in chapter 
3. 
 
However, the impacts of the EU Anti-Corruption Report thus far have not 
embodied all of the seven key components of the theory of reflexive 
governance. This is in contrast to Chapter 3 when analysing the EU Anti-
Corruption Report from a reflexive governance perspective, in which all of 																																																								
634 Rose-Ackerman, S. and P. Carrington (2013), Anti-Corruption Policy: Can 
International Actors Play a Constructive Role? North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 
pp. 3 – 35.  
635 European Commission (2016), The Experience Sharing Programme to support Member 
States, local NGOs and other stakeholders in addressing specific challenges identified in 
the EU Anti-Corruption Report. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/experience-
sharing-programme/index_en.htm  
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the seven key components of the theory of reflexive governance are 
apparent. The next section analyses the limitations of the EU Anti-
Corruption Report and offers suggestions as to why the Report could 
strengthen further the reflexive governance components. Furthermore, the 
following section offers some insights and research on areas that future EU 
Anti-Corruption Reports could also include to establish a more 
comprehensive anti-corruption policy at the EU and at Member State level.  
 
In evaluating the impact of the EU Anti-Corruption Report effectively, it 
would be ideal to compare it with the second EU Anti-Corruption Report. 
However, the second EU Anti-Corruption Report is in progress and is 
anticipated to come out in autumn 2016. The second EU Anti-Corruption 
Report is expected to be more indicator-driven and there will be a reflection 
on the progress made between the first EU Anti-Corruption Report and the 
second Report. This will offer some more concrete comparisons on the 
impact that the first EU Anti-Corruption Report had in the Member States. 
Since there is not a follow-up assessment of the extent to which Member 
States have taken action on the recommendations made by the EU Anti-
Corruption Report, some follow-up on progress is highly anticipated in the 
next Report. Nevertheless, the research can provide an insight and analysis 
of some of the elements where the EU Anti-Corruption Report had impact 
in laying some foundation for developing an anti-corruption policy field in 
the Member States. 
 
For the EU Anti-Corruption Report to have a solid impact, it would take 
some time for the Report to first gain enough visibility because it is a 
relatively new instrument and is a new development at supranational 
level.636  From a reflexive governance perspective overall, the EU Anti-
Corruption Report is designed in a form of self-regulation and embodies 
key characteristics of the theory of reflexive governance. The general 
purpose of the EU Anti-Corruption Report is to engage Member States in 
regulation of self-regulation processes in order to improve further their anti-																																																								
636 Krambia-Kapardis, M (2014), ‘Perception of political corruption as a function of 
legislation,’ Journal of Financial Crime, 21(1), pp. 44 – 55. 
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corruption measurements and anti-bribery legislations, which are often 
poorly enforced according to the EU Anti-Corruption Report. Thus, in 
analysing the general purpose of EU Anti-Corruption Report, it can be 
argued that the central impacts of the Report have the characteristic forms 
of regulation of self-regulation.   
 
5.3 General limitations of the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report includes little new data, because the Report 
draws heavily on work conducted by UN, GRECO, OECD, Transparency 
International and other regional organisations that are specialists in anti-
corruption issues. The Report includes some original data collection - in 
particular the survey conducted, but it still faces a challenge in 
demonstrating its added value and usefulness to the public and 
policymakers. This is because the EU Anti-Corruption Report risks a 
duplication of the information and data by other international organisations 
that have a longer history in anti-corruption work. The biggest contribution 
that the EU Anti-Corruption Report has made is to raise awareness of the 
sectors that are more affected by corruption and the policy and strategy 
shortcomings in dealing with corruption in the Member States. In particular, 
putting anti-corruption policy high on the agenda and creating opportunities 
for exchanging ideas and policy integration in different areas to address 
corruption also as law and policy issues. Even if the EU Commission is 
criticised for collecting existing evidence, rather than conducting new 
analysis about corruption, the EU Anti-Corruption Report acts as an 
important reference for understanding the lack of policy and supporting 
Member States for developing key tools and policies to prevent corruption. 
This is as well as engaging the EU Commission, Member States and civil 
society in ongoing dialogue to enhance further their anti-corruption 
efforts.637 
 																																																								
637 Van Ballegooij, W. and T. Zandstra (2016), Organised Crime and Corruption: Cost of 
Non-Europe Report, Annex II – Corruption. European Parliament, EPRS | European 
Parliamentary Research Service, PE 579.319, pp.  72 – 88. 
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There is no formal assessment procedure in the current EU Anti-Corruption 
Report, for instance similar to the GRECO’s evaluation.638 Some follow-up 
on country-specific recommendations is envisaged in the second EU Anti-
Corruption Report. However, no formal assessment procedures have been 
established within the framework of the EU Anti-Corruption Report up to 
this point. Other limitations are the areas covered by the recommendations 
in the EU Anti-Corruption Report. Transparency International evaluations 
of the EU Anti-Corruption Report point out the lack of specific 
recommendations in the Report - in particular, on the protection of 
whistleblowers, access to information and lobbying. In fact, communication 
from the EU Commission in 2011 on the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
mentioned that these areas would be evaluated in depth when the Report is 
issued in February 2014. Furthermore, Transparency International, in its 
evaluation, observed the lack of attention to the cross-border element in the 
EU Anti-Corruption Report -  particularly where the EU dimension is 
mostly needed.639  
 
There were other areas and sectors that the first communication by the EU 
Commission for establishing the EU Anti-Corruption Report in 2011 
promised - for example, an evaluation of law enforcement, judicial and 
police cooperation within the EU. The first communication by the EU 
Commission for establishing the EU Anti-Corruption Report also promised 
that the EU Anti-Corruption Report would also cover asset recovery, 
accounting standards, statutory audit for EU companies, enhancing the 
integrity in sport and match fixing. Furthermore, the first communication by 
the EU Commission for establishing the EU Anti-Corruption Report in 
2011 also suggested that the EU Anti-Corruption Report would provide an 
evaluation of the EU’s external policies in regards to the EU Candidate 
States, potential candidates and neighbouring countries to make 
recommendations on policy reforms in addressing their anti-corruption 																																																								
638 Schmidt-Pfister, D and H. Moroff (2013) Fighting Corruption in Eastern Europe: A 
Multilevel Perspective, New York: Routledge, pp. 78-85  
639 Dolan, C. (2014, February 3), We have an anti-corruption report: So now what?’, 
Transparency International EU. Retrieved from: 
http://www.transparencyinternational.eu/2014/02/we-have-an-eu-anti-corruption-report-
sonow-what/  
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policy shortcomings. 640  The first EU Anti-Corruption Report issued in 
February 2014 did not pay any attention to any of these areas mentioned 
above, which in the first communication by the Commission in 2011, when 
it launched the idea of establishing EU Anti-Corruption Report, suggested 
that they would be an integral part of the EU Anti-Corruption Report when 
the Report would be published.  
 
Furthermore, in the first communication by the EU Commission for 
establishing the EU Anti-Corruption Report in 2011, it was suggested the 
EU Anti-Corruption Report would also evaluate the level of corruption 
within the EU institutions and offer some suggestions for policy reforms for 
the EU institutions.641 Research finds that the DG Home Affairs dropped 
such an idea for assessing corruption within the EU institutions, because the 
Commission perceived it to be biased in its approach to evaluate its own 
EU institutions. Therefore, it is anticipated that the EU Commission might 
commission someone out of the EU institutions to make an evaluation and 
analysis of the level of corruption within the EU institutions in the future.  
 
As a result, the evaluation of corruption within the EU institutions does not 
fall within the scope of the EU Anti-Corruption Report. From the 
perspective of the EU and its report, monitoring and evaluation procedures 
with regards to corruption at the EU level and within its institutions are 
weaker than their counterparts relating to the state of corruption in the 
Member States. In order to offer some kind of evaluation and to remedy this 
gap, Transparency International made a study of corruption and integrity 
risks in the EU institutions and pertaining to the EU’s budget in its 2014 
EU Integrity System Report.642 The report by Transparency International 
contains an evaluation of ten EU institutions and agencies. Those are the 
European Parliament, European Council, Council of the EU, European 
Commission, Court of Justice of the European Union, European Court of 																																																								
640 European Commission (2011), Communication Fighting Corruption in the EU. COM 
(2011) 308 final. 
641 European Commission (2011), Communication Fighting Corruption in the EU. COM 
(2011) 308 final. 
642 Transparency International (2014), Report on the EU Integrity System. Retrieved from: 
http://www.transparencyinternational.eu/focus-areas/eu-integrity/  
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Auditors, European Anti-Fraud Office, Europol and Eurojust, and 
Ombudsman.643 So far, this report by Transparency International represents 
a comprehensive and independent study on the state of corruption at the EU 
level.644 However, the EU institutions are subject to external review through 
their membership in UNCAC. Even so, such a review has not been 
concluded to this point and it is difficult to make a concrete evaluation. 
Should the EU and its institutions accede to GRECO, it would face similar 
scrutiny and it can be evaluated more clearly. The next section will evaluate 
some key areas that the next EU Anti-Corruption Report could strongly 
take into consideration to cover and raise more awareness of the policy 
shortcomings in future EU Anti-Corruption Reports.   
 
5.4 General improvements for future EU Anti-Corruption Reports 
 
As observed in Chapter 2 and in the section above, the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report cannot meet alone all the challenges posed by corruption. In the 
Member States, the level of corruption constitutes an obstacle to the current 
anti-corruption policy and framework in place according to the EU Anti-
Corruption Report. Thus, combating corruption must be an ongoing priority 
for the Member States and the EU. There are several ways in which the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report can address some of the current anti-corruption 
policy shortcomings and support Member States to develop their own 
comprehensive anti-corruption policy fields. Furthermore, future EU Anti-
Corruption Reports could build upon the current framework in adopting 
more the reflexive governance approach to anti-corruption policy 
initiatives.     
 
The first general suggestion is that future EU Anti-Corruption Reports 
could also include the EU institutions within the scope of the Report, as was 
originally planned for the EU Anti-Corruption Report that the EU 																																																								
643 Transparency International (2014), Report on the EU Integrity System. Retrieved from: 
http://www.transparencyinternational.eu/focus-areas/eu-integrity/ 
644 Van Ballegooij, W. and T. Zandstra (2016), Organised Crime and Corruption: Cost of 
Non-Europe Report, Annex II – Corruption. European Parliament, EPRS | European 
Parliamentary Research Service, PE 579.319, pp.  104 – 110. 
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Commission proposed in its communication in 2011. The Commission 
could use another agency outside its own structure to prevent bias. 
Furthermore, including the EU institutions within the scope of the Report 
would give more credibility to the EU Anti-Corruption Report by showing 
that the EU is evaluating its own intuitions and keeping its own house in 
order. Thus, by also including the EU institutions within the scope of the 
EU Anti-Corruption Report, it would contribute in making the EU Anti-
Corruption Report a more comprehensive anti-corruption monitoring 
instrument and also strengthen the reflexive governance approach 
component: regulation of self-regulation. The EU Commission, by also 
including its own EU institutions within the scope of the EU Anti-
Corruption Report, would strengthen the reflexive governance approach 
component of regulation of self-regulation, because the EU institutions will 
have an opportunity under the EU Anti-Corruption Report to engage in 
regulation of self-regulation processes. Such a reflexive approach will be a 
positive contribution by the EU Anti-Corruption Report to also identify the 
shortcomings of EU institutions to addressing corruption within their own 
departments and institutions. This reflexive approach will also give the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report adequate credibility to promote positive anti-
corruption initiatives.      
 
Another general suggestion could be made that the EU Commission can 
involve the EU Member States at a much earlier stage in the process of 
developing the EU Anti-Corruption Report in future Reports. In the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report issued in 2014, the DG Home Affairs suggested 
that the EU Member States were involved at a later stage in the process and 
the findings of the Report were sent to Member States for correction six 
months prior to the publication of the Report. Another national suggestion 
from the UK Home Office endorsed such an approach for future EU Anti-
Corruption Reports for Member States to be involved at an earlier stage in 
the future Reports. However, what the Commission and the UK Home 
Office could have also suggested is for a greater involvement of civil 
society and private sector representatives at earlier stages of preparing 
future EU Anti-Corruption Reports, rather than consulting different 
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stakeholders for the Report. Involving a wider range of actors at an earlier 
stage would also be helpful in publishing a coherent and much more 
focused Anti-Corruption Report. Thus, it will also avoid any possible 
delays such as the first EU Anti-Corruption Report, which was suggested 
for issuing in the summer of 2013 and was finally published in February 
2014. Also, the next EU Anti-Corruption Report was predicted to be 
published in February 2016 and at it looks likely to be published sometime 
in autumn 2016. Furthermore, involving the EU Member States, including a 
wider participation of civil society and private sector representatives at a 
much earlier stage in preparing the EU Anti-Corruption Report would also 
strengthen a reflexive governance approach component: active 
participation. The increase in wider participation at an earlier stage in future 
Reports would strengthen the reflexive governance approach, because it 
will enable wider participation in shaping a more coherent anti-corruption 
policy. Furthermore, it will empower the participation of local actors to be 
involved in the process of preparing the EU Anti-Corruption Report and 
thus strengthening the reflexive governance approach.      
 
The final general suggestions for the future EU Anti-Corruption Reports 
would be to increase the number of outputs and add more new data to the 
Report. It may be useful for the EU Commission to consider making 
information available between biennial publications of the EU Anti-
Corruption Report by sharing all of the monitoring data collected. Such a 
change would have a positive impact in enabling ongoing discussions and 
sharing best practices. The experience of the CVM showed that the internal 
publication was useful in keeping the anti-corruption policy discussion high 
on the agenda and keeping a track record on meeting the anti-corruption 
policy goals. The current EU Anti-Corruption Report has not included 
much new data, but rather used secondary data conducted by other 
international organisations. To add new data, especially for the EU Anti-
Corruption Report, would raise more the profile of the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report; because of the new findings, the Report would have more 
importance as an anti-corruption monitoring instrument. Such an approach 
would also strengthen more the reflexive governance approach of collective 
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learning. Future EU Anti-Corruption Reports, by providing new data and 
also issuing internal reports in between the EU Anti-Corruption Reports, 
would strengthen the reflexive governance approach of collective learning 
by further supporting mutual learning between different levels of 
governance and making the Report more reflexive in its substance. Such a 
reflexive approach would be beneficial to the Member States, because they 
will be able to further engage in a dialogue and mutual learning experience-
sharing programme. Thus, the EU Anti-Corruption Report, by using 
reflexive governance approach, can support Member States to keep high the 
agenda against fighting corruption and develop a comprehensive anti-
corruption policy.  
 
The following section will make some concrete suggestions in areas and 
policy sectors that, throughout the research, were observed to be vitally 
important for the EU Anti-Corruption Report to be a successful monitoring 
instrument. Furthermore, the following section will address some key areas 
that can help the EU Commission through the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
to support Member States in developing a comprehensive anti-corruption 
policy at Member State and local level, as well as to strengthen more the 
reflexive governance components that were laid out in Chapter 3.        
 
5.5 Protection of Whistleblowers  
 
Throughout the different chapters, there is a pattern on how corruption 
affects people differently and how different sectors are seriously threatened 
by corrupt practices. The research throughout the chapters has offered 
different examples on how corruption weakens the very fabric of 
democracy, economy, society, the political system, and the judiciary.645 As 
a result, the legal and political forms of corruption have become part of the 
larger debate in the EU and the Member States. Furthermore, the different 
chapters have shown some of the key gaps in the systems across Europe 
and exposed the inadequate regulation and policies to address corruption 																																																								
645 Mungiu-Pippidi, A (2015), The Quest for Good Governance: How Societies Develop 
Control of Corruption. Cambridge Cambridge: University Press, pp. 1-26 
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promptly. As a result, the EU Commission in the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report estimates the total financial cost of corruption to be as high as €120 
billion per year and thus, having an adverse impact in all of the Member 
States public resources.646 Therefore, it can be argued that no country is 
immune to corruption and meets challenges for policy success in addressing 
the high cost of corruption.  
 
As the research has shown, corruption typically happens behind closed 
doors and away from the public eye. Whistleblowers reporting corruption 
have it far from easy and straightforward to report on corruption cases. In 
the EU, nearly 74 percent of those who have witnessed or experienced 
corruption did not report it. Despite the willingness of individuals to report 
corruption, this number of actual reports of corruption is extremely low.647 
This indicates that nearly 74 percent in the EU are reluctant to blow the 
whistle against corruption according to a survey conducted by 
Transparency International. Although progress has been made in preventing 
corruption in the EU, the laws and regulations - as the research has 
demonstrated throughout the different chapters - remain far from adequate 
and sufficient.648 This is because there are particular gaps when it comes to 
whistleblower protection legislation, where citizens can feel safe to 
question practices that have some form of corruption involved.  
 
Whistleblowers are crucial in exposing corrupt practices. However, despite 
being widely acknowledged as a key source to disclose corruption and other 
misconduct associated with corrupt practices, whistleblowers are regularly 
the ones who pay the price because of the lack of legal protection. The 
research in the EU finds that there are inadequate laws in place when it 
comes to whistleblower protection legislation. A recent study by 
Transparency International on whistleblower protection found that only 4 																																																								
646 Auby, .B.J, and E. Breen (2014), Corruption and conflicts of interest: a comparative 
law approach. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 3-15.  
647 Schultz, D and K, Harutyunyan (2015), ‘Combating corruption: The development of 
whistleblowing laws in the United States, Europe, and Armenia’. International 
Comparative Jurisprudence, 1(2), pp. 87-97 
648 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (2014), Retrieved from: 
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out of 28 EU Member States have legal frameworks for whistleblower 
protection that are considered to be acceptable. The other Member States 
have partial, poor or no legal framework at all in place for whistleblower 
protection.649 
 
Therefore, it can be argued that, in future, EU Anti-Corruption Reports in 
their thematic chapter could pay particular attention in evaluating the level 
of legal whistleblower protection in all of the Member States and make 
sound recommendations on implementing adequate legal protections for 
whistleblowers. The EU Commission, in the next and future EU Anti-
Corruption Reports, could engage in providing a thorough evaluation of the 
current legal frameworks for whistleblower protection in all of the Member 
States. The Commission can seek in the next Report to enable a process of 
strengthening the protection of whistleblowers and, through a reflexive 
governance approach, engage Member States in a mutual learning process 
to see what is the legal framework in place. Furthermore, such a reflexive 
governance approach would ensure that all of the Member States would 
engage in a dialogue with the EU Commission through the EU Anti-
Corruption Report to develop more adequate legal protection for 
whistleblowers. Furthermore, by evaluating the legal framework for the 
protection of whistleblowers through the EU Anti-Corruption Report, the 
EU Commission will also strengthen the reflexive governance component: 
regulation of self-regulation. Member States will have a chance to self-
regulate their own legislation concerning whistleblowers, by reflecting on 
the legal shortcomings that are in place in many of the Member States. The 
following section demonstrates in more depth the lack of legal protection 
for whistleblowers in many Member States, and why it is very imperative 
for the future EU Anti-Corruption Reports to make whistleblower 
protection as part of their thematic chapter.  
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5.6 The legal background of whistleblowers in the EU Member States   
 
In the European Union, Sweden is known by researchers to be the first 
country to pass legislation that is known as the Freedom of Information 
Law in 1766, which is also considered to be one of the first legal 
frameworks for whistleblower protection in the world. 650  Sweden's 
Freedom of the Press Act 1766 formed the basis for a legal framework that 
represents de facto protections for those who expose wrongdoing even to 
this day.651 Sweden does not have a separate whistleblower law so far, and 
only in 2016 a new whistleblower protection law was proposed.  
 
The first far-reaching whistleblower law ever passed in the EU is the UK 
Public Interest Disclosure Act (PIDA) and is widely considered by research 
to be among the best practice in the EU.652 In light of a succession of many 
high-profile political and business scandals, the UK in 1998 responded by 
passing the PIDA. Nearly all employees in the government, private and 
non-profit sectors are covered by the PIDA. The whistleblower law under 
the PIDA goes so far as to legally protect contractors, trainees and UK 
workers based overseas. Therefore, the PIDA is considered as one of the 
best practice models for whistleblower protection law across the EU.653 
 
The UK law under the PIDA requires employers to show that any action 
taken against an employee or worker was not driven by the fact that an 
employee was a whistleblower. According to research, this reverse burden-
of-proof has become an international standard. France is considering 
implementing a similar reverse burden-of-proof standard as the UK. Under 
PIDA, in addition to any financial losses, employees who have been 
responded against can also claim payment for damages and injury to their 																																																								
650 Ackerman, J. and I. S. Ballesteros, (2006), ‘The Global Explosion of Freedom of 
Information Laws’. Administrative Law Review, 58(1), pp. 85 – 130. 
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personal feelings.654 However, in the UK, the whistleblower campaigners 
suggest further improvement of the PIDA. This is despite the fact that the 
PIDA is often held as a model and has inspired whistleblower proposals and 
laws in many other countries, even those outside of the EU, such as 
Australia, Japan and South Korea.655 
 
After the UK passed the PIDA, some of the EU Member States paid more 
attention towards protecting whistleblowers and they started to also ratify 
their own whistleblowers’ protections laws. Early 2000 marked the first 
wave of ratifying new whistleblowers’ legislation in many of the EU 
Member States. The Netherlands ratified its protections for public servants 
in 2001 and established in 2006 a public sector ethics and integrity 
agency.656 Malta ratified its whistleblower regulations around 2007; later in 
2009, Malta introduced a ban on retaliation against public officers who 
report wrongdoing and corrupt acts.657 The first country in Central Europe 
in 2004 to ratify a dedicated law to protect whistleblowers from retaliation 
was Romania. The Whistleblower Protection Act covers government 
employees and it gives equal protection to disclosures made to journalists, 
activists and other parties outside the workplace in Romania.658 In other 
words, the whistleblowers legislation in Romania can bypass their 
employers without being punished. After Romania in 2004, Belgium 
ratified a law to protect public sector whistleblowers.659 
 
In 2010, following a gap of several years, Hungary implemented a similar 
whistleblowers protection law as the UK PIDA. Hungary and the UK are 																																																								
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interest?’, International Journal of Law and Management, 57(2), pp. 141-158. 
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the only two countries in the EU to have stand-alone legislation that covers 
both the public and private sectors. However, Hungary did not set up a 
government agency where whistleblowers can make their disclosures and 
file complaints of retaliation, despite implementing a whistleblowers’ 
protection law similar to the UK model.660 In 2010, Slovenia passed anti-
corruption legislation that includes legal protections for public and private 
sector employees. However, Slovenia did not ratify a dedicated 
whistleblower protection law. The measurements under the anti-corruption 
legislation in Slovenia contained many best practices to protect 
whistleblowers. 661  In 2010, Ireland amendment the Prevention of 
Corruption Act to provide some safeguards for people reporting corruption 
and put in place a Criminal Justice Act in 2011 to strengthen the protection 
of whistleblowers.662     
 
In 2011, Luxembourg approved an anti-corruption law, which also included 
some legal protections for public and private sector employees who report 
on corruption and abuse of office inspired by the UK model. 663 
Interestingly, Luxembourg also placed the burden-of-proof on employers, 
and similar to the UK PIDA legislation, it allows employees to file appeals 
to an employment tribunal. In 2012, Austria introduced for the first time 
legal protections for government employees for those in case they blow the 
whistle. Therefore, those who act against whistleblowers are subject to 
disciplinary	proceedings in Austria.664 
 
Italy in 2012 implemented its first provision to legally protect 
whistleblowers in the public sector. The legislation covers government 																																																								
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employees who report wrongdoing activities if they do not commit 
defamation.665 The provision was drafted with input from Transparency 
International Italia. 666  In 2013, France passed a law to protect 
whistleblowers that reveal only environmental and health risks. 
Introduction of such a law followed from a series of extensive reports of 
public health activates related to a diabetes drug, the overconsumption of 
salt and a hazardous industrial solvent.667 
 
The above examples clarified in more depth the argument as to why EU 
countries have made less or no progress in legally protecting 
whistleblowers, except for Luxembourg, Romania, Slovenia and the UK. 
For instance, Denmark has no designated whistleblower law, no dedicated 
agency to advise and protect whistleblowers.668 Denmark is also the only 
Nordic country with no clear regulations on whistleblowers. Portugal is also 
another example where there is almost no legal protection under the law for 
whistleblowers. Furthermore, in Portugal, whistleblowers can be criminally 
prosecuted or face civil lawsuits for defaming others, especially those in 
positions of power.669  
 
Therefore, the EU Commission in future EU Anti-Corruption Reports could 
strongly consider to make the thematic chapter on protection of 
whistleblowers. Furthermore, the future EU Anti-Corruption Report could 
shift its focus from public procurement in support of a comprehensive legal 
protection of whistleblowing and open a debate to introduce meaningful 																																																								
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legal protection for whistleblowers in the foreseeable future in the Member 
States. As the example of different EU states showed in the research above, 
there is some important progress in many EU countries, but only a few 
whistleblower laws provide sufficient legal protections for whistleblowers. 
 
There is some strong opposition to the protection of whistleblowers and 
there is a negative perception of whistleblowers in many EU countries, 
which has made it difficult to pass meaningful whistleblower laws. 
However, the EU Anti-Corruption Report has the capacity to launch a 
debate to implementing meaningful laws for the protection of 
whistleblowers. Thus, future EU Anti-Corruption Reports could dedicate 
the next thematic chapter on supporting Member States to enhance and 
improve their legislation on the protection of whistleblowers. 
 
If future EU Anti-Corruption Reports make the protection of 
whistleblowers as a thematic chapter of the Report, the EU Commission 
will also further strengthen the reflexive governance approach in the design 
of the EU Anti-Corruption Report. The inclusion of the protection of 
whistleblowers as a thematic chapter of the Report will have an impact in 
strengthening several components of the theory of reflexive governance as 
outlined in Chapter 3.  
 
Firstly, the EU Anti-Corruption Report, by making the protection of 
whistleblowers as a thematic chapter, will strengthen the collective learning 
element of reflexive governance approaches. The Report will enable a 
dialogue and mutual learning process between different actors at EU and 
Member State level to engage in a learning process about the best legal 
practices for protecting whistleblowers in the Member States. Furthermore, 
it will allow for different actors to engage in mutual learning and thus the 
EU Anti-Corruption Report would strengthen the reflexive governance 
component of collective learning further. Secondly, the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report, by making the protection of whistleblowers as a thematic chapter, 
will strengthen the reflexive governance component: active participation. 
The inclusion of protecting whistleblowers in the EU Anti-Corruption 
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Report through a reflexive governance approach will further encourage 
further a wider participation of governance at domestic, regional, and local 
level to engage in a process of enhancing the protection of whistleblowers. 
Thus, the reflexive governance component of active participation would be 
strengthened further if the future EU Anti-Corruption Reports include the 
legal protection of whistleblowers as a thematic chapter, because different 
levels of governance and of civil society would engage in shaping better 
policymaking for protecting whistleblowers. Thirdly, the theory of reflexive 
governance component of proceduralism would strengthen further in future 
EU Anti-Corruption Reports if the protection of whistleblowers were 
included. The Report will make Member States take part in the process of 
certain actors in improving the protection of whistleblowers. Furthermore, 
the EU Anti-Corruption Report would support Member States through a 
reflexive design of the Report to ensure that various levels of governments 
would make part of their procedure the protection of whistleblowers. 
Fourthly, the EU Anti-Corruption Report, by drawing guidelines for the 
Member States in the Report, would also strengthen another key aspect of 
the theory of reflexive governance: soft law. The Commission, by providing 
guidelines for the Member States on how to implement coherent legislation, 
for the protection of whistleblowers, would also strengthen soft law, which 
is another key component of the theory of reflexive governance. Fifthly and 
more importantly, the EU Anti-Corruption Report, by including an 
evaluation of the legal protection of whistleblowers in the Member States, 
in the thematic chapter would strengthen another important component of 
the theory of reflexive governance: regulation of self-regulation. The EU 
Anti-Corruption Report, by assessing the level of legal protection of 
whistleblowers of the Member States, would ultimately come up with 
shortcomings as the research suggests above; thus, it will support Member 
States to engage in a regulation of self-regulation process. Thus, the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report would strengthen further the regulation of self-
regulation element of the Report and support Member States to be reflexive 
on their own legal shortcomings in sufficiently protecting whistleblowers. 
From a reflexive governance perspective as stipulated in Chapter 3, the EU 
Commission would invite Member States to reflect on their own legal 
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shortcomings to protect whistleblowers and engage them into a regulation 
of self-regulation process. As a result, the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
would further strengthen a crucial aspect of the theory of reflexive 
governance. The following section covers some other insights on another 
important area that future EU Anti-Corruption Reports could address.  
 
5.7 Empowering Specialised Anti-Corruption Institutions at Member 
State level  
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report suggested that all of the EU Member States 
should consider examining their own anti-corruption policy shortcomings 
and come up with their own national anti-corruption action plans. The 
research throughout the different chapters above has indicated that it is 
curial that there is an institutional infrastructure in place to fight corruption 
and implement national anti-corruption action plans more effectively. In the 
EU Anti-Corruption Report, especially in the country chapter 
recommendations, there is an extensive list of reasons that lead to thinking 
that the establishment of an anti-corruption agency is vitally important to 
implement key anti-corruption policy objectives. Furthermore, the EU Anti-
Corruption Report in country chapter recommendations makes a strong case 
for Member States to strengthen their anti-corruption agencies and 
institutions, especially in many post-communist countries. The 
Commission, also in the EU Anti-Corruption Report, indicated it is crucial 
for Members States how to accept all changes in word mac to make their 
anti-corruption agencies more independent from political influences and 
increase their capacities to implement national anti-corruption policies and 
strategies.  
 
In analysing the recommendations for each of the Member States, there is a 
clear indication that many Members States lack or have any proper 
institutional infrastructure in place to fight corruption and implement 
national anti-corruption strategies effectively. Thus, in the next EU Anti-
Corruption Report, it would be highly encouraging for the EU Commission 
to also include an in depth analysis of the anti-corruption agencies in the 
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Member States and offer an evaluation of how effective these anti-
corruption agencies are in combating corruption. Furthermore, the EU 
Commission could engage Member States to further improve their anti-
corruption agencies by showing them best practice examples from other 
successful anti-corruption agencies. Also, the EU Commission in the next 
EU Anti-Corruption Report can ensure that all Member States have their 
anti-corruption agencies in line with international anti-corruption standards.    
 
The next EU Anti-Corruption Report could first recommend that all 
Member States should adopt common principles and standards for anti-
corruption agencies based on the Jakarta Statement on Principles for Anti-
Corruption Agencies.670 At the end of 2012, anti-corruption practitioners, 
experts, international practitioner, and representatives of anti-corruption 
bodies across the world, high representatives of UNDP, UNODC, WB, 
OECD, as well as Transparency International, came up with sixteen 
principles to ensure the independence and effectiveness of anti-corruption 
agencies. These common principles are mainly intended to improve the 
operations of anti-corruption agencies. The set of such principles known as 
the Jakarta Statement on Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies were 
approved by the International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities 
and also by the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) 
country parties to promote and strengthen the effectiveness of anti-
corruption agencies.  
 
The Jakarta Statement is not legally binding, it is a political statement to 
make countries reflect on their own anti-corruption agencies and be more 
committed in improving their anti-corruption standards. Furthermore, the 
Jakarta Statement supports anti-corruption agencies to have a stronger 
mandate and resources available to anti-corruption agencies in order to 
perform their duties and fight corruption more effectively. The EU Anti-
Corruption Report in the next Report could make a case study in analysing 																																																								
670 UNODC (2012), The Jakarta Statement on Principles of Anti-Corruption Agencies. 
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and evaluating whether anti-corruption agencies in each of the Member 
States are fit for purpose. Furthermore, the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
could offer recommendations by starting on the basis of the sixteen 
principles set out by the Jakarta Statement on anti-corruption agencies. 
There are other international frameworks, including the Council of Europe 
and OECD, which are very similar in setting general standards and 
principles for operations of anti-corruption agencies as the Jakarta 
Statement.671 The next EU Anti-Corruption Report could review if anti-
corruption agencies fully meet these international criteria and support 
Member States to make their anti-corruption agencies come into line with 
international standards. Some elements are key for anti-corruption agencies 
to be in place in order to be effective and the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
could at least focus on those main points. Patrick Meagher and Caryn 
Voland have identified ten factors that are key for an effective anti-
corruption agency. These include their political mandate, legal status cross-
agency coordination, prevention and monitoring government 
implementation of anti-corruption policy, accountability, independence, 
powers, professional staff and sufficient resources.672  
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report could focus on key factors that can have an 
influence on anti-corruption agencies performance, such as their 
independence and legal status, their financial and human resources, their 
investigation history, their prevention track record, their accountability, 
cooperation with other Member States and International organisation, as 
well as their education, outreach projects and the national public 
perceptions of the anti-corruption agencies’ performance.  
 
First and foremost, it is key that anti-corruption agencies are independent 
and, as Article 6 of UNCAC indicates, that anti-corruption agencies must 
be provided with the necessary independence to undertake their roles 																																																								
671 Bryane, M (2012), ‘Issues in Anti-Corruption Law: How Can Code of Conduct Laws 
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effectively and free from any undue influence. 673  Meagher and Voland 
indicated that, in many cases, the incumbent government uses anti-
corruption agencies as a weapon against their political opponents. 674 
Meagher suggests in his account that anti-corruption agencies are often 
controlled by incumbent governments, and use it to attack members of the 
opposition, as well as punishing members of their own party who are 
perceived as having stepped out of line.675 Along the same lines, Robert 
Klitgaard has observed that anti-corruption agencies and anti-corruption 
campaigns are at times used to fight political opponents rather than to 
essentially fight corruption.676 Thus, the EU Anti-Corruption Report could 
address how independent anti-corruption agencies are in the Member States 
and at the same time ensure that anti-corruption agencies are not used as a 
weapon to fight political opponents, but rather fight corruption. Therefore, 
the benchmark of an independent anti-corruption agency is the most 
important element, because the anti-corruption agency should have the 
public respect and credibility that it is actually fighting corruption. The EU 
Anti-Corruption Report could support in the next Report national anti-
corruption agencies at Member State level to have political independence, 
so that they cannot be controlled or used by the political elite for political 
purposes. 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report, in the recommendations chapter to the 
Member States, points out in numerous cases that Member States should 
allocate more resources to their anti-corruption agencies and institutions 
that deal with corruption related cases. It is vital that anti-corruption 
agencies have an adequate budget and human resources in place to perform 
their functions effectively. Thus, the next EU Anti-Corruption Report could 																																																								
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support for more resources to Member States’ anti-corruption agencies and 
encourage more Member States’ governments to allocate sufficient funds to 
their anti-corruption agencies. An adequate budget allocated to anti-
corruption agencies is also an important indicator of the government’s 
political will to fighting corruption. Research finds that many anti-
corruption agencies in the EU have complained of their limited resources 
and the uncertainties of their budget allocation for having sufficient 
financial support to run their operations. While all governments in the EU 
face budget constraints, Francesca Recanatini notes in her account that the 
allocation of limited resources for anti-corruption agencies might be an 
indication of the lack of a genuine commitment to Member States’ anti-
corruption agencies’ mission by their governments.677 Therefore, the next 
EU Anti-Corruption Report could support further anti-corruption agencies 
in obtaining adequate financial means in order to have sufficient resources 
in place that will assist to fight corruption more effectively.   
 
Furthermore, the next EU Anti-Corruption Report could support Member 
States by providing training opportunities for the anti-corruption agencies’ 
personnel, which are also vital for enhancing anti-corruption policy success 
with their level of expertise. A crucial factor for anti-corruption agencies’ 
effectiveness is their ability to have highly skilled personnel and technical 
capacity in place. Thus, the Commission in the next EU Anti-Corruption 
Report could support Member States to provide specialised training 
opportunities to personnel of anti-corruption agencies in order to implement 
key anti-corruption policy objectives that also have an EU dimension to 
them.   
 
The next EU Anti-Corruption Report might also support anti-corruption 
agencies in education and outreach projects. The EU Anti-Corruption 
Report could support Member States to reflect on their anti-corruption 
agencies’ education and outreach projects, and evaluate how effective the 
anti-corruption agencies have been in engaging citizens in anti-corruption 																																																								
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policy and anti-corruption campaigns.678 The EU Anti-Corruption Report 
has the potential to support anti-corruption agencies in the Member States 
to embark on corruption prevention projects, draw co-ordinated plans for 
outreach and education projects to prevent corrupt practices, as well as 
support collaboration between the anti-corruption agencies and other 
stakeholders in their outreach and education projects. Furthermore, the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report could also support anti-corruption agencies to 
promote their outreach project through the EU Commission website as well 
as on social media, which is a powerful channel currently for sharing 
information and especially reaching out to the youth demographic. Such an 
approach would stimulate engagement between anti-corruption agencies 
and the broader public on corruption prevention projects and initiatives. 
 
On a final note, the EU Anti-Corruption Report could in the next Report 
promote further cooperation of the anti-corruption agencies with other 
organisations. In the EU Anti-Corruption Report, it was noted that there is a 
lack of cooperation between anti-corruption institutions and other 
stakeholders to address corruption related cases. Meagher in his account 
finds that the success of anti-corruption agencies depends on cooperation 
with other organisations, because it drives anti-corruption agencies to 
achieve their targets and to commit to concrete forms of cooperation to 
address corruption more effectively.679 However, Meagher observes that 
such cooperation is difficult to achieve in reality, because anti-corruption 
agencies are frequently frustrated by their failure to secure information and 
effectively cooperate with the public prosecutions bodies. To some extent 
this was also observed in the EU Anti-Corruption Report, which indirectly 
mentioned that there is a lack of cooperation between the investigatory 
bodies and public prosecution offices when dealing with high-level 
corruption cases in some Member States.  
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Thus, the EU Anti-Corruption Report in the next Report could promote and 
enhance further for better cooperation between anti-corruptions agencies, 
which have investigatory powers with the general public prosecutor office. 
Furthermore, the next EU Anti-Corruption Report could also promote 
cooperation between anti-corruption agencies and civil society 
organisations that are concerned with anti-corruption activities in the 
Member States. 680  This will enhance further the involvement of civil 
society in the activities of the anti-corruption agencies and make them more 
transparent to the public.  
 
Lastly, the future EU Anti-Corruption Reports could ensure that the anti-
corruption agencies cooperate with other anti-corruption agencies in the 
region in sharing information and providing assistance in cross-border 
arrests of corruption suspects. Such a fresh approach of regional 
cooperation would also help to tackle issues that are related to cross border 
crime, which the EU Anti-Corruption Report aims at addressing in its long-
term objectives.    
 
Future EU Anti-Corruption Reports, by also including an evaluation of 
national anti-corruption agencies within the scope of the Report, would also 
strengthen a few key components of the theory of reflexive governance. 
Firstly, the EU Anti-Corruption Report, by recommending to the Member 
States to make their anti-corruption agencies come into line with 
international standards and ensure that these anti-corruption agencies have 
implemented the so-called Jakarta Statement on Principles for Anti-
Corruption Agencies, would strengthen further the theory of reflexive 
governance component: global interaction. Secondly, the EU Anti-
Corruption Report, by supporting the Member States’ anti-corruption 
agencies to cooperate with other anti-corruption agencies and other 
organisations, would also strengthen further the theory of reflexive 
governance component: active participation. Thirdly and most importantly, 																																																								
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the EU Anti-Corruption Report, by evaluating the effectiveness of anti-
corruption agencies in the Member States, would also strengthen further the 
theory of reflexive governance component: regulation of self-regulation. 
The Report, by highlighting some of the shortcomings of anti-corruption 
agencies in the Member States, would trigger a process for the Member 
States to engage in regulation of self-regulation. The Member States, 
through the EU Anti-Corruption Report, would acknowledge their anti-
corruption agencies’ shortcomings and, in improving their foundation as 
well as resources, would have to engage in a regulation of self-regulation 
process. Thus, the inclusion of evaluating the effectiveness of anti-
corruption agencies in the EU Anti-Corruption Report would strengthen the 
reflexive governance approach in several ways and support Member States 
to have more effective anti-corruption agencies in place.       
 
5.8 Supporting a full E-Procurement in the EU and the Member States 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report identified that corruption in public 
procurement was a serious threat to the EU and dedicated a thematic 
chapter to the topic. The Report has also indirectly indicated that, in order 
to reduce and prevent corruption in public procurement, establishing a fully 
e-procurement system would be beneficial. Neupane finds that e-
procurement can increase transparency and accountability of the 
procurement process by enhancing the connections between public officials 
and citizens, as well as tracking their actions, refining monitoring and 
control instruments to decrease the possibility of corrupt behaviour.681 E-
Procurement is seen as an innovative tool for the future to increase the level 
of transparency in public procurement systems and reducing corrupt 
practices, especially in tendering of public contracts. So far, e-procurement 
in the EU has been introduced at a rapid pace through technologies that are 
being employed in tendering for public works and interacting in e-
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marketplaces. 682  E-Procurement is also at a low cost and the use of 
technology has enhanced the efficiency in stirring up governments’ 
investments in e-procurement.  
 
However, many EU Member States have not supported the prospect of 
establishing full e-procurement in their states. The EU Commission, in the 
next EU Anti-Corruption Report, could consider to take the initiative to 
push further the agenda for establishing full e-procurement throughout the 
EU Member States. The EU Commission can play a role in supporting the 
process of establishing full e-procurement in the Member States and, in the 
next EU Anti-Corruption Report, can suggest best practices of the 
advantages of introducing an e-procurement system. In the public 
procurement directives, there is a general support for a wider 
implementation of e-procurement, because it is perceived to be an effective 
tool for reducing corruption and increasing integrity.683  
 
Globally, South Korea was one of the first countries to implement a full e-
procurement in 1997.684 The South Korean model is considered as one of 
the best practice examples in implementing a system that covers all steps of 
the procurement process. The Europe 2020 agenda under the ‘Digital 
Agenda for Europe’, in its strategy, is pushing for a full a full e-
procurement by 2020 across the European Union.685 This is an optimistic 
step forward in implement full e-procurement systems throughout the EU. 
However, in the next EU Anti-Corruption Report, the EU Commission 
could give examples of best practice to emphasise more clearly the 
importance of connecting e-procurement capacities across the EU and give 																																																								
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proper guidance for supporting full e-procurement systems in all of the 
Member States.  
 
The example of South Korea is a success story, as the government in 1997 
wanted to reform its non-transparent and corrupt public procurement 
system. Once the implementation of a full e-procurement system occurred, 
it was shown that such a previously corrupt system can see substantial 
improvements in efficiency and reduce corruption.686 It is estimated that the 
South Korean state saved around $2.5bn a year since implementing e-
procurement systems. Also, the implementation of a full e-procurement 
system in South Korea saw an improvement in public trust and, more 
importantly, the reduction of corrupt behaviour between officials and 
contractors for tenders.687 
 
Thus, the EU Commission could consider to include guidance to Member 
States in implementing a full e-procurement system and making e-
procurement in the EU an integral part of good governance practice. This 
would increase efficiency in public administration and reduce corruption, in 
particular for public tenders. 688  Furthermore, the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report can be a key tool to contribute in fulfilling the Europe 2020 agenda 
objective for a having in place full e-procurement by 2020 across the 
European Union.689 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report, by supporting Member States to 
implement a full e-procurement system, would also strengthen the theory of 
reflexive governance component: innovative problem – solving. The 
reflexive governance component suggests that the reflexive component, 
innovative problem – solving, enables Member States to engage in a 																																																								
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process of innovation and can use innovative tools to solve policy 
shortcomings. The EU Anti-Corruption Report has identified on numerous 
occasions that Member States have a serious problem in addressing 
corruption in public procurement and, by engaging in innovative 
experimentalism to use technology, such as an e-procurement system, it 
would contribute in lowering corruption, as well as making public 
procurement contracts more transparent. Thus, the EU Commission in the 
future EU Anti-Corruption Report, by supporting Member States to 
implement a full e-procurement system, would also have to use the 
component of the theory of reflexive governance - innovative problem – 
solving - in order to support Member States to find new solutions to address 
corruption in public procurement. 
  
5.9 Including Organised Crime to the EU Anti-Corruption policy 
objectives  
 
The EU Commission, in the next EU Anti-Corruption Report, could also 
extend its anti-corruption policy agenda in addressing the policy and legal 
gaps to fight against organised crime more effectively. The rationale behind 
this suggestion is that corruption and organised crime often go together. 
Furthermore, in order to support Member States to design a comprehensive 
anti-corruption policy, it should also include to some extent tackling 
organised crime. This is because organised crime groups feed corruption 
and often organised crime groups actively try to corrupt customs officials, 
immigration authorities, law enforcement, the judiciary and procurement 
processes to gain access to sensitive information, as well as to pass law 
enforcement boundaries. Three criminal phenomena – organised crime, 
corruption, and money laundering - are often very closely related; thus, in 
order to design effective anti-corruption policy, it is imperative to include 
them all at the same time. 
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Susan Rose-Ackerman finds that organised crime needs corruption as an 
enabler tool for some organised criminal activities.690 If not for corruption, 
some of the illicit activities by organised crime groups would not flourish. 
Europol has identified about 3,600 organised crime groups operating in the 
European Union, but the cost of organised crime at EU level is very 
difficult to measure. 691  This is also due to the difficulty in collecting 
independently data from organised crime offenders.  A study by the 
European Commission in 2013 suggested that crimes such as fraud range 
from 500 million euros to 5 billion euros in the European Union.692 
 
In the recommendations made by the EU Anti-Corruption Report in 
Chapter 2 to the EU Member States, it can be identified that many post-
communist countries had issues with organised crime, corruption, and 
money laundering. Research on post-communist countries has identified 
that the collapse of the communist system benefited both legitimate 
investors and organised crime groups. This was due to the entire wealth of 
the state in the post-communist countries being up for grabs at lower or no 
cost. Both legitimate businesses and criminal groups sought to share in the 
wealth in these countries. In some post-communist countries, organised 
crime groups managed to create an atmosphere of insecurity and the threat 
of violence that drove competitors away – especially recognised 
international firms.693 Thus, this left the criminal groups with an open field 
to get state entities and share the wealth of the state. Foreign investment 
from legitimate business was reduced in post-communist countries and 
these examples are also witnessed in Western Balkan countries currently.694 
Kukhianidze noted in his account that this behaviour is caused by the 																																																								
690 Rose-Ackerman, S and B.J. Palifka (2016), Corruption and Government: Causes, 
Consequences, and Reform. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 294 – 316.  
691 Europol (2013) Report on EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment, pp. 6. 
Retrieved from: https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/eu-serious-and-organised-crime-
threat-assessment-socta  
692 Hafner, M. and J. Taylor, E. Disley, S. Thebes, M. Barberi, M. Stepanek and Mike Levi 
(2016), The Cost of Non-Europe in the area of Organised Crime and Corruption: Annex II 
- Corruption. Santa Monica: CA: RAND Corporation, Retrieved from: 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1483.html. 
693 Rose-Ackerman, S and B.J. Palifka (2016), Corruption and Government: Causes, 
Consequences, and Reform. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 294 – 316. 
694 Zeneli, V (2015), ‘Corruption, Foreign Direct Investment, and International Marketing 
in the Western Balkans’. Thunderbird International Business Review, 58(3), pp. 277 – 291. 
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weakness of state institutions, which created an environment for the growth 
of organised crime groups and thus allowed them to use corruption to 
infiltrate governments and businesses.695  
 
The goal in this section here is not to try to resolve the problem of 
organised crime, nor should the EU Anti-Corruption Report attempt to 
solve it. Rather, it is to make a case that addressing organised crime should 
also be involved in designing anti-corruption policies in the EU and the 
Member States. Also, to argue that corruption is a symptom of deeper 
problems and when organised crime has a strong foothold, many of the 
anti-corruption reform proposals will only have a superficial effect. Thus, 
thinking also about organised crime and reflecting on policy shortcomings 
would be beneficial in designing future EU Anti-Corruption Reports, as 
well as supporting the EU Member States to establish a comprehensive 
anti-corruption policy.    
 
A study conducted by the European Parliamentary Research Service 
identifies that there are barriers in the fight against organised crime and the 
main obstacles are that there is a lack of ratification, transposition, 
implementation and enforcement in the EU.696 The research finds that there 
is a lack of horizontal and vertical integration in terms of the consistency 
with monitoring instruments regarding organised crime. The main examples 
are in relation to the rule of law more generally and criminal law, as well as 
between international, EU, national, regional and local governance levels. 
A possible explanation of the lack of implementation of adequate standards 
may be a reflection of many factors - mainly cornering institutional 
capacity and the political will of pushing higher the agenda on tackling 
organised crime. In some Member States, the recommendations of the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report suggested that anti-corruption agencies, police and 
judicial authorities face difficulties and challenges in their effectiveness due 																																																								
695 Kukhianidze, A (2009), ‘Corruption and organized crime in Georgia before and after 
the ‘Rose Revolution’, Central Asian Survey, 28(2), pp. 215 – 234. 
696 Hafner, M. and J. Taylor, E. Disley, S. Thebes, M. Barberi, M. Stepanek and Mike Levi 
(2016), The Cost of Non-Europe in the area of Organised Crime and Corruption: Annex II 
- Corruption. Santa Monica: CA: RAND Corporation, Retrieved from: 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1483.html. 
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to insufficient resources and, in some cases, due to politicisation. It must be 
noted that, in this area, it remains a shared competence between the EU and 
its Member States, but the Member States remain in charge of law 
enforcement and judicial procedures to fight organised crime.  
 
Thus, the EU Anti-Corruption Report in the future Reports could take into 
account the gaps of Member States in the policymaking process and 
shortcomings when addressing corruption to also involve the issue 
concerning organised crime. Future EU Anti-Corruption Reports could also 
address the lack of conceptual clarity concerning the relationship between 
corruption and organised crime. Furthermore, the next EU Anti-Corruption 
Report could support the actions of the Member States in the field of crime 
prevention and help to strengthen police and judicial cooperation between 
Member State law enforcement agencies. This cooperation and support will 
help national authorities to fulfil their full potential and achieve better 
results in fighting corruption and organised crime. Thus, it can be argued 
that this support by the EU Anti-Corruption Report in also addressing the 
issue involving organised crime would help Member States to develop a 
comprehensive anti-corruption policy field.  
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report, by emphasising the importance to the 
Member States to also include addressing organised crime, would also 
strengthen the theory of reflexive governance component: proceduralism. 
The reflexive governance approach proceduralism allows for multi-level 
actors and areas to be part of a process in policymaking. The research above 
suggests that organised crime is highly related to corruption and the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report would have a positive impact in supporting 
Member States to develop a comprehensive anti-corruption policy by also 
including organised crime. The reflexive governance component, 
proceduralism, would enable Member States to ensure that, when a future 
anti-corruption action plan is designed, organised crime is also included. 
Thus, future EU Anti-Corruption Reports would contribute better in 
supporting Member States to develop a more efficient anti-corruption 
policy by also including addressing organised crime.  
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5.10 Inclusion of EU Candidate Countries in the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report 
 
The Commutation of the EU Commission in 2011 on setting up the EU 
Anti-Corruption Report indicated under the heading ‘Stronger focus on 
corruption in EU external policies’697 that the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
once it was published would also include the Candidate countries, potential 
candidates and neighbourhood countries within the scope of the Report. 
However, when the EU Anti-Corruption Report was issued in 2014, the 
Report did not cover an evaluation of the anti-corruption policy and efforts 
of Candidate countries, potential candidates and neighbourhood countries 
as it did for the Member States. 
 
Future EU Anti-Corruption Reports could include at least the Candidate 
Countries from the Western Balkans within the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
and thus the Commission could go back to its promise in 2011 to also 
include the Candidate Countries, potential candidates and neighbourhood 
countries in the Report. The inclusion of these countries within the scope of 
the EU Anti-Corruption Report would also contribute to the EU 
Commission objective in making the Report a comprehensive and far-
reaching monitoring instrument. 
 
There is a strong case why the EU Commission could consider including at 
least the six Western Balkan countries; Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro and 
Serbia in future EU Anti-Corruption Reports. The common objective of 
joining the EU unites these six Western Balkans countries and there are 
ways in which would be mutually beneficial for the EU Commission and 
these six countries to be part of the EU Anti-Corruption Report in particular 
to develop an anti-corruption policy field in these countries.698 																																																								
697 European Commission (2011), Communication Fighting Corruption in the EU. COM 
(2011) 308 final. 
698 Kurtoglu, M.G and A. Komsuoglu (2015), ‘A critical assessment of the transformative 
power of EU reforms on reducing corruption in the Balkans’, Southeast European and 
Black Sea Studies, 15 (3), pp. 301-326. 
	 260	
 
All six countries are parties to the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption and have ratified the Council of Europe Civil Law, and Criminal 
Law Conventions on Corruption with the support of the EU. 699 
Furthermore, the EU has supported successive national governments of the 
Western Balkan to develop anti-corruption strategies and action plans, as 
well legislation to strengthen the prevention of corruption. For example, the 
EU supported the Law on Protection of Whistleblowers in Albania700 that 
came into force in 2016 and in Serbia 2015. 701  Montenegro is another 
example where the EU has further supported strengthening its anti-
corruption legal framework and a new anti-corruption agency that will be 
set up sometimes in 2016.702 Another example in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
where the EU has supported efforts to adopted the law on the agency for 
prevention of corruption.703 
 
All these efforts and initiatives by the EU Commission have been supported 
under the Commission’s Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), 
which saw €11.5 billion spent in the six Western Balkans countries and 
Turkey between the year 2007 to 2013.704 The IPA funded project ranging 
from solar energy start-ups to promoting more diversity and women in 
national politics. However, around €485 million was spent on the rule of 
law projects. According to a Report issued on 13th of September 2016 from 
the European Court of Auditors on the EU Commission’s anti-corruption 																																																								
699 UNODC Report (2011), Corruption in the Western Balkans: Bribery as experienced by 
the population. For more available at; http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/statistics/corruption/Western_balkans_corruption_report_2011_web.pdf  
700 The Law on Whistleblowing and the Protection of Whistleblowers passed by 75 votes 
in favor, with 1 abstention in the Albanian Parliament. The Act of Parliament on Protection 
of Whistleblowers, available on; https://www.parlament.al/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/ligj-nr.-60-dt.-2.6.2016.pdf 
701 The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia adopted the Law on Protection of 
Whistleblowers on 4 December 2014, and came into force on 5th of June 2015. For more 
available at; http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/whistleblowers-get-better-protection-
in-serbia 
702 European Parliament (2016), Resolution on the 2015 report on Montenegro 
(2015/2894(RSP))  
703 European Commission (2011), Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA II) 2014 – 
2020: Supporting rule of law enforcement agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
704 European Commission (2013), Annual Report on Financial Assistance for Enlargement 
(IPA, PHARE, CARDS, Turkey Pre-accession Instrument, Transition Facility).  
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efforts in the Western Balkans found that around 2% of the total IPA 
budget was spent on the fight against corruption and organised crime.705 
Yet, corruption and organised crime are widespread in six Western Balkans 
countries. No country of the six Western Balkans countries scored less than 
60 on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2015.706 
This assessment by Transparency International indicates that there serious 
concern with corruption in the Western Balkans countries. 
 
The geography positions of the six Western Balkans countries have made 
this region a gateway between Europe, the Middle East, and Asia for 
organised crime. The fragile regional governance ranging from low level of 
law enforcement to the judiciary makes it relatively easy for organised 
criminal networks to engage in narcotic trade and human trafficking, and 
weapons smuggling into the EU. 707  The shortest route usually from 
Afghanistan, which produces around 90% of the heroin that comes into the 
European market, passes through the Western Balkans countries through 
Turkey, which is known as the Balkans route.708 As a result, the countries 
of the Western Balkans have established themselves as a haven for low-risk 
and high-profit criminal enterprise. The profit margins, especially for 
trafficking narcotics, is estimated by the UNODC to be around €2 billion 
per year in which law enforcement officials have become endemic to 
corruption by criminal network forces.709 The EU Commission’s annual 
Enlargement Reports for six Western Balkans countries generally concludes 
that there is limited progress in fighting organised crime and anti-corruption 																																																								
705 European Court of Auditors (2016), Special Report; EU pre-accession assistance for 
strengthening administrative capacity in the Western Balkans: A meta-audit, No 21. For 
more available at; http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/News/NEWS1609_13/SR_WESTERN-
BALKANS_EN.pdf  
706 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2015. Available at; 
https://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#results-table  
707 European Parliament (2016), Briefing on the Western Balkans Frontline of the migrant 
crisis. Available at; 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/573949/EPRS_BRI(2016)5739
49_EN.pdf  
708 Lorenzo, C.A (2015), State-Building in Kosovo: Democracy, Corruption and the EU in 
the Balkans. London & New York: I.B Tauris & Co Ltd. pp. 100 – 101.  
709 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2015), Report on Drug Money: the illicit 
proceeds of opiates trafficked on the Balkan route. Available at; 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/Studies/IFF_report_2015_final_web.pdf  
	 262	
policy in the region. One could argue that is a diplomatic tone to express 
that the Western Balkans countries are not making sufficient progress in 
fighting corruption and organised crime. 
 
Faced with challenges of this magnitude and little resources spend on 
strengthening anti-corruption and law enforcement agencies in the Western 
Balkans, questions could be raised whether the EU Commission through its 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) pack is getting sufficient 
results. In the view of the Report from the European Court of Auditors on 
the European Commission’s anti-corruption efforts in the Western Balkans 
finds that ‘free media and a strong civil society are key drivers for raising 
public awareness of corruption and organised crime as they often encourage 
anti-corruption agencies and the public prosecution to act. In return, 
contributes directly to a track record of effective investigation, prosecution 
and final convictions in judicial cases of high-level corruption and 
organised crime.’710 Furthermore, the Report from the European Court of 
Auditors on the European Commission’s anti-corruption efforts in the 
Western finds that ‘the Commission allocated relatively little funding to 
media freedom and civil society in the Western Balkans, which amounts 
around 0.5 % in total of the IPA budget allocations’.711 For example, in the 
case of Albania, the IPA did not allocate any budget for media freedom and 
civil society in the context of the fight against corruption. Also, the EU 
Commission allocated around 2 % of the IPA funding to the fight against 
corruption and organised crime, and only as little as 1 % for supporting the 
public prosecution services in their efforts of addressing cases related to 
corruption and organised crime.712 
 
On the basis of the findings of the Report by the European Court of 
Auditors on the European Commission’s anti-corruption efforts in the 
Western Balkans, the EU Commission could consider changing its 																																																								
710 European Court of Auditors (2016), Special Report; EU pre-accession assistance for 
strengthening administrative capacity in the Western Balkans: A meta-audit, No 21. 
711 European Court of Auditors (2016), Special Report; EU pre-accession assistance for 
strengthening administrative capacity in the Western Balkans: A meta-audit, No 21. 
712 European Court of Auditors (2016), Special Report; EU pre-accession assistance for 
strengthening administrative capacity in the Western Balkans: A meta-audit, No 21. 
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approach in addressing an anti-corruption shortcoming in the Western 
Balkans by including them within the scope of the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report. This approach would increase the profile and awareness of issue of 
anti-corruption shortcomings and support them to enhance their anti-
corruption policy efforts. The EU Commission could consider including the 
six Western Balkans countries after the Berlin Process for the Western 
Balkan is concluded. 
 
The Berlin Process started with the 2014 Conference of Western Balkan 
States in Berlin713 and is designed to keep the dynamics in EU integration 
process in the light of increased Euroscepticism after the EU Parliamentary 
election in 2014. The Berlin Process is a flagship of German diplomatic 
initiatives of the Merkel Government, which will run from 2014 to 2018 to 
keep the Western Balkan's EU perspective hopes within the European 
Union. This initiative by the Merkel Government has transient a positive 
momentum for regional cooperation in which is anticipated to have an 
economic and social impact that will keep the aspiration of the EU 
membership in place in the Western Balkan region until negations for 
accession start to take place.714 
 
The Berlin Process as an intergovernmental cooperation initiative also aims 
at ensuring that there is an inclusion of civil society participation in the 
whole process of policymaking for the propose of EU integration.715 Thus, 
it also supports civil society participation in anti-corruption policymaking 
and one can anticipate that by 2018 it would have a positive impact in 
improving the institutional framework for addressing issues related to 
corruption more effectively. Therefore, it might be feasible for the EU 
Commission to consider including the six Western Balkans countries in the 
EU Anti-Corruption Report after the Berlin Process is concluded in 2018. 																																																								
713 European Commission (2014), Daily News, 26 / 08 / 14.  
714 Balfour, R and C. Stratulat (2015) ‘EU member states and enlargement towards the 
Balkans’, European Policy Centre, EPC Issue Paper NO. 7 9, ISSN 1782-494X.  
715 European Parliament Think Tank (2016), Briefing on The Western Balkans' Berlin 
process: A new impulse for regional cooperation. Available at; 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/586602/EPRS_BRI(2016)5866
02_EN.pdf  
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In line with reflexive governance approach, the inclusion of the EU 
Candidate States within the scope of the EU Anti-Corruption Report would 
further strengthen the mutual learning and regulation of self-regulation 
component of the Report.   
 
5.11 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has attempted to evaluate achievements of the EU Anti-
Corruption Report in the two years since its launch in 2014. A central 
question was to which extent the reflexive governance approach adopted by 
the EU Anti-Corruption Report had an impact on Member States as well as 
accession candidates in developing anti-corruption as a policy field. The 
research could show that the EU Anti-Corruption Report has made a 
positive contribution in raising the profile of the need to address corruption 
in the three countries under investigation. Furthermore, the EU Anti-
Corruption Report has successfully made Member States and candidate 
countries aware of policy shortcomings in addressing areas and levels of 
corruption at national level. There is also evidence that the attempt of the  
EU Anti-Corruption Report to increase the involvement of civil society and 
business leaders in fighting corruption has been successful in some Member 
States, for example contructive interactions between Transparency 
International and the UK government that the reflexive governance 
approach of the EU Anti-Corruption Report was successful in establishing 
conditions for mutual learning of Member States from each others best 
policy practice and models in fighting corruption.  
 
The research could also show that the EU Anti-Corruption Report could be 
improved by making further use of the reflexive governance approach and 
by including additional areas in the next Anti-Corruption Report. The 
following shortcomings and recommendations can be highlighted for 
consideration in future EU Anti-Corruption Reports. 
 
First, the omission of evaluation of EU institutions in the first EU Anti-
Corruption Report should be reversed and the original plan in the official 
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Report of 2011 of assessing corruption at the supranational level should be 
reconsidered. Including the EU institutions within the scope of the EU Anti-
Corruption Report would give more credibility to the Report. Furthermore, 
by also including the EU institutions within the EU Anti-Corruption Report, 
it would strengthen the reflexive governance approach component in terms 
of regulation of self-regulation.  
 
Second, there might be an advantage in involving Member States as well as 
civil society and private sector representatives at earlier stages in preparing 
the Report, rather than just consulting different stakeholders half a year 
prior to publication. Involving a wider range of actors at an earlier stage 
might lead to a more coherent and better-focused Report. It would be in line 
with the reflexive governance approach of a wider participation and 
interaction with relevant actors in anti-corruption policymaking.      
 
Third, in order to foster the dialogue between the various actors involved in 
developing national and supranational anticorruption policies, an interim 
Anti-Corruption Report could be issued after the first year of the launch of 
the official biannual Anti-Corruption Report. The experiment with interim 
reports could build on the experience of the CVM that operates with interim 
reports every half year with the aim to keep the anti-corruption policy 
discussion high on the agenda. This approach would also strengthen key 
features of the reflexive governance approach, including collective and 
mutual learning.  
 
Fourth, future EU Anti-Corruption Report might choose as thematic topic 
the protection of whistleblowers that are instrumental in reporting 
corruption wrongdoings. Similar to the thematic chapter on public 
procurement in the first EU Anti-Corruption Report such focus would 
evaluate all Member States efforts and legal instruments in protecting 
whistleblowers. In any case future Reports should make recommendations 
for improving the legal protection for whistleblowers on a regular basis. 
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Fifth, future EU Anti-Corruption Reports could improve their support for 
the introduction and running of specialised anti-corruption institutions. The 
Report could assist, in line with its reflexive governance approach, national 
anticorruption bodies by commenting on their autonomy, the guarantee of 
independent investigating powers and their interaction with civil society 
organisations fighting corruption. For the evaluation of specialised anti-
corruption institutions, future EU Anti-Corruption Report could establish a 
set of benchmarks derived from international standards. This would be in 
line with the adopted reflexive governance approach that favours 
supporting global interaction and active participation of non-governmental 
actors.  
 
Sixth, the second EU Anti-Corruption Report could improve by enlarging 
the concern with procurement. In particular this would include assisting 
Member States in introducing an e-procurement system. Establishing such 
an e-procurement system would increase transparency and accountability of 
the procurement process. Furthermore, an e-procurement system is an 
innovative tool that can help Member States in reducing corruption 
practices, especially in tendering of public contracts. It would be in line 
with reflexive governance that favours innovative problem solving. 
 
Seven, the second EU Anti-Corruption Report could improve by 
highlighting the close links between corruption and organised crime. 
Including the fight against organised crime as an objective of anticorruption 
policy would make anti-corruption policies more comprehensive. In line 
with reflexive governance it would support Member States in their self-
reglatory efforts by opening up avenues of combining resources that make 
both fighting corruption and organised crime more effective.  
 
Eight, future EU Anti-Corruption Reports could improve by including 
neighbouring and in particular EU candidate countries within the scope of 
the Report. Including neighbouring and candidate countries are in the 
interest of the EU in fighting effectively organised crime and corruption. In 
line with reflexive governance it would support candidate countries in 
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mutual learning and their self-regulatory process in constructing adequate 
anti-corruption policies that are in line with the EU anti-corruption 
standards.  
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